Thread by @copscampaign

Dave took a photograph of 'Tony Williams' and supplied a copy to the Inquiry

Regarding the Torness Alliance, this was a UK wide campaign to oppose the building of a new nuclear power station in Scotland.

The main objections were firstly the threat of catastrophic nuclear accidents (as had almost happened in 1979 at Three Mile Island in the US &in 1986 actually happened at Chernobyl in Ukraine resulting subsequently in an est 9-16,000 deaths from air pollution throughout Europe).

And secondly the lack of safe disposal of nuclear waste which would be dangerously radioactive for thousands of years.

10,000 people protested at Torness in 1979, and there were some follow-up protests in the year afterwards.

I was involved in this campaign. London Greenpeace were heavily involved in this movement, and I later got involved with that group around 1982.
London Greenpeace was infiltrated by the SDS for many years, as we will come to in Tranche 2.

According to their witness statements for T1P3 a number of SDS UCOs were infiltrating the anti-nuclear movement, and at least 4 SDS managers visited the Torness site.

However, we are unfortunately expecting most of the evidence
and documentation relevant to this movement and London Greenpeace to not
be disclosed until Tranche 2.

The 1979 Special Branch Annual Report is disclosed in full, and contains a huge wealth of evidence about or relevant to the SDS and its spying operation.

It includes 3 explicit references to myself in the monthly sections, & many other references to groups/ events I was involved with – with a month by month chronology & v helpful Index cross-referencing the names of 200+ groups and 100+ individuals targeted in that year alone.

The other SB Annual Reports disclosed are massively cut, thin and vague in comparison. The full reports for all the relevant years (including for the forthcoming Tranches) should be disclosed as soon as possible.

This will help identify many of the list of the 1,000 groups targeted, for which we have been
waiting for years.

Due to the many delays during the Inquiry and the further delays
expected, all the Witness Statements already taken from UCOs should be disclosed as soon as possible.

This is essential so that core participants can begin to prepare their responses, including seeking out others from groups and events affected by the spying operation over the life of the SDS (and later the NPIOU)...

...rather than having to wait for years until the last minute when it is generally too late to trace victims and prepare evidence effectively.

Why did the Police never consider the welfare (as well as the Human & Legal Rights) of those members of the public they targeted – the victims?
Surely they had a duty of care whilst invading and influencing people's lives?

Surely any normal human being would do so anyway, duty of care or not?

After 7 years of the Inquiry, many thousands of people in groups targeted (whether those groups have already been revealed or so far are still concealed) remain in the dark about who spied on them, what information was collected and what was done with it.

They are understandably angry, as well as being confused/
suspicious about which individuals from their past may have been police spies, & events from their life which may have been secretly invaded/ manipulated by State agents cynically masquerading as their friends & colleagues

This is unacceptable, and we need the truth.

In contrast the UCPI, at the behest of the police, is strongly applying
privacy and Human Rights concerns to protect the identity and welfare of UCOs.

This sudden police conversion to such rights not previously of any concern of their secret units during their operations is surely staggering hypocrisy.

It would be seen as ironic if it wasn’t so serious.

Many might think that those who
secretly invaded and abused people’s lives should have vacated their own privacy rights.

Furthermore in most core participants’ opinion, the current
privacy strategy of the police and Inquiry is the key cause of the massive problems, costs and delays in the Inquiry.

The public would expect that such privacy protection criteria be applied 100 times more strongly when evaluating the unlawfulness of the SDS..

and the rights of those victims who were seeking a better society who were thereby secretly targeted, lied to, abused, manipulated, and reported on to the police and secret services.

Morris concludes:
I have read and support the impressive detailed Opening Statements made on behalf of the Category H core participants, and on behalf of the Cooperating
Group of core participants – and indeed for the other Non State CPs.

These statements clearly demonstrate beyond doubt that the entire secret SDS operation was unacceptable and unlawful, as well as being worthless.

It demonstrates that the police were institutionally anti-democratic, as well as being institutionally sexist, racist and anti-working-class.

The infiltration of left wing and progressive groups and campaigns and the invasions of their members’ lives, should never have been allowed to happen.

Managers, and those higher up the chain – all the way to Police Chiefs & Government Ministers – must apologise and be held responsible & accountable

Mitting had just one question for Dave Morris – if I only had time for one of the book you've recommended, which one should I pick?

His answer: 'Demanding the Impossible'
"However it's a weighty tome" warns Dave.
Mititng doesn't mind that, but thinks three books on a single topic is too much (!)

