My take of the talks so far and the failure of the humanitarian corridor around Mariupol: RU is not serious about the negotiations. Putin and his cronies do not care about humanitarian suffering either. I rest my case: 1/6 #RussiainvadesUkraine
2/6 the composition of the RU delegation said it all, from the very beginning. Medinsky and Slutsky are policy clowns sent there to mess with the Ukrainian side. I do believe that the RU military is under pressure to end the operation. They have problems with reserves...
3/6 ...and supplies, and they suffer more losses than they ever expected. But Putin is not ready to consider retreat, compromise. Plus the majority of RU population are either supportive or silent with exhaustion. The protests are limited to the unhappy minority, which...
4/6 ...is targeted by merciless repressions and is trying to get out of the country in their thousands.
The failure of the humanitarian corridor can have 2 functions from a RU perspective: 1. RU propaganda messaging to the majority in RU and the part of the world that listens...
5/6 ...that Moscow tried but was sabotaged by the UA side, so Kyiv is responsible for massive civilian casualties caused by the next wave of attacks. 2. Breaking the morale of the UA society, leadership and army by generating more humanitarian suffering.
6/6 What follows is that support for UA must not abate, RU's approach to negotiations must be seen for what it is, and more sanctions must be imposed for civilian casualties. I don't know where the tipping point is in RU, and how far we are from it. But I think there is one. END
P.S.: Putin made his position clear at his "meeting with flight attendants" yesterday. One of the worst pieces of RU war propaganda I have seen so far.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Some thoughts about why the Kremlin could miscalculate so catastrophically on basically everything: the steadfastness of the UA leadership, the resolve to resist in UA society, UA military capabilities, and their own capability to figth this war.
I see three factors:🧵1/11
1. There is a blatant lack of knowledge and understanding in RU about political and societal developments in neighbouring countries. They used to be part of the Soviet Union until 1991. After independence RU was first too poor to fund proper research on basically anything. 2/11
In the 2000s, attention shifted to other topics, notably China/Asia. I remember the director of a big research institute telling my once that their attempt to create a department about Russia’s immediate neighbourhood was met with indifference if not ridicule. 3/11
Now I understand why he wrote that article about Ukraine last summer: to have something to base this speech on... today's Ukraine is entirely a product of Russian policy... and off he goes.
"We will show Ukraine what real decommunisation is" sounds like a very serious threat to dismember the country.
Meanwhile in Moscow: Russian NSC is discussing situation in DLNR, Ukraine. Live translation via @ru_rbc This doesn’t bode well… reader.rbc.ru/share/8R8C9EsH…
Kozak explaining (at Putin‘s request) how Ukraine is not implementing but undermining Minsk Agreements.
Both agree that it is outrageous to think Russia interferes with UKraine's domestic affairs. Insist that Ukraine and Western partners chose to ignore all proposals made by DLNR. Ignore that Ukrainian steps should be agreed with DNLR.
Leaving Moscow after 5 d of intense conversations. Early in the week most people were hopeful about signs of deescalation. Moderates thought Kremlin was calming down. Hawks believed RU would get what it wants merely by mil posturing. This changed in past 2 days.
People who know about economy are extremely worried about consequences of sanctions. But they do not have the Kremlin‘s ear. Haven’t had it for a long time. Liberals fear war AND domestic consequences in Ru: more autocracy, more repression.
Since Friday night everybody should have unterstood the situation is dead serious. What is happening now clearly is a well-staged provocation from the Russian\DLNR side. 23 February is the „National Day of the Defender of the Fatherland“. We‘ll see where we are then.
1/15 Looking at the outcome of the 🇷🇺 discussion at the EU Summit I have many questions. Why did 🇩🇪 and 🇫🇷 suggest an EU27 + Russia format when this was clearly not going to fly? Why the urgency?
2/15 Why is there so little reference in the Conclusions to the @JosepBorrellF report? Did the 🇩🇪 🇫🇷 initiative distract the chiefs? Did they not consider the EUHR’s suggestions worth discussing? Would the result have been different without the🇩🇪🇫🇷 push?
3/15 Is the idea of high-level meetings with🇷🇺 heretical? The old summit model had exhausted itself long before it was suspended, as @kadriliik rightly says. They were devoid of substance and increasingly at odds with the harsh reality of a deteriorating relationship.