1/ Ukrainian Theater of War, Day 37: Today’s update focuses on each of the Strategic Fronts in the UTW. BLUF, Ukraine has defeated Russian forces along the Kyiv-Chernihiv & Sumy Fronts. East Ukraine is now the focal point of operations. #Ukraine #UkraineWar #RussiaUkraineWar
2/ Humanitarian Impact. Ukrainian refugees exceed 5.4 million, with 6.5 million IDPs throughout Ukraine. As Russian forces pull out of NW Kyiv, the brutality of their occupation is more apparent. Russia continues to block aid convoys access to Mariupol.
3/ Weather assessment. Thunderstorms & wintery mix remain in the forecast & will continue to adversely affect aerospace and ground operations. Poor weather may hamper Ukrainian attempts to disrupt the Russian retreat from Kyiv. Temperatures generally will remain between 17/ 0 C.
4/ Kyiv-Chernihiv Front. Russian forces along the Kyiv-Chernihiv Strategic Front have been defeated. The past 48 hrs. have seen an orderly Russian withdrawal from NW & west Kyiv toward Belarus. The siege of Chernihiv has ended. East Kyiv is also free of Russian troops. #Kyiv
5/ BLUF, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have out fought & out generaled the Russian military. The Ukrainian victory in Kyiv and NE Ukraine will undoubtedly become a case study in urban defense, area defense, and deep operations in an extended battlefield. forbes.com/sites/davidaxe…
6/ Sumy Front. Russian forces along the Sumy Strategic Front have been defeated. Russian forces are abandoning equipment that is not functional to speed up their retreat before follow-on Ukrainian counterattacks are able to isolate retreating Russian formations. #Sumy#Chernihiv
7/ The defeat of Russian forces in the Kyiv, Chernihiv, & Sumy Oblasts illustrates Ukraine’s successful employment of an economized force centered on light infantry, mech & artillery groups, and a mix of UAVs and air strikes to shape an extended battlefield for deep operations.
8/ Kharkiv-Donbas Front. The Russians seek to secure the political objective point of the entire Donetsk & Luhansk Oblast up to their administrative borders. If the Russians can exploit their Izium victory, they may be able to move deep in the rear of UAF positions along the LOC.
9/ Southern Front. Russian attempts to renew operations toward Mykolaiyv have not been successful. Russian focus in on the establishment of a “Kherson People’s Republic” to meet the Kremlin’s endstate for the territorial conquest of southern & eastern Ukraine. #Kherson
10/ Aerospace Assessment. VKS operations over the Donbas continue to increase. Air strikes are not only directed against military targets but are expanding to destroy more civilian infrastructure across the Donbas and interdict aid convoy & humanitarian corridor routes.
11/ MANPADS remain the most common form of air defense in the Donbas. The Ukrainians needs to either redeploy or procure more robust air defense systems capable of providing cover to civilian infrastructure, otherwise VKS air sorties will cause significant losses in the region.
12/ Information War. It is hard not to become overly emotional at the sights of images emerging from the formerly Russian occupied areas of west & NW Kyiv. The willful devastation coupled with stories of murder and rape cannot be ignored.
13/ As hard as it is to look at, and mentally process, these inhuman acts must be documented and reported. Documentation is necessary for the prosecution of war crimes. Reporting is vital to make the case Ukraine needs sustained assistance to win the final victory.
14/ Although the past week has seen a series of Ukrainian victories, they war is far from over. Ukraine is still in a perilous position, although it is winning it could still lose. The fight for the Donbas will be vicious. Russia is staking everything on success here.
15/ Unlike the first month of the war, which saw multiple unfocused and under resourced offensives, the fight for the Donbas will be intensely focused and resourced by Russia. The tactical situation, though not ideal, still favors Russia in the Donbas.
16/ We will likely see more violent crackdowns against Ukrainian civilians resisting Russian occupation. More savage assaults on urban centers, increased use of thermobaric or illegal munitions (i.e., more white phosphorous) and potentially chemical weapons.