Next up is barrister Kirsten Heaven, appearing on behalf of the “co-operating NSCPs” group.
You can download their written Opening Statement from ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/upl…

plus Annex A - which includes a handy diagram prepared by @UndercoverNet
ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/upl…

@UndercoverNet Yet again we must express our concern about how long this Inquiry is taking! It's been a full year since the last open hearings, and we understand that we'll have to wait until 2024 for 'Tranche 2' (covering the years from 1983 onwards) to begin.

@UndercoverNet This Inquiry has been running for years, and everyone's getting older – both the former #spycops officers and those they spied on.

We'll lose precious evidence the longer the delays.

@UndercoverNet The @ucpinquiry still has not published a definitive timetable for all future hearings, and we demand this be done as soon as possible.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry In the previous hearings, we heard truly shocking evidence about the way the #spycops operated “an unjustifiable, unlawful and profoundly anti-democratic system of surveillance” that was “fundamentally flawed”.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry We have already had a glimpse into a system that obviously violated fundamental rights, as laid out in the accompanying Opening Statement.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry This time, it's the managers who are in the spotlight. Their witness statements are full of denials – they seem to be unwilling to accept responsibility or admit knowledge on key decision-making, and reluctant to provide full or honest explanations for what went wrong.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry Why are they unwilling to tell the “full unvarnished truth” now, in 2022, to this Inquiry?

Is this some long-running, institutionalised but misguided sense of 'loyalty' to the @metpolice ?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The Met has been found to be institutionally racist and corrupt, with a culture of toxic masculinity, homophobia, misogyny and sexual harassment.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The SDS was funded via the Home Office, and every year (according to the evidence we've now seen) those in charge claimed to be providing “robust management” to the #spycops they deployed

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice As senior police officers, appointed to serve the public, it is their duty now to explain “in a full and honest manner” about what went on.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice These managers presided over an unlawful system of policing that obviously violated fundamental rights – why?

Did they conceal these practices from their political masters?

Or, as we suspect, did the cover-up extend to the highest level?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice There is a lot of evidence suggesting that senior Home Office officials – who were the link between the Home Office and the security services – knew about the existence of the SDS and approved its funding.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice However the (annual) decision to continue with this funding would have been a political one, not made by them alone.

This Inquiry must establish who was controlling and directing the #spycops – who beyond these civil servants signed off on their operations, and why?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Let's not forget the admission of 'Witness Z' (on behalf of the Security Service) that the pressure to investigate these so-called 'subversive' organisations “often came from the Prime Minister and Whitehall”.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice It's crucial that these relationships are uncovered.
I
t's clear that the Home Office knew at the time that the #spycops activities were unlawful.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The political elite and senior police officers “deliberately shrouded the SDS in secrecy and did everything they could to insulate it from external oversight”.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The #spycops operated without clear guidance, robust terms of reference, a code of conduct or formal training.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice This secrecy bred complacency.

Abhorrent and unlawful practices flourished, from the 70s onwards.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The only official high-level instructions we've seen are in 2 documents:
the 1967 'Responsibilities of Special Branch' and the 1970 'Home Office Terms of Reference for Special Branch'.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice These Terms of Reference are vague, there's no clear role assigned to Special Branch and a problematic definition of 'subversion' – no wonder Kirsten calls them “woefully inadequate”!

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice As we heard in some detail yesterday, the definition of 'subversion' they chose to use was one that didn't include “unlawful”.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Robin Cook MP brought this up in Parliament back in 1978

and pointed out that this was therefore an 'invitation' to the police “ to stick their nose into any form of political or industrial activity”.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Other MPs raised concerns throughout the 70s, with the Home Secretary of the day, and demanded better public scrutiny of Special Branch surveillance.

However these MPs did not know about the #spycops unit's existence.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Senior police officers like Commander Gilbert also questioned (in 1974) the work that Special Branches were being asked to do for the Security Services.

He complained that the police were short-staffed and tied up by this “totally unproductive activity”.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Last year we heard about #spycops reporting intimate personal details of schoolchildren...

It now appears clear that this was done at the behest of MI5, who specifically asked Special Branch to gather this sort of intelligence in 1975.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The way that the Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP) was targeted is typical.

This was a political party, that stood in elections etc.

It was clearly not subversive, or violent, or any threat to public order, and the SDS knew this.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice However it was infiltrated by 'Mike Scott' (aka HN298), who even attended their education centre, White Meadows – contrary to the wishes of DAC Gilbert.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice In 1979, Mike Ferguson (by this time a senior officer in the unit) agreed to “put a source into the WRP”, suggesting that this could “serve as a stepping stone” for further infiltration.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The Home Office knew that there were issues, and that there was no “water-tight basis” that could justify the level of State surveillance going on at this time.
They knew it was unlawful.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice There was a decision made at the very end of the decade not to rewrite the Terms of Reference because “it might stimulate more questions than it answered”.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice There is also evidence of Home Office complicity in ensuring that there was no proper external oversight of Special Branch or these kinds of unlawful policing practices.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Did HMCIC ever learn about the existence of the SDS, and if not, why not?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Margaret Thatcher was elected to power in 1979.

