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Editor of FPRI's Orbis

@FPRI_Orbis

Mar 5

https://twitter.com/FPRI_Orbis/status/1498039977766236172

Wanted to add a third item to the list of "Vladimir's Delusions"--not only underestimating Ukrainian resistance and Western resolve, but apparently Chinese willingness to help. A 🧵. 1/

https://twitter.com/FPRI_Orbis/status/1498039977766236172

During the 4 February summit, Putin seems to believe he got a pretty large blank check from Xi. Perhaps this was predicated on a rapid Russian fait accompli in Ukraine. But as this drags on and as sanctions tighten, China is holding back. 2/

In the weeks prior to the invasion, Russian commentators kept stressing that Russia would just pivot away from the West to China and survive quite nicely. Not so apparent now. 3/

Read 9 tweets

Editor of FPRI's Orbis

@FPRI_Orbis

Mar 5

I’ve been around the Russia game for long enough to see how narratives change. For a number of years, it was how we were much more threatened by a weak Russia than a strong Russia. Right now, we have the narrative of how not only Ukraine but the West in general is threatened by

by Russia, that Putin will just keep going into the heart of Europe. Eight days into the conflict, and we are back to considering Russia much weaker.

Does this mean we will see a resurrection of the narrative that our security is going to be threatened once again by a weak Russia?

Read 4 tweets

Editor of FPRI's Orbis

@FPRI_Orbis

Mar 4

Receiving requests for a follow-on NATO explainer to discuss the Kosovo precedent (1999) and what might happen if Ukraine (all or in part) were to join with an existing NATO state. As always, I base these on existing precedents, but clever lawyers/politicians can reinterpret. 1/

In 1999, Serbia/Yugoslavia had not attacked a NATO state and Kosovars were not part of NATO. So if NATO intervened, how did they do it? We need to go to Article 4 (Washington Treaty) and 52 (UN Charter). 2/

Article 4 allows for NATO members to convene the alliance to discuss threats to the security of any individual member, and for the alliance to decide whether to take any steps. Spillover of Milosevic's campaigns was deemed to be a threat. Since the UN Security Council 3/

Read 15 tweets

Editor of FPRI's Orbis

@FPRI_Orbis

Mar 4

@FPRI_Orbis

A quick @FPRI_Orbis explainer on NATO. Seeing a lot of comments like "NATO should institute a NFZ" or "NATO should bring in Ukraine right now." Reminder: NATO can do nothing on its own. NATO can only do what its 30 member states agree to do--and on the basis of consensus. 1/

NATO, like the historic Polish Sejm, operates on the principle of consensus. Any one NATO member can cast its "liberum veto." For 20 years, one NATO member, Greece, held up the admission of North Macedonia, over the country's name. 2/

The 2011 NATO mission in Libya highlights alliance politics. The U.S. wanted NATO to take the official lead. A number of NATO members didn't want the Libya mission. The compromise: NATO would intervene in Libya (as the alliance), but each NATO member could decide whether 3/

Read 7 tweets

Editor of FPRI's Orbis

@FPRI_Orbis

Mar 4

@seanmcfate

This is a fascinating read. It really touches on points @seanmcfate has been raising about the changing nature of war, the "privatization" of conflict (and deniability for governments), transfer of assets. Combine this with reports about thousands of volunteers for Ukraine's 1/

https://twitter.com/PhilipWegmann/status/1499740742608166916

equivalent of the Foreign Legion. But we also come back to what I call the "IM Force" problem: do these volunteers understand that if they "are caught or killed, the Secretary will disavow all knowledge of your actions." On the other hand, will Moscow, which itself uses 2/

private military contractors, accept that these volunteers and equipment are not state-sponsored, and assume there is in fact a hidden Western hand? 3/

Read 4 tweets

Editor of FPRI's Orbis

@FPRI_Orbis

Mar 4

@carnegiecouncil

Both at the @carnegiecouncil & @FletcherRussia events this week, I referenced the "Dayton" model as one way conflicts end. A variant of that is having two major outside powers with ties to the parties at war to induce and nudge talks. We've seen hints of Chinese disquiet 1/

as the Russian invasion drags on (and didn't produce the rapid "changing facts on the ground" results) and Chinese equities in both Ukraine and Russia risk damage. The U.S. also doesn't want this conflict to become a destructive war of attrition. 2/

@POTUS

.@POTUS was part of the Obama national security team which explored with then VP Xi Jinping a proposed new "model for great power relations" between Beijing & Washington. Why not both flatter but also pressure China to step up and work with the U.S. for reversing the invasion 3/

Read 11 tweets

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