It is 53 days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Today I update my analysis of Russia’s shift to the east and examine key variables that will impact on operations in this part of #Ukraine. 1/25 (Image - @RALee85) 
2/25 Russia, having ‘reset’ their theory of victory for their invasion of Ukraine, is building up its forces in the east. That said, they will continue strategic strikes across Ukraine, and remain alert to opportunities in the south. Image – UAWardata.com
3/25 As I explored earlier this month, the Russian have two key options to operationalise their strategic objectives. These are options built around either deep or shallow operational envelopments. Noting recent Russian movements, this assessment remains the same.
4/25 Option 1 is a ‘go big option’ – a deep double envelopment of Ukrainian forces in the east. This would see the Russians attempt to advance on the city of Dnipro from the northeast and from the south. Concurrently, they would need to fix Ukrainian forces in Luhansk & Donetsk.
5/25 This would primarily seek full territorial control of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. It would also aim to fix Ukrainian forces in the east while the Russians attempt a deep envelopment to encircle them.
6/25 The ultimate objective would be to seize all Ukrainian territory east of Dnipro and destroy Ukrainian forces in the Joint Force Operation in the east. This would be a significant military and political victory for the Russians.
7/25 Option 2 remains a ‘minimalist approach’ which sees a shallow envelopment of Ukrainian forces. This would see a similar ‘fix and envelop’ campaign where the Russians would pin the Ukrainians in the east by attacks in Donetsk & Luhansk.
8/25 Concurrently, advances from the northeast (and possibly the south) would aim to give the Russians control of territory east of the line from Izyum through to Mariupol.
9/25 The objective would be to finally seize all of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, an incomplete task since 2014 and one of Putin’s key objectives for this war.
10/25 It would also aim to significantly reduce the strength of the Ukrainian Army, which deploys some of its best forces in this region.
11/25 In military planning, we often discuss the enemy’s ‘most likely’ & ‘most dangerous’ courses of action (COA). In the east, given Russian dispositions and their demonstrated strengths / weaknesses, their most likely COA is the ‘shallow envelopment option.’
12/25 If the Russians can successfully achieve this ‘most likely COA’ in the east, and defend their seized territory in the south, it might satisfy Putin’s current ‘theory of victory’ for his special military operation.
13/25 But there are several variables which may impact on their capacity to achieve this.
14/25 First, the Ukrainians appear to have launched attacks in the vicinity of Kharkiv and Izyum. The key variable is whether these are local spoiling attacks aimed to disrupt Russian preparations for further advances, or part of a wider Ukrainian counter offensive.
15/25 Both are possible. Good tactical leaders are always looking for opportunities to disrupt the enemy’s plans. And good command environments nurture this. The Ukrainians have demonstrated they have both in this war. So these could just be local attacks.
16/25 But we can’t discount a wider counter offensive by the Ukrainians. They know that seizing the initiative from the Russians before they can launch a major offensive in the Izyum area would disrupt Russian strategy AND mess with Putin’s reputed 9 May time.
17/25 The 2nd variable is Mariupol. If it falls, it could free up Russian troops for the eastern offensive. The key variable is how many, and what their combat readiness might be. After weeks of tough urban fighting, the Russians may need a break. edition.cnn.com/2022/04/17/eur…
18/25 A 3rd variable is logistics. We have seen how poor Russian logistics is throughout the war. Can they improve this to supply the concentration of forces in the east? The key variable is whether their logistic system, and rear area security approach, will allow this.
19/25 But logistics also impacts on the Ukrainians. For the east, they are likely to require larger amounts of artillery ammunition, fuel and other items whether they are on the offensive or operating defensively.
20/25 A 4th variable is the role of Russian forces in the south during an eastern offensive. Will they remain on the defensive, or assume a more active role by conducting feints and supporting attacks to draw Ukrainian forces from the east or north?
21/25 A final variable is Russian contingency plans in the event their eastern offensive does not achieve its objectives. There is almost nowhere else that Putin can look to provide ‘victory’. If it becomes clear they can’t achieve a decisive success in the east, what then?
22/25 As I have written previously, the Russians are yet to demonstrate the adaptive capacity to significantly improve their tactical competence. Regardless of the greater concentration of mass they have deployed in the east, this is an important factor.
23/25 Failure might trigger Russian use of nuclear or chem weapons. They have been searching for a pretext to use chem weapons. Another bloody nose from the Ukrainians might justify – in Russian minds – the use of such weapons to achieve a breakthrough. nytimes.com/2022/03/21/sci…
24/25 The eastern theatre may feature large scale combat of a type we did not see in the north. The Russians, who are more familiar with the terrain in the east, will look to use numbers (including low quality proxy conscripts) & firepower superiority to generate a breakthrough.
25/25 At the same time, the Ukrainians may decide on a series of counter offensives before the Russians begin their eastern offensive in order to disrupt the Russian plan enough for the Ukrainian army to seize the initiative. End (Image – military.com)
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