Thread by @malmoeb

1/ @ESET (see tweet below) has reported that #Emotet uses LNK attachments for the initial infection vector.

We can download a sample from Bazaar by @abuse_ch for doing our own analysis (sample from 2022-05-02).

bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/ce7191e…

#CyberSecurity

https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1518923380782739458

2/ exiftool works very well to find out the path and command line arguments of the malicious LNK file:

3/ The analyzed sample from @Netskope calls PowerShell directly. However, in our sample, cmd.exe is called first, then PowerShell with a base64 encoded command argument.

Picture taken from here - an analysis worth reading:
netskope.com/blog/emotet-ne…

4/ This infection mechanism is an excellent opportunity to point out that PowerShell script block logging should be enabled globally.

The @splunk Threat Research Team has written a blog with related detections. Even if Splunk is not used as SIEM, have a look at the detections.

/5 For example, hunt inside the PS logs for the keyword "$DoIt", a function of the DKMC framework we also see repeatedly in our IR cases, or hunt for the keyword IWR (Invoke-WebRequest), which Emotet uses for downloading the second stage code.

splunk.com/en_us/blog/sec…

6/ Or use @velocidex for hunting convenient inside the PowerShell logs 🙏💙

7/ Coming back to Emotet, collect all ASEP (Auto-Start Extensibility Points) in your network and specifically look for services that have regsrv32.exe in the ImagePath.

#ThreatHunting

8/ The random names in the System32 directory should be easy to find.

(Image taken from the Netskope blog, see the third tweet for the link).

Good luck 🍀