With @apsmolenska we provide a birds-eye view of a bewildering world of EU climate finance policy. We argue for a radical overhaul, to make the prudential regulation of risk much more political. A 🧵 /1
As the @ECB recently acknowledged “few institutions have put in place Climate and Environmental risk practices with a discernible impact on their strategy and risk profile.” Banks are sleeping, greenwashing is rampant. /2
Today, bank lending mostly pursues short term profits.
In the neoliberal era, the Basel/EU framework acquired a narrow microprudential focus: preventing excessive risk-taking. The framework pursues this outcome by quantifying risk and setting bank capital as risk buffers. /2
These rules have failed to keep up. Climate change creates risks due to changing temperatures and an accelerating transition – the risks are long-term, complex, interconnected, so difficult to measure. /4
What should be the way forward? We sketch two scenarios: A business as usual “deferential” scenario asks firms to disclose and banks to model climate risks. We doubt that this strategy will work, it is a “risky bet” /5
We illustrate the problem with @shell’s EU 2050 strategy involving insane volumes of trees (a new forest the size of Romania) and as yet non-existent super technologies – with these assumptions banks can keep funding oil for decades to come. /6
The alternative we propose – a Guided Transition – sees supervisors take on radically new roles: setting out the future that banks should anticipate, in particular that of the EU’s climate agenda. /7
The Guided Transition breaks with the old regulatory paradigm. It acknowledges that banks are often unable and/or insufficiently incentivized to price risk. Prudential regulation must itself become political. /8
Instead of merely asking banks to estimate potential losses, policymakers should guide bank lending through a fine-grained account of how banks should invest. /9
As we also argue that, despite pervasive strategic ambiguity, a Guided Transition is already visible in major new policy initiatives: climate stress testing, taxonomy-aligned disclosure requirements, mandatory transition plans. /10
The major challenge we see now is to how to find adequate procedures. Financial policy that sets out the future that banks should anticipate will unavoidably become more political. This is the future, with it its own risks, for which we need to prepare. /end
Finally out! On the European Central Bank, technocracy, and one of the most painful chapters in European integration: the #ECB’s treatment of sovereign debt (going from 1988 till 2020)
In 2005, the ECB’s treatment of sovereign debt became market-based. From then on, any government whose debt lost the approval of Moodys, S&P and @FitchRatings would no longer be accepted by the ECB /2
These strict rules placed the ECB right at the heart of the 2010-12 sovereign debt panic.
Using interviews and new archival sources I ask: Why didn’t the ECB do more to stabilize markets? And why was one mid-March video call enough to stop the 2020 panic? /3
Did policymaking really change after 2008? Not immediately, but a genuine paradigm shift is taking place… amongst central bankers and EU technocrats setting financial and fiscal rules.
In 2020, the European Central Bank funded 92% of the pandemic deficit incurred by Member States fighting the pandemic – I show that this is monetary financing in all but name
Also, the past year every trick in the rulebook has been used to push banks to green their lending – basically a return to pre-1990s @eric_monnet style credit guidance for sustainable finance
This is BS of course "Mr Weidmann said such a move would contradict the principle of market neutrality that is enshrined in EU law." ft.com/content/60d983…@OlafStorbeck@MAmdorsky /1
The term “market neutrality” is not from the Treaty but rather a very recent addition to ECB vocabulary. In fact, in a 2008 paper ECB officials explicitly deny that its operations are “market neutral”. ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops…
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The @ecb mandate contains two passages that might mistakenly be taken to imply the Weidman's radical neoliberal notion of neutrality. One is a uniquely vague passages about acting “in accordance with the principle of an open market economy” (TFEU 119) /3