It is noted that she did not share her “predecessors’ disquiet about the work of Special Branches” !

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice We then moved on to discussion of the SDS's internal rules and training.

#spycops

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The #spycops unit's founder, Chief Inspector Conrad Dixon, did provide guidance for the SDS in a document he wrote in 1968: ‘Penetration of Extremist Groups’

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Along with the Home Officer Circular of the time, entitled 'Informants who take part in crime’ there was plenty of guidance available to the new unit.

However it seems that this was ignored.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice There were lots of suggestions – eg that deployments should last no longer than 12 months.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Dixon's original advice was that undercovers should not “take office in a group, chair meetings, draft leaflets, speak in public or initiate activity”

However we he disregarded this advice himself, by voting in meetings.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice For some reason William Furner (HN3095) is not being called to give any evidence.

He described Dixon as “having a very loose reign”.

Riby Wilson, another SDS manager, said Dixon was “very free and easy”.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice We know that 'Sean Lynch' (HN68) was deployed from 1968 until 1973 – far longer than the suggested 12 month limit – and 'Roger Harris' (HN200) was deployed from 1974-77.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Deployments lasting 4 years seemed to become standardised

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice .
“I was told that my deployment would be 4 years" said HN304 ‘Graham Coates’ - deployed from 1976-79.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice "I was told that this was the perfect length because it would take 12 months to become properly efficient, but if the deployment was more than 4 years I would either burn out or become so stressed that I would be ineffective”

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The SDS Annual Report of 1982 noted that it was “normally a maximum of four years”.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Did the unit's managers positively decide this?
Did they properly consider this decision?
Who was involved in this decision?
Were any risks taken into consideration or were the UCOs simply allowed to drift on without robust management and clear guidance?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice She says "it's not rocket science" - obvious that long, loose deployments would lead to problems

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice “I would give them fatherly advice like not taking drugs, not getting involved with mischief and, not getting illnesses” said Roy Creamer

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice 2Managers clearly decided that married UCOs were preferable for deployments.

Very few are willing to admit, however, that this was an attempt to guard against sexual activity when undercover.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice One said "The reason married men were favoured is because it was considered that there would be less temptation for them to enter into inappropriate relationships with women".

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice and went on to add "The maximum that an officer was allowed to be a ‘hairy’ was two years, this was considered an absolute rule"

However this 'absolute rule' was repeatedly broken

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Did the managers simply ignore the obvious risks, knowing what the inevitable consequences might be, particularly regarding inappropriate relationships?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice In the very early years of the SDS, Roy Creamer and Conrad Dixon had significant knowledge of left-wing politics and would provide political briefings.

However, apart from some time in the back-office, UCOs reported having no, or very scant, training.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice There was certainly no training for UCOs about not actively participating in groups, what intelligence to collect, and privacy concerns.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Some #spycops have reported the existence of a large, possibly black, loose-leaf folder with notations from previous officers on tradecraft - how come this folder hasn't been mentioned by everyone else?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice This Inquiry must, we say, also look at the basic police training given to all UCOs whilst attending police staff college at Bramshill.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Police officers must surely have received basic training on legal principles and professional conduct, such as: the lawfulness of entering a private property without a search warrant, engaging in sexual relationships whilst on duty and participating in crimes...

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice If so, how did #spycops and indeed any of the managers, reconcile this training with the undemocratic and illegitimate system of undercover policing they encountered when they joined the SDS?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice And what training did their managers have?
How did this affect the development of the unit and the tradecraft & techniques used by the #spycops ?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice How did inexperienced managers such as Derek Brice and Geoffrey Craft - neither of whom had ever worked undercover in the SDS - learn about tradecraft?

