Russia does not possess the weapons or networking capability to hit moving targets like weapons convoys with standoff cruise or ballistic missiles. This means in order for them to interdict or destroy these shipments they will not only need actionable intelligence, but...🧵
They will need to be willing to risk manned aircraft in highly contested airspace and/or special operations forces deployed deep in territory that is not even near areas under Russia's control. This greatly complicates achieving the objective of stopping even some...
of these shipments. Otherwise, they will be limited to standoff attacks like the one today that take hours to prepare (likely days for them) and sacrifice standoff weapons that are increasingly in short supply, some of which won't even hit their targets...
Air defenses are capable of shooting down Russia's cruise missiles, but it is far from a shield of any sort. They have low radar cross-sections (some have LO/stealth features as well) and they fly low, making shooting them down very tough, especially when employed en masse...
But that doesn't mean they will be any more effective at hitting static shipments based on dated intel, especially after this wake-up call. Ukraine/NATO tactics will adapt, probably have before the strike. The larger risk here, like everything, is that Russia gets frustrated...
and attacks fixed shipments where they know they are emanating from outside of Ukraine (Polish airfields etc). Yes this would be akin to declaring war on NATO, but at this point in time, considering talk of concerns of nuclear and chemical weapons use is becoming normalized...
Keeping this real possibility in mind is critical. Also, these missiles are not that reliable. VERY roughly equivalent to earlier BGM-109 Tomahawks, in some ways better in some ways far worse. One straying over into Polish territory is not a possibility...
It's a probability at this point.
& please do not give me weird offhand examples of Russian capabilities with mid-course target updating for anti-ship missiles or other systems that are very low capacity or in some sort of semi-experimental state. We are talking about a major sustained operation in the NOW here.
Finally, this is why concentrating on rushing Ukraine FAMILIAR ground-based air defenses (not focusing on MiG-29s), which can fortify the west, is essential to keeping Russian tactical airpower out of that region & shipments flowing. All you need to know: thedrive.com/the-war-zone/4…
Bonus tweet: Hitting road-mobile targets from great distances in complex terrain is hard to do. This is not some Russian folly. Very expensive weaponry and complex networking architectures are needed to do it reliably, especially hitting multi-vehicle convoys effectively.
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