It’s clear from a spate of POW interviews I’ve seen the troops themselves had no idea they were going to launch this op and were completely unprepared for it, including officers. Morale is low, nothing was organized, soldiers don’t want to fight & readily abandon kit.
There's all sorts of secondary evidence, albeit anecdotal given what one can see - tanks and equipment abandoned that's in working order with fuel in it. Logistics is hardly the only explanation for the issues on display.
They've compounded the problem by generally not using combined arms formations, instead sending small detachments forward, often operating without support. These small units are easily cut off and likely to abandon their gear in the absence of a larger formation backing them.
Since yesterday it looks like the Russian military is making adjustments, so force employment is visibly changing, but the evidence about how they prepared, or more accurately didn't prepare for this war is starting to stack.
All that said, there are a lot of Russian units fighting, this war is likely to get more brutal, with numbers and firepower being a decisive factor even if the initial planning was shambolic. My impressions are based on the opening days of fighting, and terribly incomplete.
I suspect we will find out the truth was somewhere in the middle, Russian officers probably knew they were going to war when told to deploy to the border, but doubtfully understood the real nature of the operation. This isn't to take anything away from the UKR mil performance.
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Long thread about how I think the first 96 hours have gone, still very early/incomplete impressions. The initial Russian operation was premised on terrible assumptions about Ukraine’s ability & will to fight, and an unworkable concept of operations. Moscow badly miscalculated. 1/
The Russian operation was focused on getting to Kyiv quickly, forcing a surrender, and pushing a small number of units forward quickly in a way that avoided large engagements with UKR forces. They’ve been skirting major cities, going for key road junctions/smaller towns, etc. 2/
Why did Moscow choose this course of action? A few theories: they didn’t take Ukraine & its military seriously. They wanted to avoid attrition & devastation because of consequences for pol goals in Ukraine, costs of casualties, and they want to hide the costs from the public. 3/
Russian units are not fighting as BTGs. They’re not doing combined arms warfare. They’re driving down roads in small detachments, pushing recon and VDV units forward. Tanks without infantry. It’s not going well for them because this isn’t how they organize and fight (more later).
Folks are taking the right lessons about Ukraine’s military from this, but a number of the wrong ones about the Russian military. This operation looks terrible, and it should, because it’s assumptions were nuts, but this isn’t the Russian mil fighting as it would against NATO.
It’s taken me a while to figure out what they’re trying to do, because it looks so ridiculous and incompetent. Ukraine’s military has done great. The Russian op is a bizarre scheme, based on terrible political assumptions, with poor relationship to their training & capabilities.
Some very early impressions of the last two days. It's an operation with maximalist war aims, and Moscow's thinking on this war seems to have been colored by war optimism. It looked as though Russian forces were expecting a quicker UKR military collapse and easier gains. 1/
Early campaign to knock out Ukrainian air defenses and air force had mixed results, Russian aerospace forces aren't particularly practiced at SEAD or DEAD. Most of the strikes in the opening phase were via cruise missiles. UKR air force still has some aircraft up. 2/
A brazen heliborne assault to take Hostomel airport with a small airborne element was a puzzling move. I doubt the goal was to land more airborne at a contested airport easily covered by artillery and MLRS. Likely they expected to hold out for ground reinforcements. 3/
I made a basic map, with red arrows, which I have held off from posting because I believed it would not be responsible to put something out like that unless it was clear the war had begun. This is just one very incomplete estimate of what the Russian op plan might look like.
Maps like this can be terrifying so please use with caution and don't treat it as any kind of established fact.
Just to emphasize, the Russian campaign does have maximalist war aims. It is about regime change, and multi-axes ground offensive. There's no evidence it will necessarily stop at the river.