@danieljleahy & @ww2tv had a crackerjack stream on Australian Stuart tanks at Sanananda New Guinea this morning. Someone in the chat asked how they go there.
This thread will address that question. 1/
So, lets talk about the Australian Operation Lilliput that ran freighter convoys from Milne Bay to Oro bay in 1942.
John Sheridan Fahnestock and Adam Bruce Fahnestock, friends with Pres. Roosevelt, originated the idea of a unit of small sailing ships to deliver supplies to Bataan, called “Mission X.”
These small boats were the key distribution mode for the SWPA. They moved supplies at night from advanced bases outside the bombing range of the Japanese Army and Naval Air Forces. Like the PT-Boat, their biggest enemy in 1942-43 was the small Japanese float planes... 3/
...that flew day & night plus were both low and slow enough to spot them. Then either these sea planes attacked, or worse, orbited and reported by radio to awaiting Japanese fighter patrols. 4/
The RAAN vessel HMAS Paluma (a 45 ton former examination vessel, see photo) did the actual surveys with the USASS luggers & fishing smacks the to find a reliable approach for larger vessels from Milne Bay to supply troops landed by air near Cape Nelson. 5/ ozatwar.com/sigint/paluma.…
The 1st Lilliput convoy "Operation Karsi" was in Dec 1941, it took "...the former train ferry Karsik was pressed into service as an emergency tank landing ship, carrying four M-3 Stuart tanks of the Australian 2/6th Armoured Regiment to Oro Bay." 6/ awm.gov.au/visit/exhibiti…
The Japanese took great exception to these convoys.
And given the geography of the Owen Stanley mountain range. The IJN had air superiority a few hours every day.
Photo left is of survivors of the s’Jacob, sunk on 8 March 1943, await rescue by HMAS Bendigo near Oro Bay 7/
The Allies in their turn took greater exception to these IJN attacks and deployed airfields radar & fighter control sensor network to gain air superiority & shield these sealanes.
This effort began before the Stuarts were delivered & went on after Sanananda was won.
NLAW's inertial guidance is accurate versus moving targets to 400 meters and stationary at twice that. It uses a 15 cm Bill style slant down tandem HEAT warhead and will beat the front slope of any Russian tank.
You can't jam it. 2/
Only active defenses can stop and NLAW. And a tank hunter team can simultaneously fire several at the same tank to saturate an active defense.
Given the enormous interest in the "Electronic Warfare during the Battle of the Bulge" thread.
I'm posting a new thread whose subject is the historiography of EW in WW2 with foundational books, a road map of available primary sources, & recent research
"Instruments of Darkness..." provides the some of the history of the "Battle of the Beams" but focuses on RAF Bomber Command's war with German integrated air defense system (IADS) 3/
The subject of this thread will be the electronic warfare history of the Battle of the Bulge.
This history is almost unknown in military history circles, let alone the public, because there have been exactly two articles on it in 75(+) years. 1/
STRATEGIC JAMMING IN PERSPECTIVE.
Long range jamming platforms have been the focus of air campaigns against integrated air defense system (IADS) since WW2. There have never been enough of them and their allocation is a strategic level concern in every war fought since 1945. 2/
The 8th Air Force's 36th Squadron was its heavy jamming unit. It supported 8th AF bomber streams forming up to attack German with VHF band barrage jamming to prevent the Luftwaffe hearing formation chatter & it had a jamming major role during the D-Day invasion of Normandy. 3/
Konstam's book is wonderful for most of the journalistic "Who, What, Where, When, How, & Why" on Dec 10, 1941, but it leaves out how the command control, communications & intelligence worked for the IJNAS Rikko Kokutai and why it came into existence in time to destroy Force Z. 3/