I’ve had a lot of people DM me about Ajax.
I was involved a long time ago, I’m a proper civilian now, but here’s what I learned.
There are three fundamentals to grasp and then some art of the possible.
First, and most important, we need to assess what we think “harm” is.
People were dismissive of the first KC investigation as they felt his definition of harm was unrealistic. It wasn’t.
Operating AFVs, all day, in all weathers, is hugely demanding. Noise, heat, cold, rough terrain, over stimulation. It’s hard.
All of that is expected & normal
The fundamental problem is lack of human centric, legislation aware design. When JCB design their vehicles they produce a “pod” for the operator tbat is safe to operate from a noise, vibration and vision/safety POV.
If you’ve been in a modern combine, tractor, JCB you’ll feel it
It’s time to talk about moral injury and the Army.
Because if it’s not fixed, I think it might fundamentally alter:
- who stays and who goes,
- how the Army is led
- who the Army attracts.
What I’m saying is - it might shift the character of the Army & service.
A thread.
Let’s start with a definition
Moral injury is distressing psychological, behavioral, social, impact in the aftermath of exposure to events.
It’s different to PTSD - which is based on trauma, processing and recalling memory, and/or the disturbance of the present by the past.
Moral injury occurs when people experience a discrepancy between the moral code they hold, in relation to how they operate within their workplace, which negatively impacts their psychological wellbeing and mental health
We can see how it plays out in a values based organisation.
Been asked by a few for analysis.
Here’s my take from Strategic to Tactical on the current crisis.
Caveat: I’m no longer serving so all this is from #OSINT
🧵
Strategically this operation is doomed.
The rhetoric Putin deployed is unravelling at home and with his friends.
The longer the conflict takes the less solidarity there will be from the East and BRIC.
Despite “fortress Russia” economy China will not like long term disruption.
Putin may have sold a rapid and devastating victory to his elites at home and friends abroad and that’s becoming less likely without deploying overwhelming force.
This type of operation would completely undermine his narrative and build further condemnation and unrest. But why?
In July 2020 I was disciplined by my 1* and 2* boss for challenging a 3* letter on the issue of racism.
In my 12 line email I urged us to move beyond activity, activism, process and hubris and immerse ourselves in the everyday where mistakes occur.
A 🧵on Op Teamwork eve.
First it’s a profoundly good thing we have problem recognition.
The Army finds it hard to act proactively on these issues, often needing an external crisis (oversight) or internal crisis (confidence/discontent) to move.
That’s the first thing to fix (return to this later)
Having had problem recognition
and the acknowledgement for the need for change
where are we then on these two graphs?
More importantly Teamwork needs to be part of this journey.
1. Context of our people 2. What we can all do 3. Tips for leaders 4. Convergence with alcohol 5. Neurodiversity 6. The most precious thing: hope.
Let’s thread
Context.
We tend to focus on location, family etc
It’s also good to understand factors from growing up, family, poverty,
exposure to trauma/grief/violence/drug/alcohol misuse,
education completion/setting/needs.
Normalise getting into that detail and what to draw from it.
2. We all have a role in promoting positive approaches and engagement with #MentalHealthAwareness
- talk about mood
- take time off/out and say so
- create psychological safety to engage & declare challenges
- avoid slurs on mental health creeping in
- use Op SMART tools
BE KIND