17/ Now comes the truly gut-wrenching part of the war, one in which Putin & the Kremlin will use every tool at their disposal to reverse the defeat in Kyiv & NE Ukraine in a ruthless attempt to salvage some notion of “victory”. Now is the time Ukraine needs the West the most.
18/ These maps have been created by me based off the most reliable information of activity in the Ukrainian Theater of War from a variety of sources. Errors will be corrected as soon as they are identified.
19/ Information regarding Ukrainian units are meant to be general, are based on Ukrainian General Staff statements and social media posts, official Ukrainian government press releases, and local news. It does not depict current unit movements.
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1/ Ukrainian TVD Operational Update (Day 1030): The situation in the Ukrainian Theater of Military Action (TVD) remains challenging for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Since November 28, the ZSU has struggled to stabilize defensive lines in many key sectors along the Strategic Front while effectively managing delaying operations in the critical Pokrovsk-Kurakhove Operational Direction. However, Ukrainian forces have regained lost ground in a few important areas. This thread provides a general overview of events throughout the Ukrainian Theater of Military Action (TVD) since late November. #UkraineWar #Donbas #Pokrovsk #Kupyansk #Pishchance #VelykaNovosilka #Kurakhove #ChasivYar #Siverek
2/ Operational Terms. Here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions to help you understand the thread's graphics.
3/ Northern Strategic Direction: The Northern Strategic Direction (SD) remains the TVDs secondary SD. ZSU operations in this SD have very likely lost the ability to shift the operational initiative in Ukraine’s favor. As previously assessed, the employment of the RS-26 Rubezh intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) (a.k.a. Oreshnik) has not deterred Ukraine from continuing to employ ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP systems against Russian deep logistics and command nodes within the territory of the Russian Federation. However, since Western authorization to use these systems on the territory of the Russian Federation was granted, ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP strikes have been limited. This is likely due to low stockpiles and not the continued threats by President Putin to conduct another Oreshnik strike.
OSV Kursk will continue to counterattack the southwestern flank of the Sudzhalodgment, threatening an operational encirclement of Ukrainian forces and forcing a withdrawal. It is likely that OTU Siversk(?) will attempt to counterattack towards Novoivanovka. DPRK forces will almost certainly continue to be atomized at the small-unit level and integrated into larger VSRF formations to gain experience. VSRF and ZSU forces will likely continue positional engagements in the Kharkiv region; Russian forces will likely remain focused on efforts to seize Vovchansk.
1/ Southern Strategic Direction Update (Day 1013): Today's short update focuses on events in the Southern Operational Direction since November 04, 2024, and the Maritime and Aerospace theaters. The Southern Strategic Direction is now the tertiary SD of the Ukrainian Theater of Military Action (TVD). VSRF activity throughout this SD is mostly defensive and has primarily focused on the continued in-depth strengthening of the Surovikin Line.
Elements of the Operational Group of Forces East (OSV Vostok) in the Velyka Novosilka Operational Direction will prioritize offensive actions in coordination with OSV Tsentr to complete the seizure of southern Donetsk Oblast. Operational Group of Forces Dniepr(OSV Dniepr) will continue to conduct limited assaults in the Orihkiv Operational Direction and set conditions for a potential offensive to seize Orihkiv. Russian forces will maintain defense along the Dnipro River in Kherson. The ZSU will continue to rely on deep strike and SSO-U infiltration raids in coordination with Partisans to disrupt and degrade SVRF's capability and capacity to defend Zaporizhzhia and Kherson effectively. The priority of ZSU effort will remain the defense of southern Donetsk Oblast. #UkraineWar #Zaporizhzhia #VelykaNovosilka #Orikhiv #Kherson #Crimea #BlackSea #RussianAirForce
2/ Operational Terms. To help you understand the thread's graphics, here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions. (Note: I am still refining and updating this list. Please bear with me as I do. Thank you.)
