1/5 Another significant capture in #Ukraine. Reported discovery today of a #SIMBox being used to relay Voice calls & SMS and other info to Russian forces (including top leadership of Russian army) & other individuals in #Ukraine. I will explain what this is and how it works.
2/5
First the system is comprised of 3 main parts, 1) the SIM Box server - in this case a Hypertone SMB-128 . This handles the control of up to 128 SIM Cards, cycles them when detected etc , and co-ordinates interaction with the #GSM Gateways hybertone.com/en/pro_detail.…
3/5 Next the GSM Gateways, there are two Hypertone types being used here:
- There are 3x GoIP 8 - VoIP Gateway for 8 Channels being used,
- along with 1x GoIP-4 4 SIM VoIP GSM Gateway.
Both can be used for SMS or Voice
4/5 Lastly the Software, unfortunately unable to make out the logo (anyone identify it?), but it would be used to co-ordinate the messages, call forwarding settings (in and out) etc. Whole system would look like the below.
There is also a Xiaomi Mi AIoT Router AX3600 present
5/5 A significant find as given their comms problems, this reportedly has been used to communicate with top leadership in the Russian forces. Ukrainian mobile opcos have made unprecedented defensive moves, this is '#cyberwar' impacting the battlefield rusi.org/explore-our-re…
6/5 Extra point - expanding the above, you should never use systems like this for military comms. #SIMBoxes are unreliable and actively hunted by mobile opcos.The use (and detection) of this system is due to #Ukraine aggressively defending the mobile network #SS7/#Diameter space.
1/12
It has been confirmed that the #Taurus interception was done via “a non-secure line”. Below is my opinion of one way in which it *might* have been done, taking into account the situation and #Russia's previous history.
Essentially it involves using #SS7 interception.
🧵
2/12
First step is that we assume the call intercepted was generated by a German mobile device, roaming into Singapore. In the press release we are not told for certain it was a mobile. So could have been a mobile or a hotel line (or wifi)
2/11
After a WhatsApp vulnerability exploited in 2019 #WhatsApp/#Facebook sued NSO Group. As part of its evidence there was a contract between a NSO Group reseller and a telecom regulator.
Within that contract was a list of features, including something called #MMSFingerprint
3/11
What is an MMS Fingerprint? NSO’s description says it can "reveal the target device and OS version by sending an MMS to the device".
Problem here is this attack wasn’t known in the industry. So I went to work trying to figure it out. files.lbr.cloud/316009/whatsap…
@RowlandCorr and I cover what may happen in the future. In particular we look at the little-known Russian separatist Mobile Operators Phoenix (Фенікс) and Lugacom (Лугаком)
2/10
The unlicensed Phoenix (Фенікс) & Lugacom (Лугаком) opcos were formed from the separatist seizure of Ukrainian Mobile Operator equipment after 2014 invasion of the #Donbas
They have been growing as the licensed Ukrainian Operators have pulled out
🧵A good recent example of #Ukraine contesting the Mobile Network / InfoSec battlespace.
Multiple #SIMBox seizures as part of an "enemy bot farm" network were announced yesterday by the Security Service of Ukraine. 1/6 ssu.gov.ua/novyny/z-pocha…
Technically this is a much bigger setup that the #SIMBox relay discovery from 2 weeks ago, (see my previous thread) which is not surprising as these are more traditional ‘bot farms’ used for signups for social media 2/6
According to the #SBU, the 5 enemy bot farms in the network used social media (including some banned in Ukraine) to “spread disinformation about a full-scale Russian invasion of our state and spread distorted news from the front”.