The subject of this thread will be the electronic warfare history of the Battle of the Bulge.

This history is almost unknown in military history circles, let alone the public, because there have been exactly two articles on it in 75(+) years.
1/
STRATEGIC JAMMING IN PERSPECTIVE.
Long range jamming platforms have been the focus of air campaigns against integrated air defense system (IADS) since WW2. There have never been enough of them and their allocation is a strategic level concern in every war fought since 1945.
2/
The 8th Air Force's 36th Squadron was its heavy jamming unit. It supported 8th AF bomber streams forming up to attack German with VHF band barrage jamming to prevent the Luftwaffe hearing formation chatter & it had a jamming major role during the D-Day invasion of Normandy.
3/
Where the 36th HBS gets involved in the Ardennes involves ART-6 through ART-11 "Jackal" series communications jammers. The photo below shows one of a series of six jammers targeted against German tank radio traffic.
4/
aafradio.org/countermeasure…
The "American Jackal" jammer was a piece of kit that duplicated a British tank radio jammer used in the Western Desert to cover 8th Army in Wellington twin engine bombers.

The Luftwaffe sent Me-109's after them and it didn't turn out well.
5/
spitfirespares.co.uk/radio%202l.html
Despite the highly classified nature of the 36th Jamming Sqd’s capabilities, their were liaison teams of the British Branch of the American MIT Radiation Laboratory (BBRL) all over North West Europe from two months before D-Day to the Ardennes offensive.
6/
Starting in April 1944 BBRL was briefing every senior US Army staff officer it could catch. The flag rank briefer was named John Trump, the uncle of Pres. Donald J. Trump. So Ninth and Third Army senior staff would have been well aware of the capabilities of
7/
...the British build Jostle and American built Jackal tank radio jammers in the 36th Squadron’s B-24’s.

The problem with this 36th HBS Jackal tank radio jamming capability was the 8th AF bomber generals hated it.

They didn't want to share B-24's penny packet with the Army.
8/
Spaatz, Doolittle etc wanted to pass this mission to Ninth AF medium bombers.

This wasn't practical for the simple reason training up & equipping a medium bomber sqd to the 36th's capability would take too long.
9/
Now that we have the context established, lets get to the meat of the 36thJamming Squadron's involvement with the Ardennes offensive.

Short form: Everyone in Allied high command knew where the German Ardennes offensive attack force was.

With one exception, everyone
10/
...thought it was a _DEFENSIVE_ counter-attack force waiting for an allied attack.

The sole exception being 1st Army's G-2 intelligence officer Colonel Benjamin "Monk" Dickson.

 As  Jörg Muth author of "Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the
11/
...German Armed Forces, 1901–1940" recently put it on the H-War e-mail list:

12/
The full story of Colonel Benjamin "Monk" Dickson's Intel report 37 has to await another Ardennes thread, but it gives context to US Ninth Army's G-2 not only identifying 6th Panzer Army's assembly area, but also convincing  Lt. Gen. William Hood Simpson to request the 36th
13/
Heavy Bombardment Squadron (RCM) to fly sorties to jam their radios days before the attack.

 A request which was "officially" denied by 8th Air Force because of the German IADS heavy Flak gun threat B-24 to jamming planes. 
14/
This is how Maj. Richard Riccardelli's 1985 article "Electronic Warfare in WWII" described the process by which Ninth Army asked for and was denied jamming support.
15/
The word that jumps out is -staffing-. The Ninth Army request for jamming had to be well staffed to make it through the approval process to get to 8th AF & get rejected there on the grounds of vulnerability to German Flak gun concentrations in the proposed jamming orbit of
16/
...Sixth Panzer Army radio emitters.

This staff work for requesting the 36th Jamming Sqd's support was akin to a request asking for the Operation Cobra type carpet bombing and had to include as a minimum the following:
17/
So, to be clear, LTG Simpson & staff, General Bradley & Staff, General Eisenhower's SHAEF staff, and 8th AF all knew where the Sixth Panzer Army was and its capabilities.

LTG Simpson wanted to do something about it and was denied.
18/
After the German's attacked, things changed.

General Patton's 3rd Army asked for the 36th HBS (RCM) to provide support. The 36th flew jamming missions on the 28th & 31st of Dec 1944 near Bastogne.

Three more jamming missions were flown 2 - 7 Jan 1945 supporting Patton.
19/
The biggest reason the EW history of the German Ardennes Offensive is unknown has less to do with the esoteric nature of EW than the light it places on the Allied command decisions before the attack.

The surprise of the attack wasn't intel failure. It was command failure.
/End
Article P.S.

Maj. Richard Riccardelli, "Electronic Warfare in WWII", Army Communicator, Winter 1985, pages 40 - 49
ibiblio.org/cizewski/signa…
Article P.P.S.