3/ Velyka Novosilka Operational Direction: The failure of OSUV Tavriva's leadership to anticipate an assault on Velyka Novosilka from any direction other than the southern approaches has placed this geographic objective point in danger of falling to the Russians. Within days of the capture of Shakhtarske and Yasna Polyana, the 29th Guards Combined Arms Army executed an operational left turn to reorient on an east-west attack axes to assault Velyka Novosilka. The eastern approaches to the town were lightly defended, with only spare minefields guarding likely avenues of approach, which were quickly breached by advancing Russian forces. Supporting this attack were assaults from the south by elements of the 5th Guards Combined Arms Army on Makarivka and Novodarivka. ZSU defenses in these directions were better prepared to respond to a multi-axes SVRF advance. The Russians briefly held Makarivka in early November 2024 before ZSU counterattacks retook the settlement by the end of the month.
The 29th Guards Combined Arms Army will continue to attack north and northwest of Velyka Novosilka towards the T-0518/H15 Highway intersection. Russian forces in the Rozdolne and Noyvi Komar will expand their zone of control north and west; they are not likely to advance into the north environs of Velyka Novosilka. The 5th Guards Combined Arms Army operational priority is likely the capture of Zelene Pole and Temyrivka to cut the last line of communication into Velyka Novosilka to to facilitate the operational envelopment of OSUV Tavriva’s strategic flank in southern Donetsk Oblast, forcing a general withdrawal into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. OSUV Tavriva will continue their active defense of the Velyka Novosilka Operational Direction and seek counterattack opportunities.
1/ Ukrainian TVD Operational Update (Day 1008): The situation in the Ukrainian Theater of Military Action (TVD) remains challenging for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However, since November 5, the ZSU has managed to stabilize defensive lines in many key sectors of the Strategic Front while effectively transitioning to a delaying operation in the critical Pokrovsk-Kurakhove Operational Direction. This thread provides a general overview of events in the Northern and Donbas Strategic Directions of the Ukrainian TVD since early November. #UkraineWar #Donbas #Pokrovsk #Kupyansk #Pishchance #VelykaNovosilka #Kurakhove #ChasivYar #Siverek
2/ Operational Terms. To assist in comprehension of the thread's graphics, here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions. (Note: I am still refining and updating this list. Please bear with me as I do. Thank you.)
3/ Northern Strategic Direction: After approximately 104 days since offensive operations started in Kursk, the Biden Administration (with the governments of France and the United Kingdom closely following suit) has finally been compelled to lift restrictions on the use of long-range strike weapons (like ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP) on targets within the Russian Federation. However, the United States has not committed to President Zelensky’s request for Tomahawk cruise missiles and other long-range missile systems. Due to the limited quantity of ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP stockpiles, ZSU strikes on logistics facilities, airfields, and command posts inside the Russian Federation have been limited in scope and have had negligible effects on VSRF operations.
In the Kursk OD, VDV-led counterattacks continue to pressure ZSU defensive lines. Although there has been anecdotal reporting from Ukrainian troops in the Kursk lodgment stating they have engaged in combat with DPRK forces, there has yet to be credible footage to substantiate these claims. Russian efforts to mask the location of DPRK units by atomizing units (i.e., only deploying small units, likely company and below, within SVRF battalions) and dressing them in Russian uniforms appear successful. Obfuscating the location of DPRK units allows them to gain the necessary experience to operate as an effective independent force.
