Thoughts on the current state of the war and where things might be heading. About 2 weeks ago I suggested that Russian forces have ~3 weeks before combat effectiveness becomes increasingly exhausted. I think that's generally been right, but we're not quite there yet. Thread. 1/
The war has broken down into what could imperfectly be called three fronts, and Russian advances have stalled out along two of them. Around Kyiv RU forces are trying to consolidate positions, but I don't think they can make an assault on the city. Kyiv is far from encircled. 2/
In the southwest there was a fitful advance around Mykolaiv towards Odesa that had little chance of success given the paucity of forces employed. This has been set back by a UKR counter offensive. I expect little progress there for either side and more of a shifting front. 3/
This means we're not going to see an amphibious landing at Odesa, or a Russian march to Transnistria, anytime soon (if ever). At least not in this phase of the war. However, Russian advances towards Kryvyi Rih do threaten UKR lines of communications west of the river. 4/
The area to watch in the coming week is the Russian attempt to encircle UKR forces in the JFO. A slowly progressing pincer movement from the north and south (using Nathan Ruser's map). This is where UKR forces could be in a precarious position. 5/
Since inception the Russian military effort has lacked focus. Too few forces, on too many axes of advance, some competing with each other. I think in the next two weeks they are likely to concentrate on UKR forces in the east and the battle for Mariupol. 6/
I suspect unrealistic political aims & timetables have driven an unsound mil strategy. Kyiv, Odesa, Donbas, etc. There's a desperation to show progress. Increasingly it looks as though the Russian mil is focusing on the Donbas, and maintaining along other fronts. 7/
Depreciating combat effectiveness sets the stage for either a significant operational pause along most fronts or a ceasefire. This does not necessarily imply a political settlement, but a period to reorganize, consolidate, and resupply. An end to the first chapter of this war. 8/
I think Moscow is searching for something it can use to declare a victory. Taking the Donbas, and having leverage to attain concessions from Kyiv is probably what they're looking to accomplish at this point. This is at best a guess. 9/
Much depends on what Putin knows and thinks about the course of the war, and whether he feels pressured at home. Our impression of the war & reality on the ground might be quite different from his. Its not clear he understands what the prospects for Russian success are. 10/
Naturally there is uncertainty about the state of Russian armed forces along different parts of the battlefield, its bound to be uneven, and we know even less about the state of Ukrainian forces. 11/
The next chapter in this war could prove even uglier as it will likely turn into a war of attrition, with greater bombardment of civilian areas. Here I am more concerned about the future evolution of this conflict, despite the remarkably poor Russian performance thus far. 12/
Generally, I don't see how any military success can add up to something that constitutes a political victory for Moscow. If there is another phase, Russian forces will probably try to compensate for poor performance by inflicting greater destruction. 13/
Worth noting, the Russian military is interpreting 'demilitarization' quite literally as a secondary goal in this conflict, going after Ukraine's defense industry and key military infrastructure. It seems they want to substantially degrade Ukraine's military potential. 14/
Has the war entered a stalemate? Yes and no. Russian forces may make slow, incremental advances in the Donbas. I suspect UKR military can hold on most fronts and perhaps even counter attack on others. However, attrition is undoubtedly taking its toll on both sides. 15/
In general I've tried to be cautious in rendering predictions because I think we don't know if this point in the conflict is near the beginning, the middle, or the end of the war. Few things are as contingent and indeterminate. End.
I will add Nathan's other map seeking to depict just Russian force movements.

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More from @KofmanMichael

Mar 13
Very long Sunday thread on the extent to which we overestimated the Russian military, a bit about the war, and on how we should think about Russian military power. 1/
First impressions tend to be imperfect at best. You're working with an incomplete picture, anecdotes, and guessing at causality. How much of it is a bad plan, lack of organization, terrible morale, or failure to execute the basics - perhaps all of the above. 2/
The initial Russian operation was a shambolic attempt at regime change, with little planned or organized. In some ways closer to an attempted raid. I think we've seen a smart UKR effort to defend, and a unimpressive Russian attempt to adjust and prosecute this tragic war. 3/
Read 22 tweets
Mar 13
About BTGs. I would think of this more as a unit of organization, but less as a unit of force employment given how the war has been fought. Someone suggested if you take out x% of a BTG then it becomes combat ineffective. Small thread. 1/
In a war against an opponent fighting combined arms with sizable formations, sure. In this war without battalion level engagements, not really. They’re moving as BTGs, but dispersed, and not fighting as BTGs in engagements. The fights are relatively small. 2/
Attrition is attrition. But the BTG is generally not fighting as a cohesive formation in this war, more as company tactical groups. End.
Read 4 tweets
Mar 5
I try not to make too many predictions. I think given all the problems in the Russian campaign, delusional assumptions, an unworkable concept of operations, little prepared for a sustained war like this, I give it ~3 more weeks before this is an exhausted force. 1/
Exhausted in terms of combat effectiveness. What follows next I don’t know. Maybe a ceasefire where both sides reorganize and resupply, maybe a settlement. It depends on the course of the war and the situation in Russia. End.
That’s not indicative of either side winning, or the war ending. I can’t predict how the next few weeks will go. Just looking at it from my limited perspective, I see this phase of it as bounded, especially given how the war began.
Read 4 tweets
Mar 1
It’s clear from a spate of POW interviews I’ve seen the troops themselves had no idea they were going to launch this op and were completely unprepared for it, including officers. Morale is low, nothing was organized, soldiers don’t want to fight & readily abandon kit.
There's all sorts of secondary evidence, albeit anecdotal given what one can see - tanks and equipment abandoned that's in working order with fuel in it. Logistics is hardly the only explanation for the issues on display.
They've compounded the problem by generally not using combined arms formations, instead sending small detachments forward, often operating without support. These small units are easily cut off and likely to abandon their gear in the absence of a larger formation backing them.
Read 6 tweets
Feb 28
Long thread about how I think the first 96 hours have gone, still very early/incomplete impressions. The initial Russian operation was premised on terrible assumptions about Ukraine’s ability & will to fight, and an unworkable concept of operations. Moscow badly miscalculated. 1/
The Russian operation was focused on getting to Kyiv quickly, forcing a surrender, and pushing a small number of units forward quickly in a way that avoided large engagements with UKR forces. They’ve been skirting major cities, going for key road junctions/smaller towns, etc. 2/
Why did Moscow choose this course of action? A few theories: they didn’t take Ukraine & its military seriously. They wanted to avoid attrition & devastation because of consequences for pol goals in Ukraine, costs of casualties, and they want to hide the costs from the public. 3/
Read 25 tweets
Feb 27
Russian units are not fighting as BTGs. They’re not doing combined arms warfare. They’re driving down roads in small detachments, pushing recon and VDV units forward. Tanks without infantry. It’s not going well for them because this isn’t how they organize and fight (more later).
Folks are taking the right lessons about Ukraine’s military from this, but a number of the wrong ones about the Russian military. This operation looks terrible, and it should, because it’s assumptions were nuts, but this isn’t the Russian mil fighting as it would against NATO.
It’s taken me a while to figure out what they’re trying to do, because it looks so ridiculous and incompetent. Ukraine’s military has done great. The Russian op is a bizarre scheme, based on terrible political assumptions, with poor relationship to their training & capabilities.
Read 6 tweets

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