1/5 While the Russian sanctions will certainly increase the desire of some countries to have an alternative to the dollar, it wasn't insufficient desire that prevented the emergence of the RMB or some other currency in the past as a safe haven alternative. ft.com/content/d5346d…
2/5 It was the basic conditions of global currency status. For the RMB to become an alternative to the dollar it isn't enough that once, during a period of turmoil, it retained its value. This is just the minimum necessity for a safe haven currency, and very far from sufficient.
3/5 For the RMB to be a major alternative to the dollar, not only must it remain stable during every crisis, but, more importantly, China must completely open its capital account, remove any interference on inflows and outflows, and liberalize its financial system.
4/5 Among other things of course this means losing control of its current account and accepting large, persistent deficits. It also requires, above all, rule of law granting supremacy to property rights and treating foreign owners the same way as it treats Chinese owners.
5/5 Not only is this not the case now, but China hasn't even been moving in that direction. The dollar will eventually lose its centrality, and US sanctions may certainly speed up that process, but without radical political transformation the RMB cannot become the alternative.
It's interesting to read this 1986 article in the context of current discussions. nytimes.com/1986/08/31/bus…
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1/8 Interesting interview of Japan's Saito Renho, a former president of the Democratic Party of Japan. I couldn't help but read within a Chinese context her comments about Japan's failed attempts to resolve demand-side imbalances with supply-side measures. hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/…
2/8 She starts by pointing out that "the idea of Abenomics was to improve the economy by a trickle-down effect, by enriching the 'haves' within society, the richer and the large corporations."
3/8 She continues: "The improvement for the rich would then improve labor conditions throughout society and raise the economic growth of Japan as a whole."
1/7 Chinese exports have soared recently, and its trade surplus is the highest in its history, and yet Beijing is still far more enthusiastic about further promoting and subsidizing trade than about developing its weak and lagging domestic consumption. en.people.cn/n3/2022/0308/c…
2/7 According People's Daily, "China has released guidelines focusing on cross-cyclical adjustments to help companies secure industrial and supply chains, guarantee foreign trade orders, stabilize expectations, and further unleash the growth potential of exports and imports."
3/7 The new guidelines include "strengthening fiscal and financial policy support, encouraging development of new business formats such as cross-border e-commerce and overseas warehouses, and easing international logistics pressure on businesses."
1/6 The decline in India's unemployment rate is clearly bad for the economy, as is the reversal of urbanization, but this isn't necessarily the case for a rise in income inequality, which tends to boost the domestic savings rate. ft.com/content/b99a43…
2/6 In advanced economies – and some developing economies like China – where savings are too plentiful and demand weak, the main constraint on business investment is weak demand.
3/6 In that case conditions which raise ex ante savings (i.e. by lowering consumption) tend to suppress growth in productive investment, especially private-sector investment.
1/9 A lot of analysts and Chinese policymakers are worried about slowing export growth and are suggesting that Beijing may need to take steps to boost exports, but I think that not only is this interpretation a mistake, it is a dangerous mistake. wsj.com/articles/china… via @WSJ
2/9 It's true that exports in the first two months of the year were "only" 16% higher than in the same period last year, less that the 21% year-on-year growth in December and November, but last year saw truly extraordinary export growth in China.
3/9 The dollar value of exports during the year grew by 30%, which is roughly twice the dollar value of nominal GDP growth. This means that China's overreliance on the export sector – rare for large economies – grew last year when it really should be shrinking.
1/7 Li Keqiang: “All these measures amount to a large injection of government funding to support enterprises’ innovation endeavours.” As always Beijing is proposing a new round of supply-side measures to support the manufacturing sector. scmp.com/economy/china-… via @scmpnews
2/7 While at first subsides for manufacturing, research and logistics, along with tax cuts and easier access to credit, might seem the most obvious and effective ways to boost productive investment by the business sector, in fact they depend on the underlying constraints.
3/7 A supply-side approach implicitly assumes that businesses are eager to expand production but are constrained by scarce savings, a high cost of capital, supply and logistical bottlenecks, and perhaps high start-up costs.
1/6 Just as I expected, China's GDP growth target for the year was announced this morning at the Two Sessions meeting to be 5.5%, on the high side of the consensus within China and much higher than IMF and World Bank expectations for the year. caixinglobal.com/2022-03-05/chi…
2/6 Beijing set such a high target mainly because this is a politically important year and because of unemployment concerns. A lot of analysts doubt they can achieve it, but I think Beijing still has the debt capacity to achieve GDP growth rates of over 6% if they wanted.
3/6 But this wouldn't be "high quality" growth (i.e. consumption, the trade surplus, and business investment) which, I suspect, will contribute 3-4 percentage points of growth, much less than last year but higher than average.