1/ Election Day in the United States is finally here. The Presidential Race between Republican Candidate, Former President Donald Trump, and Democratic Candidate, Vice President Kamala Harris, has been polarizing, to say the least, with anxiety running high for not only Americans but people around the world, on its outcome. Ukrainians likely have the highest amount of anxiety over the outcome of the U.S. Presidential Election, as the winner will almost certainly set the war on a trajectory that will either enable a Ukrainian victory or a capitulation. #UkraineWar #UkraineRussiaWar️️ #USAElection2024 #HarrisWalz2024 #TrumpVance2024 #PresidentialElections
2/ According to a Bipartisan Policy Center report, an estimated 244 million Americans are eligible to vote. The 2022 mid-term elections saw 161.42 million Americans registered to vote. However, the turnout saw roughly 75 million people vote, or 46.6% of the electorate. By comparison, approximately 158.4 million Americans voted in the 2020 Presidential Election out of 240 million eligible voters (168.3 million registered), a turnout of 66%. According to the New York Times, 78 million Americans have already cast their votes through early voting. Suppose the 2024 election cycle sees at least the same percentages of the electorate participate. In that case, at least 161.04 million people will cast ballots for the 2024 Presidential Election, with possibly roughly 48% of those votes already having been cast through early voting.
3/ Polls across the United States generally open between 0500-0600 locally, with polls closing between 1900-2000 locally. The first polls will close on the eastern seaboard of the United States at 2000 EST (0100 GMT). It will take several hours for the first returns to come in, but all eyes will be on the turnout in the 7-battleground states in this election: Georgia, North Carolina, Nevada, Arizona (though some elections models have the state leaning Republican in the final days of the Presidential Race), Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania.
1/ Ukrainian TVD Daily Tactical Update (DTU) (Day 983): Since Sept 17, the situation in the Ukrainian TVD has deteriorated for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU). As of 04 November 2024, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) retain the strategic initiative and have improved positive operational momentum in the Donbas, specifically throughout the southern Donetsk Oblast. This thread provides a general overview of events since mid-September. #UkraineWar #Donbas #Pokrovsk #Kupyansk #Pishchance #Vuhledar #Kurakhove
2/ Operational Terms. To assist in easy of comprehension of the threads graphics, here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions. (note: I am still refining and updating this list, please bear with me as I do, thank you).
3/ Northern Strategic Direction: The Northern Strategic Direction (SD) is now the TVDs secondary SD. There is remote potential for ZSU operations in this SD to shift the strategic initiative in Ukraine’s favor. Despite some tactical and operational success in Kursk, the Government of Ukraine failed to achieve its principal strategic goal, to compel the United States to lift restrictions on the use of long-range strike weapons on targets within the Russian Federation. The ZSU remains faced with the dilemma of either continuing to reinforce efforts in Kursk or transition to the defensive and shore up the operational deterioration of OSUV Tavriya’s strategic flank in southern Donetsk Oblast. The decision on where to place its operational focus during the winter of 2024-25 will impact the strategic trajectory of the war.
1/ Ukraine TVD, Day 935: As of 16 September, the VSRF retains the strategic initiative and positive operational momentum throughout the Ukrainian TVD. The ZSU continues efforts to expand the Kursk lodgment, with Russian ground forces conducting a counterattack in the Korenevo area. OGV Sever offensive actions, through reduced in scale, maintain the ability to fix a significant number of Ukrainian forces in the Kharkiv region. In the Donbas elements of the 2GCAA have slowed their advance on Pokrovsk for logistical resupply, with the 201MRD attacking through the operational flank of OSUV Tavriya south of the M30 highway. In Zaporizhzhia, elements of OSV Tsentr and Vostok have renewed offensive action in the Vuhledar area, pressing hard for Bohoiavlenka. The VKS stepped up strikes on Ukraine's energy grid while the PSU continues large drone strikes targeting fuel and energy complex facilities in the Moscow region. #UkraineRussiaWar️️ #UkraineWarNews #UkraineFrontLines #RussianArmy #UkraineNeverSurrenders #Russia
2/ Current weather outlook for the Ukraine TVD. Weather will not significantly impact ongoing operations. Weather favors offensive action. Courtesy of @davidhelms570
3/ Operational Terms. To assist in easy of comprehension of the threads graphics, here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions. (note: I am still refining and updating this list, please bear with me as I do, thank you).