So, as always, mixed signals, with basically two avenues of interpretation: either things are about to get better, or they're about to get a lot worse.
Here's what we know. The Russians and Ukrainians met, talked at some length, released very similar statements confirming that talks would continue, and returned to Moscow and Kyiv for consultations.
But that's only half the story. The other half is that Kharkiv came in for the most brutal air and artillery assault of the war to date (as best I can tell), attacks on Kyiv renewed, and Russia continued to mass troops and equipment outside the capital.
Meanwhile, per @meduzaproject, the Russian MoD is beginning to report more about the results of the war-they-won't-call-a-war, including a detailed (and unverifiable) accounting of the military losses they've inflicted.
Oh, and there's the sanctions front, on which topic this picture of CBR chief Nabiullina and chief economic adviser Oreshkin at a meeting with Putin today speaks volumes 👇
So, here's the version of the story that says things might be about to get better. Bear with me (and caveat that I'm not saying I'd buy what I'm about to sell).
The Russian side repeated its insistence today on 3 goals: demilitarization, 'de-nazification', and neutrality. We have all been interpreting that to mean regime change, and for good reason. But it may matter that the Kremlin itself hasn't talked about regime change.
Yes, many (most) of the Kremlin's acolytes have talked about regime change, but Putin has the rhetorical space to back away from that if he wants to.
Putin could claim victory on Russian TV based on a promise of neutrality, on the amount of Ukrainian military destroyed (confirmed or otherwise), and on the "arrests" of a few "nazis" who will be tried in Russia for things like the Odesa fire.
Please note that I'M NOT SAYING UKRAINE SHOULD PROMISE NEUTRALITY. And the arrest of Ukrainian citizens for trial in Russia would be a travesty and maybe a crime. I'm not justifying anything here -- just explaining a scenario.
In other words, Putin in his call with Macron and Medinsky (?!) in his talks with the Ukrainians left just enough space for a climb-down. That would leave questions about why they launched this war, and about credibility more broadly, but they may feel they can handle that.
HOWEVER, ever since this crisis began, the Kremlin has been maintaining just enough space for a climb-down, in order to force Western & Ukrainian policymakers to account for multiple possible scenarios. This looks and feels a lot like that, all over again.
All indications are that the sanctions have come harder and faster than Moscow believed, and Nabiullina, Siluanov and Oreshkin are clearly playing for time as they figure out how to stabilize things.
The economic bloc will likely have asked Putin for a bit of breathing space, and Putin may be calculating that the West might slow the pace of sanctions imposition if there's a prospect of talks yielding something.
If that's the case, then I despair for what comes next. As the military analysts have been saying for 36 hours now, Russia seems to be turning to the kinds of tactics we feared they would:
This war would then go from very bad to utterly cataclysmic.
This whole thread is much more speculative than I like to be, so let me clarify one thing in closing: I'm not predicting either of these scenarios. In fact, the likelihood is that neither of these things happens, because reality is much messier than I'm making it out to be.
Rather, hat I'm trying to do is to demonstrate that there are (at least) two plausible interpretations of events, and thus to remind us of two things: one, this is how strategic ambiguity feels; and two, it works both ways.
I don't know whether Putin knows what's going to happen next, but I'm willing to bet good money that Medinsky has no clue -- and neither do the brass, and especially not the soldiers in the field. As @RALee85 has written, that may be one reason this invasion hasn't gone to plan.
So that's the takeaway: Whatever I think, whatever you think, whatever Putin thinks, the future isn't written yet.
Correction: Definitely a crime.
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Anti-war protests in Russia do not appear to be waning. Per @OvdInfo, a further 2700 arrests today in 51 cities, bringing the total number of arrests since the invasion to nearly 6k.
Protests appear smaller than the Jan/Feb 2021 protests around Navalny’s arrest, but maybe not by much (good numbers are hard to come by). And the more frequently we see scenes like 👇, the bigger they’ll get.
The real question, though, is when scenes like the one above begin to interact with scenes like the one below, where people queue to get money out of their bank accounts:
Question for those who actually understand these things: @LawDavF@james_acton32@CameronJJJ@KofmanMichael — When Putin orders nuclear forces on “special preparedness”, what does that mean in practice? And what impact does that have on the posture of US forces?
The rhetoric is one thing — and entirely subject to interpretation. But presumably these sorts of orders also have a technical side to them, which can have its own consequences. Trying to understand that.
Apologies if you’ve written about this already and I’ve not been able to find it.
I’m not here to supplant the analysis of military experts: if you want to understand the ins and outs of the war, and of how Russia fights wars, follow @KofmanMichael@RALee85@LawDavF and others. But let me take a moment for a bit of politics.
When Putin announced the war, he talked about the invasion in the same breath as Russia’s wars in Chechnya and Syria. As @KofmanMichael mentions in the thread above, those wars were brutal. That’s one of the things that was so frightening about the possibility of war in Ukraine.
Sanctions have very rapidly escalated, as transatlantic consensus has consolidated. Two key things to note now: 1) Escalation is proactive, not reactive, for the first time since 2014; 2) Moscow has not responded.
It’s important not to exaggerate here. Economies, like wars, aren’t fully predictable. Putin may not have calculated such a rapid response, but he will have known that these kinds of sanctions were on the cards.
Moreover, Russia has a highly skilled central bank and finance ministry, who will have contingency plans. At best, though, those plans will slow the impact of sanctions, rather than eliminating it.
One more thread today, and then I'm going to take a break and decompress for a while. This one's about protests and Russian public opinion.
Per @OvdInfo, there have been ~1700 arrests at anti-war protests across Russia today. Given the propensity of these numbers to lag, the actual number is probably higher.
We don't know how many people came out to protest. It may not have been very many, but it will likely have been 10-20 times the number who were arrested, at least.
Reading between the lines on sanctions, it's a decidedly mixed picture.
What has been announced thus far is very clearly not the full package of sanctions that had been on the table. Exactly why that's the case is a question worth discussing.
To be clear, these sanctions will hurt. Quite a bit. Together with the falling ruble, the financial and banking sanctions will sap Russia's reserves and raise its capital costs.
The sanctions on the offspring of oligarchs are more interesting. These are designed to sharpen the focus of the entirety of the Russian elite on the future, and to force them to reconsider whether they're willing to let Putin mortgage their kids' futures.