Warren Buffett on special situations and activist investing.
Before Buffett became a long-term GARP investor, he was more focused on special sits, illiquid, small-cap, deep value positions. He was even interested in companies he could take control of.
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Interestingly, Buffett's best returns came during the late 50's to 60's when he had a much different approach to investing.
This thread is a series of quotes from Buffett's 1961 partnership letter where he describes some of the opportunities he is looking for at the time.
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"Our second category of investments consists of 'work-outs.' These are securities whose financial results depend on corporate action rather than supply and demand factors created by buyers and sellers of securities".
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"In other words, they are securities with a timetable where we can predict, within reasonable error limits, when we will get how much and what might upset the applecart. Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc.,
lead to work-outs".
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"An important source in recent years has been sell-outs by oil producers to major integrated oil companies".
"This category will produce reasonably stable earnings from year to year, to a large extent irrespective of the
course of the Dow".
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"Obviously, if we operate throughout a year with a large portion of our portfolio in workouts, we will look extremely good if it turns out to be a declining year for the Dow or quite bad if it is a strongly advancing year"
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"Over the years, work-outs have provided our second largest category. At any given time, we may be in ten to fifteen of these; some just beginning and others in the late stage of their development".
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"The final category (of investments) is 'control' situations where we either control the company or take a very large position and attempt to influence policies of the company. Such operations should definitely be measured on the basis of several years".
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"In a given year, they may produce nothing as it is usually to our advantage to have the stock be stagnant market-wise for a long period while we are acquiring it. These situations, too, have relatively little in common with the behavior of the Dow".
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"Sometimes, we buy into a general with the thought in mind that it might develop into a control situation. If the price remains low enough for a long period, this might very well happen".
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"If it moves up before we have a substantial percentage of the company's stock, we sell at higher levels and complete a successful general operation".
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During this time period of a different approach to investing, Buffett's annual compounded return for the partnership was 29% over a 10yr period from 1957-1966, compared to Dow's annual return of 9.7%. Buffett's cumulative results were 1029% vs. 141% for the Dow.
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Nick Sleep & Qais Zakaria managed the Nomad Investment Partnership for 12yrs from 2001-2013.
During that time they delivered 921% returns vs. 117% from the MSCI world index.
Their letters to shareholders have become one of the best resources available to investors.
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Nick Sleep has an endless amount of valuable lessons in his letters. I'd suggest any investor who hasn't read the letters to prioritise it.
Nick Sleep has become famous in the investing world for a lot of reasons, but most notable is his early investment in $AMZN and $COST
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Is this thread, I'm going to share Nick Sleep's original thesis on $COST in 2004.
He invested in Costco in 2002, but wrote extensively about the company in 2004. He never sold his shares. Since purchasing, Costco's share price has appreciated ~1400%.
What would you pay (market value) for this company? I’ll reveal the company later in the thread.
- Strong network effects, pricing power & a long runway for growth.
- Powerful IP that could be monetised in many different ways…
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- Loyal user base/fans. High retention rate and improving.
- $1.3 billion in sales, $606 million EBITDA. 47% EBITDA margins in FY21.
- FY21 revenue growth of 42% YoY.
- EBITDA has doubled over the past two years. ~41.5% CAGR….
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I’ll continue the thread after this tweet, but comment your guess below.
With limited information provided, I’d suggest any high quality US company with 47% EBITDA margins and a 41.5% CAGR would earn at least a 20x EBITDA multiple, probably much higher.
Rob Vinall’s recent purchase of $CVNA and the huge drawdown of the share price has made me finally look into the business that every growth investor has been raving about for years now.
Carvana’s share price is down ~60% from their all-time high.
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Revenues for Carvana have grown at a ~112% CAGR over the past 5 years. Which is a pretty insane number, it’s hard to even comprehend.
The revenue growth is obviously unsustainable, but there is still a long runway for growth for $CVNA
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Currently only 1% of used car sales in the US are e-commerce sales. JP Morgan forecast that number to increase to 12% by 2030.
$CVNA have around 40% market share of e-commerce used car sales. If* they maintain that market share we could see >30% sales CAGR until 2030.
I’m always interested by what other great investors are buying and selling. Not to blindly copy/clone. But to source ideas or even just out of interest.
Here are some of the most interesting investments from the 13F filings from Q4 2021.
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Li Lu increases his position in $FB by 53%.
I’d like to think this happened after the drawdown. But the buy is from Q4 2021. Li Lu payed ~$320 per share. $FB Now trades at $220 per share. Curious to see what his next 13F looks like.
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Greg Alexander increases his stake in $BABA by 20%.
Alibaba has been a stock with a lot of pessimism from the market. But China bulls like Greg and Charlie Munger keep averaging down.
$BFIT is a low-cost provider of ~900 gyms in Europe (500 in France). They are a great case study of Nick Sleeps’ concept of ‘scale economies shared’.
Basic-Fit have a long runway of growth and if we normalise to pre-covid revenues they might be reasonably priced.
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I’ll start with a quick shout out to @vperelman for his podcast with @AndrewRangeley where I first heard the idea.
Additionally @1MainCapital and his commentary on $BFIT in his Q4 letter.
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$BFIT revenues have halved since 2019 (pre-covid) from £515m down to £247m. So important to note that a big assumption in the Basic-Fit thesis is a return to pre-covid numbers. Which I think is a reasonable assumption to make.