Dollar Wrecking Ball - Brazil exports 55% of global #soybeans (mainly to China). Issue: US export 35% which seems to set international prices. That turns soybeans farming in Brazil into poor business at current potash prices ($1250/Mt) b/c of BRL-FX rate.
Same for corn. BRL exports 21% of total, ARG 20%, US 32% while setting prices. LatAm farmers need fertiliser subsidies or use less which would reduce yields & worsen ongoing food crisis. What do I miss? Stocks? Labour cannot move dial. Below BRL, worse for ARS.
Less of a problem for ARG but certainly for Brazil's soybeans 2nd crop season with planting in April & Mai as well as wheat.
Global context: 3 fertilisers-corn ratio (same for soybeans) are within "affordable range" (not to be mixed up with end-consumer corn price).
My point: farmers in US & EU (EU is corn "self-sufficient") are fine (ex energy). LatAm not but = up to 50% of exports.
There have been 8 shocks to the global food prices - yes eight (8). Most of them are ongoing!
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1/n As for team transitory,…
No 1 - War: Ukraine, which was known as the ‘breadbasket of the FSU’, has 1/4 of world’s ‘black soil’ fertile land. In 2021 Ukraine accounted for 20%, 7%, 18% of global exports of barley, wheat & corn, respectively. It is under attack & VVP wants this war to be a food crisis.
2/
He will get his will. The UN Food and Agricultural Organisation estimates that 20-30% of sunflower, grains and corn will not be planted or harvested. It forecasts food prices to rise by another 8-22% because of the loss of Ukrainian production (FT, 9 April).
“Lower fertilizer use [b/c of higher cost] may mean a smaller crop. The International Rice Research Institute predicts that yields could drop 10% in the next season, translating to a loss of 36m tons of rice, or the equivalent of feeding 500m people.” bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
“Rice farmers are particularly vulnerable. Unlike wheat & corn, which have seen prices skyrocket, rice prices have been subdued due to ample production and existing stockpiles.”
It’s important to listen to an educated bearish view in any trade & be able to justify why “the opportunity (crude >$100) exists.”
My view on Ed Morse’s bearish oil price outlook:
a) Bias: Ed is around since the 70ies & knows a thing or two but is bear since 2014/15;
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b) he doesn’t handicap US shale growth enough for diminished DUCs inventories or the constraint of capital, labour & supplies such as frac sand/rigs/pipes;
c) he underestimates the ongoing risk to OPEC exports in an already tight market (as seen for Libya in last 2 days);
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d) he does not take the political will of the EU to ban Russian oil into consideration;
e) he ignores the logistical challenge to “smuggle or blend” Russian Urals into the EU market or the time lag it creates to reload for Asia (Aframax -> VLCC reloading);
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2022 outlook for oil is rock solid. Why? Crude prices of inventories incl reduced SPRs. In Q2 however, combo of SPR releases into seasonally weak demand + China lockdowns will calm short-term spreads & affect sentiment somewhat while curve went up at long-end vs 1 month ago.
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But record Brent pricing in March meant barrels were already being drawn into Europe from all over the world to plug self-sanctioned Russian losses. Those now overlap with 1st tranche of SPRs announced in March, causing spreads to normalise (they may test contango briefly).
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Meanwhile, EU losses of RUS imports will partly be redirectly into Asia but at significantly longer voyages. Overall, our base case remains unchanged & for up to 2mbpd of shut-ins as Russian storage fills & self-sanctioning continues. This seems to play out judging storage.
On 23 March the Kremlin requested EU gas deliveries to be denominated in rubel. Putin said: “If these payments are not made [in rubel], we will consider it a failure of the buyer to fulfil its obligations, with all the ensuing consequences.”
Russia delivers 35% of EU gas of which 60% is paid for in € & rest in US$. Such are the contractual obligations. Therefore, all G-7 ministers agreed on Monday 28th that such a request would be "a one-sided & clear breach of the existing contracts.”
Oil is an extractive industry. The industry needs to replace ONE North Sea each year (3mbpd) just to stay still (more in future due to base declines). That needs $600bn. Industry didn’t and does not invest it. Meanwhile demand is back at pre-Covid levels.
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The world may draw another 2mbpd of liquids out of storage in 2022 (massive!) due to variety of factors - Russian sanction being a big one! And no, sanctions will not go away with a peace agreement. “West” will request check & balances after nuclear threads post VVP.