John Mearsheimer's interview w/ Isaac Chotiner is...a lot.

It's so painfully evident that he has just resolutely decided not to reassess priors even as Putin's recent statements and actions and ::gestures at everything:: directly contradict his views.

newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/w…
You know, they say as you get older, you become less flexible in your thinking, but goodness - it comes across like he just didn't watch either of Putin's pre-invasion speeches or read the transcripts.
Instead he just keeps repeating that one quote from 2000 as if Putin said that yesterday and it was very probative; I mean, shoot, in 2002 Putin said Ukraine was a sovereign state and conversations about joining NATO would be "entirely appropriate."
People sometimes change their opinion over a period of ::checks notes:: 22 years.

Or they get tired of lying. You'd think Mearsheimer, as the author of Why Leaders Lie would be open to the possibility that weak, vulnerable 2000 Putin was lying.
Anyway, I'm also really damn tired of having this guy's one 2014 article blaming the USA for everything because, you know, the USA is the only important country on the planet Earth, quoted at me in my blog comments like it is dicta from God.
In any event, I believe Putin when Putin discusses Putin's motives about what Putin wants.

And Putin said that Putin believes that Ukraine isn't a real state, that its creation was a mistake and that actually it should be part of Russia.

Seemed pretty clear to me.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Bret Devereaux

Bret Devereaux Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @BretDevereaux

Mar 3
This week on the blog, we're talking about the theory of protracted war - a strategic framework for a militarily weaker power looking to outlast and eventually defeat a much stronger enemy (with a brief discussion of implications re: Ukraine): acoup.blog/2022/03/03/col…
Decided to post this one early because events are moving quickly and it seemed like an accessible primer on this sort of warfare could help people to understand what is happening in Ukraine and how the conflict may evolve.
Of course there are potential outcomes that don't involve a protracted conflict - a sudden outbreak of conscience in Moscow, or the collapse of the Russian Armed Forces. But I think these are, unfortunately, substantially less likely than a protracted war.
Read 4 tweets
Mar 2
👀
It's not clear to me how accurate our information here would be, but goodness if even remotely true.

As longtime ACOUP readers know - if you don't get an army's logistics right, nothing else matters.
I don't have a primer on modern motorized logistics, but I have literally just got my copy of @BA_Friedman 's On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines (2021) and as a first-entry primer, it has a lot to recommend.

I, of course, mostly look at pre-modern logistics.
One of the major differences is that almost all pre-industrial logistics is subsistence supplies (read: food, fodder and water), but as Friedman notes, modern armies that's only around 10% or so of transported logistics, with ammunition, fuel and spare parts making up the bulk.
Read 6 tweets
Mar 2
Good thread from agriculture expert @SarahTaber_bww (hat tip to @CarringtonWard for pointing it out) on both how agricultural disruptions caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine will ripple through the region and also on the local agricultural terrain's impact on operations.
The bit about Ukraine's muddy fields complicating Russian logistics is absolutely a factor. One of the reasons experts were confident the invasion would come now or not at all is that the assumption was Putin wanted to move while the ground was frozen.
But temperatures in Kyiv have remained stubbornly mostly above freezing during the day for the past week, so the fields aren't frozen so the Russians can't cut across them.

My understanding is that situation will get worse for Russia, not better, in the next few months.
Read 4 tweets
Mar 1
So this past week, I wrote an explainer on the war in Ukraine read now by more than 60,000 people & even more explanatory material here.

This week I also found out my department likely won't have the resources to renew my contract next academic year, so I'm out of a job in May.
Since the search I was a finalist for seems to have been cancelled without making an offer, that means that - while I'm still exploring options - chances are I won't have an academic job in the fall.

This also isn't a 'we don't teach military history' rant (we do teach it!)...
...but it is a 'our institutions do not value history (all fields) enough' - often less than the general public - and 'our field doesn't value public education and engagement enough.'

Historians are teaching 'the important stuff' but being made to do it on a shoestring budget.
Read 7 tweets
Feb 28
The center of Kharkiv is ::checks notes:: 20 miles from the Russian border. A medieval army on foot with a decent cavalry contingent might expect to have the city cut off and invested in four days.

But apparently not the Russian army with trucks and BTRs.
Of course that's not the only Russian axis of advance and they are making ground elsewhere, but that's probably also the problem - too many separate prongs, with resources split too thin.
Again, fog of war caveats, but it seems like only the push in the south is moving at speed? Speed is important for Russia here - slogging it out with highly motivated Ukrainians in every town and city in the country one by one is going to impose unacceptable losses.
Read 6 tweets
Feb 27
Twitter! Remember, for all those watching Ukraine, that the fog of war here is thick and the war in Ukraine is only in its early phases. Both triumphalism and despair are premature.

Also remember both Ukraine and Russia are going to be doing information ops here. 1/20
Both amplifying true information and also untrue information for the morale and public opinion effects. That's part of war: you trumpet your successes (or even make a few up) because you need to maintain morale.

Be wary of 'feel good' stories. 2/20
Twitter in some ways reminds me of Thucydides' description of armies on the shore at the naval battle in the Harbor of Syracuse (Thuc. 7.71), "Meanwhile, the 2 armies on the shore, while victory hung in the balance, were a prey to the most agonizing&conflicting emotions..." 3/20
Read 20 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(