A week has now passed since Russia began its hideous war against Ukraine. Let's talk a little bit about where we are, how we got here, and what lessons might be drawn.
If you recall, in December 2021 Russia presented an ultimatum, which contained a number of demands, including one about NATO's further non-enlargement into the former Soviet space. We also saw Russia complain loudly about Kyiv's refusal to implement the Minsk Agreements.
It seems that the policy the US/NATO pursued was: to reject the core Russian demands as unacceptable while giving Putin some space for negotiation and a graceful exit. Unprecedented sanctions were promised as a "stick" in this strategy.
Some analysts (I am thinking of people like @scharap and even @LievenAnatol) were at the time suggesting that more should have been done on the Minsk front, in the way of perhaps prodding Ukraine towards some sort of a settlement.
But it's fair to say that the mainstream opinion was against such arm-twisting because it was regarded as another Munich. A month ago I was in Kyiv and encountered considerable defiance among government officials on the subject of negotiating with Russia.
There was also great confidence - delusion some might say - that there would be no war. In retrospect, it seems obvious we misread this situation.
I wonder if we should've done more on the diplomatic front, especially given that everyone understood then (as we understand now) that NATO should not get directly involved. It would be more honest not to lull the Ukrainians into a false sense of security by grandstanding.
In retrospect, seems some assurances to Russia about NATO's non-enlargement into Ukraine and implementation of the Minsk Agreements was a relatively low price to pay, compared to where we are now. (@LievenAnatol argued, I recall, that it was a way of testing Putin's intentions).
We are where we are, and the Ukrainians have shown their bravery beyond all measure. Ukraine is in a brutal, horrific war. Russia will pay dearly for this criminal misadventure. It faces just condemnation as an aggressor. There is no return to status quo ante.
What we need to think about now, though, is how to avoid this war from further escalating. It is true that much here depends on Putin and his henchmen - they are the aggressors. But here are a couple of observations from a Cold War historian. Take them or leave them.
During the Cold War, the main danger came not from policy makers purposefully deciding to use nuclear weapons. We tend to assume that policy makers are rational, and even Putin - for all his delusions - can be described as rational insofar that this war was a calculated risk.
The main danger came from *inadvertent escalation*. There were several moments when we could have fallen off the brink. Recall October 1962, and all the things that went wrong (the shooting down of a U2 over Cuba, the submarine standoff etc). All these could have ended badly.
We could have easily ended in a shooting war between Moscow and Washington, where the unplanned use of nuclear weapons was a distinct possibility. Look, I don't want to go over all the arguments here. Read @michaeldobbs's brilliant book One Minute to Midnight.
We had another situation in November 1983 around the Able Archer exercise, where the Soviets - though never intending to launch a nuclear strike against the US - could have concluded that the nuclear war had already begun and retaliated.
The fog of war is a thing. Inadvertent escalation is a thing. That's why in the midst of all tensions we must continue to stay calm. Even as we condemn Russia's brutalities and (rightly) apply strong sanctions, we should stay focused and not allow this war to widen.
That's why yesterday I criticised the no-fly zone idea. Not because establishing a no-fly zone immediately leads to a nuclear war. That's not how it works. But it would be a step-up on the ladder of escalation that will result in a direct hot war between Russia and the West.
I have doubts about how this will minimise civilian casualties. But I don't doubt that we would see the war become more intense, with more civilian casualties, and a potential for further escalation, leading all the way down to a nuclear war. This is to be avoided.
And, yes, let's continue talking about the diplomatic track. Not that anyone doubts that Putin is a hideous, brutal dictator who doesn't care for human life. We know him for the tyrant that he is. But this doesn't mean that we abandon all diplomacy.
If anything, the last couple of months are an important reminder that opportunities were possibly missed, and wrong signals were most definitely sent. We are in a war because diplomacy failed. Maybe it was doomed to fail. But this is one "maybe" too far for me.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
We've heard a lot of discussion in recent days about how our real exit game in this nightmare could be a palace coup or a popular revolution against Putin. Putting my historian's hat on, let's dissect this proposition. I am not very hopeful. 👇🏿
Russia/USSR does not have a very convincing track record when it comes to doing away with No. 1. Consider Stalin. He unleashed a bloodbath like Russia had never seen and even terrorised his closest comrades. But they were afraid to gang up on him.
Now, I know some will say: but there are rumours of him having been poisoned. I've never seen any convincing evidence to support this theory. As far as we can tell, he died from a stroke in March 1953.
An anti-war demonstration in Mongolia. Seems 10 people showed up, with 20 journalists, with anti-war slogans and a Ukrainian flag. Later (according to the author), Mongolian neo-Nazis turned up and got into a fight with the peace activists. All to the tune of "No Woman No Cry."
Mongolia has maintained a democratic system since its 1990 revolution. A remarkable feat, given that it's locked between two authoritarian neighbours on whom it economically depends. But the prospects for long-term survival of Mongolian democracy remain somewhat uncertain.
In foreign policy, Mongolia has moved away from its skilful balancing policy (where Russia and China were played against the West++, the collective 'third neighbour'). China and Russia now loom much larger in its foreign policy priorities.
A few thoughts about a NATO no-fly zone over Ukraine.
No.
We have to be brutally frank about this. Russia is conducting a horrific war against Ukraine. An unjust war, unjustly waged. Innocent people are dying: it's tragic and heartbreaking. We must help Ukraine in every conceivable way... except for getting NATO directly involved.
Reasonable people understand this, and that's why reasonable people (including in the Biden Administration) said - before the war ever began - that NATO would *not* become involved. This may have well contributed to Putin's war calculus - he wasn't counting on NATO involvement.
Wang Wenbin appears a little less dazed in this press conference, and it does seem that China has finally formulated a position on Russia's war in Ukraine. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_6…. The position is benevolent neutrality, as I would have expected.
The benevolence is mainly rhetorical, at least for now: China "understands" Russia's "legitimate" security concerns and opposes sanctions on Russia.
At the same time, Beijing restates its support for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, one of Wang Yi's "five points" on Ukraine. The repeated promise to look at the Ukraine issue "on its own merits" (按照事情本身) limits the applicability of this principle.
A great panel on Russia/Ukraine with my SAIS colleagues today. Let me pick up a thread that was touched upon but that requires further elaboration. Let's formulate it this way: is Putin unhinged or is he a rational actor?
I'd argue that seeing Putin as unhinged is unhelpful as a matter of policy choice. Doing so entails a logical fallacy. If we say that Putin is unhinged / determined to grab Ukraine no matter what, what we really say is that he is willing to fight a nuclear war to achieve his aim.
But if so, putting up resistance to his aggression in Ukraine makes no logical sense because Putin will unleash a nuclear war before he retreats in Ukraine, and, as a result, we'll have no winners, only losers. Hell, we'll all end up dead.
There are two ways to think about just war. The first criterion is jus ad bellum, the right to war. Russia failed by a wide margin. Its security concerns, such as there were, its made-up claims of a "genocide" - all did not add up to nearly enough to justify an attack on Ukraine.
The second criterion is called jus in bello - justice in war. This is an undertaking to use proportional force and to minimise civilian casualties. Russia's attack on Kharkiv today shows a blatant disregard for this principle.
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that Russia's war in Ukraine is an unjust war, unjustly waged.