Cathal Mc Daid Profile picture
Science, Security, Sports.
Mar 6 12 tweets 4 min read
1/12
It has been confirmed that the #Taurus interception was done via “a non-secure line”. Below is my opinion of one way in which it *might* have been done, taking into account the situation and #Russia's previous history.

Essentially it involves using #SS7 interception.
🧵 Image 2/12
First step is that we assume the call intercepted was generated by a German mobile device, roaming into Singapore. In the press release we are not told for certain it was a mobile. So could have been a mobile or a hotel line (or wifi)

theguardian.com/world/2024/mar…
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Feb 15 11 tweets 4 min read
1/11
Today, we’re releasing details of a small but interesting mobile #vulnerability called MMS Fingerprint, reportedly used by #NSOGroup.

How this might work, and how we found it, is a bit unusual.

@EneaAB @josephfcox @rj_gallagher @campuscodi @lorenzofbenea.com/insights/dusti… 2/11
After a WhatsApp vulnerability exploited in 2019 #WhatsApp/#Facebook sued NSO Group. As part of its evidence there was a contract between a NSO Group reseller and a telecom regulator.

Within that contract was a list of features, including something called #MMSFingerprint Image
Apr 25, 2022 10 tweets 7 min read
1/10
3rd part of @adaptivemobile series on the mobile battlefield of #Ukraine

@RowlandCorr and I cover what may happen in the future. In particular we look at the little-known Russian separatist Mobile Operators Phoenix (Фенікс) and Lugacom (Лугаком)

blog.adaptivemobile.com/the-mobile-net… 2/10
The unlicensed Phoenix (Фенікс) & Lugacom (Лугаком) opcos were formed from the separatist seizure of Ukrainian Mobile Operator equipment after 2014 invasion of the #Donbas

They have been growing as the licensed Ukrainian Operators have pulled out

euobserver.com/investigations…
Mar 29, 2022 6 tweets 4 min read
🧵A good recent example of #Ukraine contesting the Mobile Network / InfoSec battlespace.

Multiple #SIMBox seizures as part of an "enemy bot farm" network were announced yesterday by the Security Service of Ukraine. 1/6
ssu.gov.ua/novyny/z-pocha… Technically this is a much bigger setup that the #SIMBox relay discovery from 2 weeks ago, (see my previous thread) which is not surprising as these are more traditional ‘bot farms’ used for signups for social media 2/6
Mar 15, 2022 7 tweets 5 min read
1/5 Another significant capture in #Ukraine. Reported discovery today of a #SIMBox being used to relay Voice calls & SMS and other info to Russian forces (including top leadership of Russian army) & other individuals in #Ukraine. I will explain what this is and how it works. 2/5
First the system is comprised of 3 main parts,
1) the SIM Box server - in this case a Hypertone SMB-128 . This handles the control of up to 128 SIM Cards, cycles them when detected etc , and co-ordinates interaction with the #GSM Gateways
hybertone.com/en/pro_detail.… Image