I expected some internal test data, or even results from previously identified activity.
So you can imagine my surprise when I saw results that were from a handful of hours ago
Evidence of lateral movement?! In front of my very eyes!!
So I honed in the host machine in question. The aim here was to contextualise the activity, and identify what other facets of the adversarial campaign were visible
But the results were complicated....
@HuskyHacksMK later commented on this with the exact mix of emotions I was feeling.
An executable - nddc.exe - was directly associated with this lateral movement-like activity.
Instead of MORE malicious evidence, the existing 'malicious' evidence was brought into question.
For comparison, I have included what Impacket's WMIExec would look like in the SIEM
My next step was to go the host itself. Initially, I was going to reverse engineer the executable under the assumption it was malicious.
But something felt 'off' about treating it like malware.
It seemed too legit in it's directory placement
Some like to turn to Google straight away. This is a valid approach
Before I go down search tunnels, I let the 'data speak'. This means I do not impose a hypothesis or conclusion but let the evidence guide me.
Google will add context, but it will not let YOUR data speak. 📢
Instead, I leveraged global prevalence as @MaxRogers5 would advise.
If a significant number of machines display the same behaviour, this is an informative finding.
And we got back fascinating results: other machines in other domains are also displaying this behaviour, uniformly
Drilling down further on a machine, we can see that this weird NDDC.exe activity also has a ‘beaconing’ pattern, which suggests it is scheduled with precise regularity
Once I've saturated the raw data and it can't tell me any more, I turn to google to fill in the gaps.
My initial searches were just to ascertain what NDDC is.
I find out its Network Detective Data Collector, a Kaseya-related tool.
This by itself doesn't absolve the activity.
Reading the docs justifies why Network Detective (nddc.exe) behaves this way with SMB shares during a network audit.
And the end result of our investigation was to contribute to an awesome, growing repo of false positive behaviours.
The efforts of our investigation on Network Detective mean the infosec community may not have to go to these lengths next time.
Instead, they can benefit from our findings! 🤝
This is what it's all about: contributing back to the community that we all borrow tools and tips from
In conclusion, we pulled on a suspicious thread that we ultimately unraveled as legitimate (but weird), and shared our findings with our peers via WTFbins.
The first technique in the article discusses how to retrieve the PowerShell history for every user account via the 'ConsoleHost_History file' (typically enabled on Windows 10 endpoints) 2/6
The second leverages @EricRZimmerman's PECmd tool to examine Prefetch, an application caching system that we can use to evidence execution 3/6