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It's not clear to me how accurate our information here would be, but goodness if even remotely true.
As longtime ACOUP readers know - if you don't get an army's logistics right, nothing else matters.
It's not clear to me how accurate our information here would be, but goodness if even remotely true.
As longtime ACOUP readers know - if you don't get an army's logistics right, nothing else matters.
https://twitter.com/Charles_Lister/status/1499077601712869379
I don't have a primer on modern motorized logistics, but I have literally just got my copy of @BA_Friedman 's On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines (2021) and as a first-entry primer, it has a lot to recommend.
I, of course, mostly look at pre-modern logistics.
I, of course, mostly look at pre-modern logistics.
One of the major differences is that almost all pre-industrial logistics is subsistence supplies (read: food, fodder and water), but as Friedman notes, modern armies that's only around 10% or so of transported logistics, with ammunition, fuel and spare parts making up the bulk.
That means that a modern army can often stop to resupply and lets its logistics catch up (something a pre-modern army very much cannot do, see acoup.blog/2019/10/04/col…). But of course the Russians cannot do a logistical pause forever.
More on pre-modern logistics by me here: acoup.blog/2019/05/10/col…
In any case, if the supply problem is remotely this bad at this point - both only a week in and also after several days of trying to resupply - there are some much deeper problems in the planning here.
Logistics are only going to get *harder* as Russians push further.
Logistics are only going to get *harder* as Russians push further.
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