Yun Sun -“If Russia works with Chinese financiers, in order to block that channel, the US needs to increase the cost for China Eximbank and China Development Bank”: ft.com/content/bf930a… 1/3
US officials are, of course, well aware of this and have "pointed out [to Chinese officials] that they knew how China had helped Russia evade some of the 2014 sanctions, and warned Beijing against any future such aid": nytimes.com/2022/02/25/us/… 3/4
This piece also details the stepping up of Chinese food and energy deals with Russia in the period leading up to the invasion, channels that still face fewer restrictions: nytimes.com/2022/02/26/bus… 4/4
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So this piece seriously doubles down on the "China didn't know Russia was going to invade" argument. As Yun Sun says, that would reflect some interesting things about the Xi-Putin relationship, Chinese intelligence etc. if true. But... 1/
Even if one doesn't credit the account widely circulated in diplomatic circles (cited here bloomberg.com/news/articles/…) that Xi asked Putin to hold off any invasion until after the Olympics, there are alternatives that arguably fit the facts better than China getting "played" 2/
For a start, Xi can perfectly plausibly have been given a heads-up by Putin without thinking that this needed to be shared so widely that Jin Canrong and Shen Yi got to know about it... 3/
The messaging from various European governments to China on how it handles the crisis with Russia has sharpened up in the last few days, increasingly making it clear that it will have an impact on the relationship. Clearest was @ABaerbock yesterday:
It was hard this week not to think back to the CAI drama in December, when Germany/France jammed the agreement through in the window before the Biden administration took office, taking advantage of Xi's interest in pre-emptively spiking US coalition-building on China 1/
It was characterized by its advocates as a victory for "strategic autonomy". In numerous meetings at the time, the suggestion that waiting for consultations with the new US administration might be mutually beneficial was treated almost as an affront to European sovereignty 2/
I raise this not in the spirit of whataboutism, nor to suggest that the CAI and AUKUS are remotely like-for-like, nor to suggest that the manner in which the latter was handled stemmed at all from the former 3/
A few snippets from the background briefing on AUKUS last night from senior US administration officials, specifically with reference to France, Europe and the Indo-Pacific 1/5
Considerable emphasis was placed on this being about bridging European and Asian allies and combining efforts in the Indo-Pacific. UK was framed as a European power... "The only states pivoting to the Indo-Pacific faster than the US are in Europe" 2/5
It was framed as a unique set of circumstances facing an Australia that felt "isolated". That it was an independent Australian decision to move away from the French program and to explore this capability with US/UK, not something DC/London initiated at the expense of Paris 3/5
A lot of China-Taliban questions have come up this week. An incident worth highlighting (with excerpts) that may help to illustrate why China will remain nervous about security around their economic projects even with Taliban assurances 1/4
There was a pervasive belief back in the 2000s that the Chinese projects in Afghanistan had a protected status. Then this attack took place. 2/4
The Taliban did actually stage a pro-Chinese demonstration to show that they were not behind the attack, which was ultimately attributed to Hekmatyar 3/4
I can't post the full chapter from the book but a few disconnected snippets in this thread below capture the early China-Taliban interactions when they were last in power, and I hope provide some helpful context. Some of the central issues have not changed since. 1/4