Thread by @ProfPaulPoast

Many are surprised by the poor performance of Russia's military in Ukraine.

But let's be honest: when it comes to fighting wars, Russia has always -- to use the formal term -- "stunk".

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By "stunk", I'm not just referring to losing wars. I'm referring to how efficiently Russia's military achieves its objectives.

amazon.com/Military-Effec…

But wins and loses are a useful starting metric.

amazon.com/Win-Lose-Draw-…

Admittedly, Russia/Soviet Union has some historically significant victories.

These include against Napoleon ...

... and against Nazi Germany (particularly at the Battle of Stalingrad).

But Russia's losses are quite notable. They include the Crimean War...

...the Russo-Japanese War...

...and World War I.

And even the notable victories have to been taken with a HUGE grain of salt regarding Russian military prowess.

Napoleon's "Grande Armee" wasn't all that "grand" by the time it actually reached Russia. That's really the lesson to draw from Minard's famous graph of Napoleon's march: by the time the army reach Smolensk it as down to 145k from 420k.

And you were more likely to see a horse in the German "War Machine" that invaded in 1941...

than a Panzer tank (see @adam_tooze)
amazon.com/dp/B008DR6YXO/…

Consider some of Russia's "smaller victories", such as against Finland in 1939-40.

In that case, Russia/USSR "won", but by incurring heavily losses in personnel (left column is Finland's losses; right column is Russia's).

Or go back to the wars in Chechnya. Though Russia inflicted massive damage...

nytimes.com/2005/08/16/wor…

... it also took heavy losses.

chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-19…

Stated differently, Russia has little regard for the "loss exchange ratio": how many forces you lose/how many forces your opponent loses.

tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…

To underline this point, consider data from the Correlates of War project.

correlatesofwar.org

Using data on battlefield losses during "inter-state wars", this graph shows the percentage of wars in which the listed country had the most battlefield deaths of all the participants. The take away should be clear.

The Russian military essentially uses an "attrition model": keep take losses until the other side quits, is destroyed, or, if the fighting goes long enough, Russia itself decides to stop fighting.

Unfortunately, if the plan is to wait for Russia to stop fighting, then you could be waiting a long time.

https://twitter.com/RitaKonaev/status/1501743785365094403

No need for outstanding strategic planning under this model.

https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1498023067099959297

And if your military doctrine is based on an attrition model, then you can get away with coup-proofing the military (e.g. removing highly competent officers from positions of power). See @ProfTalmadge's book.

amazon.com/dp/B013G4LGL8/…

This could help explain Russia's history of non-coups by the military (despite opportunities). See @bdtaylor_SU's excellent book.

amazon.com/Politics-Russi…

All of the above, should put into context the heavy losses Russian forces are incurring in the current war.

washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/…

In short, how Russia's forces are performing in Ukraine is consistent with Russia's historical strategy in war fighting: take heavily losses and hope the other side quits.

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