We found that, win or lose, most countries that enter war continue to make their foreign debt payments.
But the relationship wasn't perfect: there were some countries (winners and losers) that defaulted. We dove into those cases.
In these cases, it was difficult to draw a direct line from the outcome of the war to the decision to default. There was correlation, but not causation.
The case that came closest to a direct connection was...Russia in 1918.
Once the Bolshevik's came to power, their leader, Vladimir Lenin, made the decision to repudiate Russia's foreign debt. As article 3 of the decree bluntly states: "All foreign loans without exception are unconditionally annulled."
But it's important to keep in mind that Lenin made the decision to default WHILE ALSO ending the war (see Treaty of Brest-Litovsk). They were coupled together.
The second way in which a 2022 default would be unusual is that it repudiates the CURRENT Russian regime (i.e. it's the ultimate self-own).
In 1918, Lenin defaulted on the "Tsarist debt". It was a way to dissociate the Bolshevik's from the previous regime.
Patrick and I found that this is not unusual.
When leaders come to power through "irregular means" (like a revolution), they often default on the foreign debt of the previous regime. It's a way to delegitimize the previous leadership.
In short, if Putin defaults on Russia's foreign debt, he will do so during war and will undermine his own regime.
For an ostensible student of Russian history, he apparently learned the wrong lessons.
[END]
Addendum 1: I you want to know more about the importance of foreign debt to financing war efforts, @rosellacappella & I have a chapter in the new edition of "What Do We Know About War" (edited by @sbmitche & John Vasquez) amazon.com/What-Do-Know-a…
Addendum 2: For further details on the Bolshevik default and its implications for international finance, see @HmalikH's recent book (h/t @boyd_vandijk).
Specifically, imposing economic sanctions is a key part of the international response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. bbc.com/news/world-eur…
While we might think of sanctions as a "non-violent" instrument that can deter an attack or cause a war to deescalate, that's not always (or even often) the case journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.117…