@spawnofKahn @donachaidh @John_Hudson @washingtonpost Before it was suppressed by Putin, the Russian "Gruz-200" group reported 12,100 confirmed Russian Army KIA/MIA in the Donbas in 2014-2015.
Ukraine MoD reported another 762 to 3438 irregulars KIA/MIA.
This was in artillery-heavy “medium intensity” war where WIA>KIA by 10 to 1
Ukraine MoD reported another 762 to 3438 irregulars KIA/MIA.
This was in artillery-heavy “medium intensity” war where WIA>KIA by 10 to 1
@spawnofKahn @donachaidh @John_Hudson @washingtonpost What stopped Putin wasn't total losses. It was the losses in the Regime Security units.
The total manpower for the Russian VDV plus naval infantry, Tanman Guards, the MVD/FSB SWAT units, FSB/GRU Spetznaz, and Southern VO Motorized forces is roughly 50,000 over all.
2/
The total manpower for the Russian VDV plus naval infantry, Tanman Guards, the MVD/FSB SWAT units, FSB/GRU Spetznaz, and Southern VO Motorized forces is roughly 50,000 over all.
2/
@spawnofKahn @donachaidh @John_Hudson @washingtonpost The Regime Security units were used as about 25% "stiffeners" for the a-- & trash on that Phillip Karber slide.
Doing the sums:
(12,862 KIA/MIA + 25,724 WIA) * 25% = 9,647 casualties, AKA 1/5th of the standing Russian REGIME SECURITY FORCES in Feb 2014.
3/
Doing the sums:
(12,862 KIA/MIA + 25,724 WIA) * 25% = 9,647 casualties, AKA 1/5th of the standing Russian REGIME SECURITY FORCES in Feb 2014.
3/
@spawnofKahn @donachaidh @John_Hudson @washingtonpost (15,538 KIA/MIA + 77,690 WIA) * 25% = 23,307 casualties, ~1/2 the standing Russian REGIME SECURITY FORCES in Feb 2014.
Summary: Putin stopped in 2014-2015 when the Regime Security Forces were rendered combat ineffective. The Ukrainians are aware of this Putin Regime dynamic
4/
Summary: Putin stopped in 2014-2015 when the Regime Security Forces were rendered combat ineffective. The Ukrainians are aware of this Putin Regime dynamic
4/
@spawnofKahn @donachaidh @John_Hudson @washingtonpost The Clock on an all out Russian offensive is the depth of spares for the Russian Air Force versus the depth of Ukrainian SAM missile reserves.
Russia has maybe two weeks worth of high intensity operation spares for their entire 1400 something air fleet.
5/
Russia has maybe two weeks worth of high intensity operation spares for their entire 1400 something air fleet.
5/
@spawnofKahn @donachaidh @John_Hudson @washingtonpost After that the Russian sortie rate tubes and Ukrainian armored formations can move on large scale.
The Ukrainians have more SAM rounds per missile launcher than anywhere outside the Moscow Oblast.
And Russia's SEAD forces are very limited.
6/
The Ukrainians have more SAM rounds per missile launcher than anywhere outside the Moscow Oblast.
And Russia's SEAD forces are very limited.
6/
@spawnofKahn @donachaidh @John_Hudson @washingtonpost The Ukrainians goal in the coming fighting is to slow Russian advances and suck them into city fighting and supply line of communications protection without losing large number of mobile forces so they can exploit the burn out of the Russian air fleet, thusly
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