Thread by @WarintheFuture

Five days since the Russian conquest of #Ukraine began. In the past 24 hours, we have seen limited Russian progress in the north and east, but more in the south. My 5th set of observations, noting there is a long way to go in this campaign. 1/23 (Image via @IAPonomarenko)

2/23 Superb reporting continues from many sources on the Russian invasion. This includes @KofmanMichael @maxseddon @IAPonomarenko @RALee85 @shashj @DanLamothe @ikhurshudyan @McFaul @defenceHQ @thestudyofwar @OrlaGuerin @siobahn_ogrady
among many others.

3/23 The war is entering a critical and perilous phase. The lethality race that I described in yesterday’s thread continues to build. We have seen multiple commitments for Western lethal aid in the past 24 hours.

4/23 At the same time, the Russians continue to commit additional combat forces. According to the latest background briefing at the Pentagon, covered by @danlamonthe, Russia now has committed about 75% of its combat power’ initially arrayed at the Ukrainian border.

5/23 We will probably see an increase in the use of artillery, rockets, thermobaric weapons and air delivered munitions. As @kofmanmichael notes, the ‘Russian mil is an artillery army first, and it has used a fraction of its available fires in this war thus far’.

6/23 We know the Russian defense ministry has ordered units to resume their offensive from all directions after a "pause" on Friday for possible negotiations with Ukraine. It is likely that the Russian military leadership has rethought & will adapt their operational approach.

7/23 We should see evidence of this in the next day or so. We already see more Russian forces on the way. As I discussed yesterday, the Russians have shown the capacity to learn in the past – and failure can be a good teacher.

8/23 This thread here, also from @kofmanmichael, is an excellent summary of Russian operations so far.

9/23 The Russians have almost completed securing a ‘land bridge’ in the south from Russia to Crimea. This would also cut Ukraine off from the Sea of Azov, which will have implications for its economy. I will look at the southern theatre in a later thread. (Map - @defenceHQ)

10/23 A focal topic for today is the big decisions that the Ukrainians will probably need to make in the next 24-48 hours.

11/23 There are at least three big decisions pending for the Ukrainians that have both military and political dimensions.

12/23 First, their combat forces in eastern Ukraine. As the map from @washingtonpost (via @DanLamothe) shows, Russian forces are advancing south from Kharkiv and north from Melitopol.

13/23 Cutting off Ukrainian forces in an eastern pocket of the country would be a significant gain for Russia, and a dangerous development for Ukraine.

14/23 But if Ukraine is to save its military forces there, it means ceding land east of a Kharkiv - Dnipro – Melitopol line. This will be a difficult political decision for President Zelensky.

15/23 Big decision 1 - At what point does Ukraine withdraw its military forces in the east (to survive and fight on) before they are cut off by Russian forces advancing from the south and north?

16/23 Second, securing the western border. Ukraine needs to ensure the continued delivery of western aid across these land borders.

17/23 Can and will the Russians deploy forces to interfere with these shipments? It would be an interesting development because it could possibly introduce Russian targeting of third-party nations. This could be enough to deter Russia (maybe).

18/23 Big decision 2 – Should Ukraine send more forces to the west and how much combat power can they afford to commit to this mission to pre-empt Russian interference?

19/23 Finally, the Ukrainian Air Force. It has fought well, but the Russians have so far taken a 'minimalistic' approach to the employment of AirPower, and its integration with ground forces.

20/23 As this fine piece from @Justin_Br0nk describes, we have not seen the full might of the Russian Air Force during this campaign so far. rusi.org/explore-our-re…

21/23 If the Russian campaign plan evolves (as I think it will) we may see a larger & more aggressive use of Russian airpower in coming days. This will be designed to support ground combat forces & deny Ukrainians the use of their airspace for crewed and uncrewed aircraft.

22/23 Big decision 3. If the full weight of Russian airpower is committed to this war (and it is very considerable) what are the Ukrainian options for redeploying their airpower assets elsewhere so they can continue the fight?

23/23 My observations, part 5, ends. I will post later on city sieges as part of the Russian conquest of Ukraine. Thank you to the many followers, old and new, who have been read & shared these posts. I hope they provide useful insights. (Image via @IAPonomarenko)