But here's the thing: when Japan surrendered, they still asked for a condition. They wanted to qualify the "unconditional surrender".
You see, the Potsdam declaration called for eliminating the authority of those who "deceived and misled the people of Japan". The Japanese feared that this meant Emperor Hirohito.
Japan would not accept a peace that "prejudice the prerogatives" of the Emperor.
Berenice Carroll, in her 1969 @JPR_journal paper, offered an evaluation of this tendency, which then questioned the adage: "war is pressed by the victor, but peace is made by the vanquished." It's not so simple.
That wars end in settlements is key to thinking about the nature of war itself.
Indeed, as I ask my students: if the sides sign an agreement at the end of the war, why couldn't they have done that at the beginning? Why bother fighting and create all of those costs?
This is the puzzle of war, as James Fearon aptly described at the beginning of his seminal piece, "Rationalist Explanations of War":
"The central puzzle about war, and also the main reason we study it, is that wars are costly but nonetheless wars recur." cambridge.org/core/journals/…
In this 🧵, I elaborate on Fearon's answer to the puzzle for why deals aren't reached before fighting starts.
Without going too deep into bargaining theory or how the fighting of the war itself can alter the terms of an acceptable bargain, the point is to accept that the 🇺🇦-🇷🇺 war is not going to end in a decisive outcome.
Those calling for "unconditional surrender" have a skewed understanding of how wars end...
Addendum 2: While I didn't elaborate above, if you do want more on how bargaining theory sheds light on the ending of war, then I highly recommend Dan Reiter's 2009 book... amazon.com/dp/B00EM3457U/…