Another tweet is dreadful analogy. This is worse than the absurd analogies that followed 9-11. This latest descent into absurdity is to refer to George Washington and a future the Ukrainian insurgency.
A better alternatives: Mosby as a similar style of raider guerrilla as Sidor Kovpak, the famous Ukrainian partisan leader.
Perhaps a better reference point, for an American view analogy, might have been this book. Closer to the kind of conflict Americans pursued for a large part of their history. The relevance here being the brutal conflict that is escalating in the Ukraine.
Perhaps more insightful to the actualities of Russian insurgency warfare and the Ukraine. The first was published by @USArmyCMH in the 1950s. The follow up Armstrong edition cost the State Department millions of dollars and indirectly led to the greater intervention in Vietnam.
A dubious option, but given the US interest, could have been to have recommended the more recent publications about COIN or the ‘surge’ from Iraq. We of course know how those winnable COIN wars worked out in the end.
Instead Twitter masses are offered a totally irrelevant book. Please note Page 338 clearly explains why this book and its contents are not relevant or helpful in analysing the present conflict in Ukraine.
Evidence shows the Ukrainian resistance is far from being an effective insurgency. The scale of destruction is destroying the Ukrainian capability for rendering insurgent resistance except at local level. There is no George Washington scenario.
The Russian Way of War - Putin’s #Anaconda plan unrolls.
A summary of observations based upon intel received.
Initial lodgements have been exploited and are beginning to join/meet closing gaps in and flanks while filtering the rear areas
The most obvious consistency with Putin’s previous wars is the application of total destruction against civilians. This has been applied with brutal savagery as in previous conflicts.
We are watching mechanised genocide.
Grave concern for the use of chemical warfare. This could be used against Ukrainian forces as in the Moscow state theatre siege. But also defoliants or common weed-killers used against crops. The railways enables the swift and secure movement of chemicals.
The issue.
Russian rail supply and it’s been in operation long before the war started. Integrating these movements to the Ukraine rail network is quite straightforward.
Images: ibtimes, 112.international, thedrive.com
History - Armoured Trains and the military use of railways.
A thread for all my kind friends and followers who requested more content. Mostly German with a few pictures from elsewhere.
Images: PWB
Mapping why the Germans had to employ armoured trains on the eastern front. 2 maps: the main railway network; and, a map show the intensity of partisan activity in the area area of Army Group Centre in 1943.
Maps: @USArmyCMH
The war of the rails was probably the decisive aspect of the Soviet insurgency. While decoy raids trashed German regiments, there were never enough to carry a strike into the rear areas.
#armchairgeneral - preliminary thoughts about future European security.
The old scenario: in the middle of a war, planning for the next one. However, in the face of abject failure, Europe should reconsider an integrated and independent security system.
Europeans watch daily as horror unfolds, feeling utterly defenceless as European people are thrown under the hammer of a dictator.
This, however, is not a demand for the tired old European army concept within the NATO agenda. We need to accept NATO has failed.
Europe requires a functioning security structure to better serve the Europeans, whether in or out of the EU. A security policy that serves European interests and defends the European way of life. A structured policy, force and power capability - owned by Europeans not America.
2022 - is the 80th anniversary year of Hitler’s Bandenbekämpfung Directive. This thread is the first in a series of threads uploaded through this year.
Bandenbekämpfung was the Nazi concept of a war against insurgency. There was much discussion over the definition of the partisan as an illegal combatant. Copy of the first discussion document, but conferences and planning began in March 1942.
Image: PWB
The reason for its implementation had been the increasing partisan problem in Russia, Yugoslavia and Slovenia. Throughout the latter half of 1941 the SS-Police and the army attempted to address the problem to be more effective in security warfare.
Image: @BundesarchivD
The problem with the logistics argument is the absence of facts. The heavy ordinance landing on Ukrainian cities proves: either forward depots or stacked loads. Greater issue can the Ukrainians remain supplied?
In regards to the railways argument, there are parallels to WW2. Without constant interdiction, the railways keep rolling. With declining air space and layers of Russian AA defences, the chance of interdiction is reducing daily.
Russia’s war machine - err - maybe if Russia switches off the fuel supply the western world’s economies will wobble very badly. Impoverishment of nations through energy prices and inflation will seriously undermine the western capability to resist/confront Putin.