In case you're wondering why China's expanding its navy at such scale, here's the answer—straight of the recent translation of their 2020 Science of Military Strategy. Hint: it's not about taking Taiwan, facing down regional neighbors, etc.
Global interests, global naval power.
Would you like to know more?
"...a China that can maintain the security of its own SLOCs is a China that can deny those SLOCs to others. This prospect...is what truly drives the unprecedented scale of Chinese maritime expansion." lowyinstitute.org/publications/a…
While the translations are rough, this looks like their taking note of Air-Sea Battle, Distributed Lethality, etc.
And they clearly aren't cool with continued U.S. naval primacy, or even the idea of the "so-called" global commons outside of territorial seas.
I see that the PLA has recognized, as we have, that carrier-based UAVs will have strong attack capabilities.
Hang on a sec: I'm being told that we have not, in fact, recognized that.
If you were wondering whether Djibouti would remain the PLA's only overseas military facility...surprise, surprise, it won't:
BTW, in case you were worried about China's intermixing of conventional and nuclear-capable missiles, don't expect that to change anytime soon—they appear to very much consider that to be a feature, not a bug:
As for conventional PLARF ICBMs - perhaps not such a wild idea after all...
Interesting that they seem convinced that the U.S. is deploying conventional ICBMs, when that is actually not a part of any program of record, much less a transformation that is underway.
One more thing: in the section about future naval construction, what's interests me is what's NOT talked about. The center of force structure development is presented forthrightly: aircraft carrier formations and nuclear submarines, plus ISR, AEW, long-range strike, info ops.
Another focus area: development of longer-range forces, including large transport ships and large integrated landing ships, for a "long-sea" strategic projection force.
So...what about short-range landing ships for, you know, "national reunification"? (i.e., Taiwan) No mention.
DoD's assessment has been and continues to be that the PLA lacks the sealift for an all-out amphibious invasion, and doesn't appear to be doing much about it. This document doesn't seem to show any plans to change that, with the PLA moving on to power projection further afield.
So what's the deal? Does the PRC not really intend to be able to invade Taiwan by sea? Will it build lots of helicopters instead and focus more on aerial assault? Is it waiting to build up the PLAN's amphibious fleet later? If so, seems like we'd see that coming from a long way.
Maybe they're planning to build a missile force so threatening that they get the Taiwanese to "come out with their hands up", or to wreck Taiwanese, US & allied forces so thoroughly in the opening salvo that they can effectively invade unopposed. cnas.org/publications/r…
Or perhaps their amphibious assault fleet has been hiding in plain sight & just isn't painted gray? Or maybe some combination thereof?
Any way you cut it, this apparent ongoing capability gap draws my eye, and makes me wonder what they have in mind. warontherocks.com/2021/08/mind-t…
I forgot to mention - if you want to read the (translated) words for yourself, check it out here at CASI’s web site: airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/A…
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Some stream-of-consciousness: the more I think about China's growing precision strike capabilities (e.g., 300 IRBMs and 600(!) MRBMs, ALBMs, etc.) and read the PLA's strategic documents, the more unsuitable I think the A2/AD concept (which is ours, not theirs) really is.
Our thinkers project a bubble thrown up by China (who then sits inside it) which we (as the active participants) then try to get through to save Taiwan or the SCS, etc. So we work to figure out how we're going to penetrate it and operate inside it.
But that's not what their thinkers have in mind - rather, imagine wrecked bases and airfields, paralyzed C2, destroyed HQs, ships sunk at the pier, ports mined shut, etc. And a PLA with the freedom of action to then carry out its plans with little opposition or interference.
A few thoughts about Michael Anton's recent @FDRLST article, in which he essentially recommends standing aside in the case that China decides to act militarily against Taiwan.
I won't address the geopolitical - or domestic political - angles to what he has to say. Reasonable people can and do disagree on these topics, and there are plenty of folks out there with opinions on all sides of the arguments about restraint, wokeism, etc.
What I DO want to address are some of the specific military- and naval-related facts he presents to underpin his arguments, as a number of them are misleading, show a lack of familiarity with key military questions that underpin his larger argument, or are factually incorrect.
Ok, here we go: a few thoughts on the 2021 China Military Power report, which was released today (finally!).
I'll focus on updates that I thought were interesting/consequential - areas that were new or differed from last year's report. defense.gov/News/Releases/…
First, a topic that many folks know is near/dear to my heart: the PLA Navy's growing force structure. In the key takeaways: an overall force of 355 ships/subs (+5 from 2020) & 145 major surface combatants (+15!). The estimated in-service date for the Type 003 is now 2024 (+1 yr).
There's an added takeaway statement, discussed elsewhere later in more detail, that the PRC is enhancing its ASW forces to protect its aircraft carriers and SSBNs.
Bottom line: the PLAN has not traditionally been very good at ASW, but they've recognized this & are working on it.
I have been waiting for months for this incredibly impressive demonstration of OSINT to come out - ever since I saw it presented at a @ChinaMaritime conference earlier this year.
The author (Mike Dahm) used AIS, commercial imagery, and other sources to weave an incredibly detailed picture of key amphibious assault exercises in 2020 and 2021 where the PLA experimented with the use of numerous civilian ships to supplement its organic sealift capacity.
Key takeaways IMO: the PLA and its reserve civilian fleet probably can't yet support a large-scale invasion of Taiwan, and the ships used so far to practice are a select cadre. But this capacity could expand rapidly after capabilities are formalized & expanded to other ships.
There's been plenty of discussion in the news recently about the dozens of merchant ships stuck waiting off of Long Beach/LA waiting to unload due to delays caused by various factors such as COVID, port capacity, container ship demand and size, etc. businessinsider.com/shipping-delay…
To gain some perspective on just how much shipping this is, I thought it might be useful to figure out how much tonnage we're talking about, as ships come in various shapes and sizes and the raw number of hulls may not mean much to folks.
So I went onto marinetraffic.com and did a quick snapshot survey, looking at all the ships near Long Beach that looked like they were either at anchor or adrift, and took note of their dimensions and tonnages. I counted 71 at that time (this AM). marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/ce…
And apparently Naval Base Guam isn't one naval base, it's 12!
And the Naval Hospital is a "base", too!
Even by the source document's absurd standards, the number of "bases" is 439, with 300+ yet smaller facilities called "lily pads", or even "unconfirmed".