William Cahill, "The Unseen Fight: USAAF radio counter-measure operations in Europe, 1943 to 1945," Journal of Aeronautical History June 2020
aerosociety.com/media/15088/20…

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More from @TrentTelenko

11 Dec
@ArmouredCarrier @smooreBofB1940 @AC_NavalHistory @Drachinifel @MilAvHistory @MilHiVisualized @CBI_PTO_History @DrydockDreams @TheBaseLeg IJNAS single engine planes in service in 1941 were equipped with the Type 1 Ku 3 RDF system. This included the Mitsubishi F1M Type Zero Observation Seaplane, Allied reporting name Pete.

So IJN cruiser spotters could & did use the Yamamoto C3I System within range of the beacons.
@ArmouredCarrier @smooreBofB1940 @AC_NavalHistory @Drachinifel @MilAvHistory @MilHiVisualized @CBI_PTO_History @DrydockDreams @TheBaseLeg MacArthur's Central Bureau tracked single engine IJN float planes as a operational pattern warning of a major troop convoy before enciphered message traffic arrived.

I hadn't figured out how they were doing that until the role of M/F radio beacons came along.
@ArmouredCarrier @smooreBofB1940 @AC_NavalHistory @Drachinifel @MilAvHistory @MilHiVisualized @CBI_PTO_History @DrydockDreams @TheBaseLeg Those IJN float planes worked at night hunting for PT-boats as well as submarines by day.

They needed the beacons up to accomplish their missions.

When Central Bureau hear the beacons. They knew a troop convoy was in-bound.
Read 5 tweets
10 Dec
The subject of this thread is the IJNAS C3I system behind the destruction of Force Z.

(I'll be using clips from Angus Konstam's book to illustrate this thread)
ospreypublishing.com/store/military…
1/
The anniversary of the sinking of Force Z is on the minds of many #twitterhistorians

For example, @ArmouredCarrier has three really nice videos on YouTube about the sinking of HMS Repulse
2/
youtube.com/results?search…
Konstam's book is wonderful for most of the journalistic "Who, What, Where, When, How, & Why" on Dec 10, 1941, but it leaves out how the command control, communications & intelligence worked for the IJNAS Rikko Kokutai and why it came into existence in time to destroy Force Z.
3/
Read 26 tweets
9 Dec
@Vausterlitz1 It was not a "dumb" question.

It is just one that has not been well answered.

On 11 January 1942, the IJA completed a study on whether Hawaii could be successfully invaded and, if it could, what would be needed to retain the islands.
@Vausterlitz1 They concluded:

Yes, we can capture it, but supplying would be very hard due to shipping tonnage shortages.

Namely, food to feed 500,000 Americans plus the Japanese Garrison would have to be carried across 4,000 miles of ocean;
@Vausterlitz1 because these were the breakdowns by food grown on Hawaii for consumption:

fruit (84%)
rice (10%)
dairy products (28%)
fish (30%)
eggs (40%)
meat (41%)
vegetables (46%)

The IJA officer noted that 2.9 million tons of supplies had been sent by the US to Hawaii during 1941; or
Read 7 tweets
8 Dec
"MacArthur's Pearl Harbor" AKA the Dec 8, 1941 destruction of FEAF air power at Clarke Field is the subject of this thread.

(Photo: Destroyed P-35 fighters on Clark Field)
1/
One of the important things to know about General Douglas MacArthur was that almost nothing said or written about him can be trusted without extensive research to validate its truthfulness.

There were a lot of reasons for this. The biggest being that if the Clinton era
2/
political concept of “The Politics of Personal Destruction” had been around in the 1930s through 1950s, Gen. MacArthur’s face would have been its poster boy.

Everything he did was personal & that made everything everyone else did in opposition to him “personal” to them. Thus

3/
Read 23 tweets
7 Dec
The subject of this thread is "The Forgotten and Buried Intelligence Lessons of Pearl Harbor, December 7th, 1941."

It is both a 2019 column of mine on the Chicagoboyz blog & an enduring lesson for today.

chicagoboyz.net/archives/61235…
1/
The successful surprise Kido Butai carrier fleet movement to Pearl Harbor was the result of a sophisticated the denial and deception measures to blind allied signals intelligence as to their movements.
2/
A deceptive movement that worked thanks to the hard work & diligence of both Adm Isoroku Yamamoto's staff planners as well as pre-war Japanese intelligence.

The IJN played the US Pacific Fleet's operational tendencies like a harp.

3/
Read 42 tweets
9 Nov
The issues that @fortisanalysis founder, @man_integrated spoke about recently piece on why the USA may never recover from the current supply chain disruptions have a historical analog in WW2 military supply chains.

That will be this thread's subject
1/
Intercontinental logistics is never easy. Even more so when there is a thinking enemy of the other side shooting holes in them.

Yet for all that, the US never got the single most important piece right the clearing cargo through ports & beaches.

See the WW2 D-Day example.
2/ ImageImage
In the Pacific theaters, it was far worse.

The tyranny of distance, no/poor infrastructure, bureaucracy, and inter-service politics were bigger foes than the Japanese.

3/ ImageImageImageImage
Read 30 tweets

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