1/9
A lot of analysts and Chinese policymakers are worried about slowing export growth and are suggesting that Beijing may need to take steps to boost exports, but I think that not only is this interpretation a mistake, it is a dangerous mistake.
wsj.com/articles/china… via @WSJ
2/9
It's true that exports in the first two months of the year were "only" 16% higher than in the same period last year, less that the 21% year-on-year growth in December and November, but last year saw truly extraordinary export growth in China.
3/9
The dollar value of exports during the year grew by 30%, which is roughly twice the dollar value of nominal GDP growth. This means that China's overreliance on the export sector – rare for large economies – grew last year when it really should be shrinking.
4/9
if China is to rebalance demand, an almost inevitable consequence will be a reduction in the export share of GDP. But if Beijing responds to "weakening" export growth, it will do so with supply-side measures that will only worsen China's domestic imbalance.
5/9
It's not a coincidence that consumption growth is relatively weak whenever export growth is relatively strong, and vice versa. Both of them depend on the domestic distribution of income, but in inverse ways.
ft.com/content/a9572b…
6/9
A rise in the household income share of GDP boosts domestic consumption but slows export growth, and vice versa. That's why "dual circulation" never stood a chance, and probably explains why for all its former ubiquity, no one seems to refer to it anymore.
7/9
Beijing is caught up in a weird feedback loop: they are afraid of weak consumption growth, and so implement policies that boost exports as a way of compensating for this weak consumption growth, but it is these very policies that ensure that consumption growth will stay weak.
8/9
Already the Commerce Ministry has warned that Beijing must implement measures that support export growth, but rather than continuing to subsidize manufacturing, Beijing should really be focusing on repairing domestic demand.
9/9
The former only increases China's reliance on trade surpluses and public-sector investment to resolve domestic demand deficiencies. This is the opposite of what Beijing says it has wanted to do for years.

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More from @michaelxpettis

Mar 8
1/5
While the Russian sanctions will certainly increase the desire of some countries to have an alternative to the dollar, it wasn't insufficient desire that prevented the emergence of the RMB or some other currency in the past as a safe haven alternative.
ft.com/content/d5346d…
2/5
It was the basic conditions of global currency status. For the RMB to become an alternative to the dollar it isn't enough that once, during a period of turmoil, it retained its value. This is just the minimum necessity for a safe haven currency, and very far from sufficient.
3/5
For the RMB to be a major alternative to the dollar, not only must it remain stable during every crisis, but, more importantly, China must completely open its capital account, remove any interference on inflows and outflows, and liberalize its financial system.
Read 5 tweets
Mar 7
1/6
The decline in India's unemployment rate is clearly bad for the economy, as is the reversal of urbanization, but this isn't necessarily the case for a rise in income inequality, which tends to boost the domestic savings rate.
ft.com/content/b99a43…
2/6
In advanced economies – and some developing economies like China – where savings are too plentiful and demand weak, the main constraint on business investment is weak demand.
3/6
In that case conditions which raise ex ante savings (i.e. by lowering consumption) tend to suppress growth in productive investment, especially private-sector investment.
Read 6 tweets
Mar 6
1/7
Li Keqiang: “All these measures amount to a large injection of government funding to support enterprises’ innovation endeavours.” As always Beijing is proposing a new round of supply-side measures to support the manufacturing sector.
scmp.com/economy/china-… via @scmpnews
2/7
While at first subsides for manufacturing, research and logistics, along with tax cuts and easier access to credit, might seem the most obvious and effective ways to boost productive investment by the business sector, in fact they depend on the underlying constraints.
3/7
A supply-side approach implicitly assumes that businesses are eager to expand production but are constrained by scarce savings, a high cost of capital, supply and logistical bottlenecks, and perhaps high start-up costs.
Read 8 tweets
Mar 5
1/6
Just as I expected, China's GDP growth target for the year was announced this morning at the Two Sessions meeting to be 5.5%, on the high side of the consensus within China and much higher than IMF and World Bank expectations for the year.
caixinglobal.com/2022-03-05/chi…
2/6
Beijing set such a high target mainly because this is a politically important year and because of unemployment concerns. A lot of analysts doubt they can achieve it, but I think Beijing still has the debt capacity to achieve GDP growth rates of over 6% if they wanted.
3/6
But this wouldn't be "high quality" growth (i.e. consumption, the trade surplus, and business investment) which, I suspect, will contribute 3-4 percentage points of growth, much less than last year but higher than average.
Read 6 tweets
Mar 4
1/9
Another interesting piece by Adam Tooze in which among other things he notes Russia's intensively conservative monetary policy: "Under Finance Minister Siluanov, Russia pursued a regime of severe austerity, coupled with...
@adam_tooze adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-91…
2/9
a free floating exchange rate and an increasing shift to a domestic bond market - the classic trifecta of the Wall Street consensus (Daniela Gabor)."
3/9
He then asks, in the context of MMT, "why should Russia not use its monetary and fiscal sovereignty, reinforced by the new regime of exchange controls, to launch a stimulus program and, in so doing, negate a large part of the impact of sanctions?"
Read 9 tweets
Mar 3
1/5
This is interesting. According to ANZ, official Russian entities may together account for one quarter of total foreign ownership of China's onshore bonds, or $140 billion, probably mainly in the form of government bonds.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/5
It's always hard to get the data to reconcile, but according to ChinaBond, foreigners hold just under $400 billion (roughly 11%) of Chinese government bonds, which comprise the bulk of foreign bond holding in China's onshore markets.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/….
3/5
This suggests to me that if ANZ's data are correct, official Russian entities own closer to one-third the total foreign ownership. Either way, they hold a large amount.
Read 5 tweets

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