Did they also read the black loose-leaf folder in the back office?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Evidence about training and tradecraftt is especially important to the bereaved families whose loved ones identities were appropriated by #spycops

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice This immoral and unlawful practice began in this period, and became normalised within the SDS, and adopted by some officers in the (later unit) NPOIU.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The public order justifications put forward do not stand up to any scrutiny.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Within the vast quantity of undercover reporting before this Inquiry, there is very little evidence of reporting relevant to public disorder, the apparent raison d’etre of the SDS.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice There is little evidence within the disclosure to support managers’ assertions that the SDS was successful in public order policing.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice However we note that according to Chief Inspector Derek Kneale in 1975 “there has, over the past years, been a decline in the disorders associated with political demonstrations”.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The targeting of the WRP by the SDS provides a perfect example of how far the SDS had drifted further into unlawful and shadowy work that posed no threat to public order.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice How can managers giving evidence to this Inquiry be so sure that the SDS was making a positive and important contribution to public order policing during this T1 era?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Is there any evidence that they were qualitatively assessing the usefulness of SDS reporting from a public order perspective?

Is there any evidence that they sought and obtained feedback from their clients in public order divisions?

The answer can only be ‘no’.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The usefulness of the SDS to public order policing is best summed up by Roy Creamer when he states that: “the idea that the SDS would find out and reveal plans was wishful thinking, I think"

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Various senior officers formed a 'study group' to examine the usefulness of the SDS's work and the contribution they made to public order policing, in an attempt to request more funding from the Home Office for the #spycops

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice However the report they produced dodged the question of public order, and became a missed opportunity for senior managers to give an honest appraisal of the utility, justification, and indeed lawfulness of the SDS

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice They failed to face up to the precise extent to which their role had become dominated by intelligence collection for the Security Services and MI5

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The significant public order events of this era, namely, Red Lion Square, Southall, and Lewisham were not pre-empted or policed successfully because of any work conducted by the SDS.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The demonstration at Southall was undoubtedly a catastrophic failure.
It resulted in the death of the teacher, Blair Peach.

HN41, who gave evidence in the secret hearings in T1P4, spoke of “disastrous mistakes” in the public order planning for Southall

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice According to him “there was a perception that the public order branch weren’t perhaps as receptive to some of our ideas as we thought they might have been"

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The left wing and campaign groups the SDS targeted were an inevitable reaction to injustices in society, not the cause of 'public disorder'.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The failure of the SDS operations at Red Lion Square, Southall, and Lewisham was the failure to recognise that the fundamental cause of 'public disorder' at such events was public revulsion against fascist mobilisations, and the police being seen to be protecting them.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The managers were ultimately responsible for the quality, accuracy and relevance of the reporting produced by the #spycops

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice There is evidence to suggest that some managers were aware of this and either tailored the reporting or turned a blind eye to irrelevant reporting, 'banter', gossip etc

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Managers did not carry out any qualitative analysis, did not assess the value of the #spycops reports (for public order purposes or countering subversion), did not see the threat assessments produced (if any), and failed to consider the threat posed to freedom of speech.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice These were obvious matters that were being raised in public, in Parliament, and went to the heart of the lawfulness and justification of the activities of the SDS.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Why weren't these issues considered at the time? Why was there such a fundamental lack of critical thinking?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice By signing off on these reports, managers were confirming the accuracy of their contents.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The suggestion by Trevor Butler that his role was merely ‘editorial’ is not only a staggering admission of managerial failure but also a blatant attempt to create distance from documents that are obviously flawed and misleading.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice The #spycopsinquiry must consider the lawfulness of these operations.

On the face of existing evidence, these were unlawful, ideologically motivated, and profoundly undemocratic political policing operations.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Some #spycops have stated that they were tasked to infiltrate specific groups, while others described largely having free rein and often drifted around left wing or anarchist groups, reporting on whatever or whoever they came across.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice It's suggested that C Squad was involved in deciding who should be targeted. Managers had some influence.
Was targeting guidance coming from higher up in Special Branch/ the wider @metpolice ?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Mrs must now explain what they know about political direction in SDS targeting decisions.

This is particularly important to Category E - Trade unions and trade union members.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Did managers query whether it was in fact lawful and appropriate in a democratic society for police officers to target groups and individuals engaged in lawful activities?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Moving on to consider welfare and supervision...
#spycops behaved in inappropriate and abhorrent ways, whilst they were supposedly being actively managed

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Managers now deny having any knowledge of both inappropriate sexual relationships and any of the deeply sexist and misogynistic banter, even though they were visiting the safe houses wheer this banter took place approximately twice a week.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice It has emerged that more evidence emerged in the recent secret T1P$ hearings of #spycops sexist banter and joking about sexual conquests when undercover.
However NSCPs have been unable to explore this further as they were excluded from these closed hearings.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Almost every SDS Annual Report to the Home Office emphasises the close supervision of officers and managerial attention to their welfare.

Geoffrey Craft says “I do not think any police officers were more carefully monitored than this lot”

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Despite this bold assertion, Geoffrey Craft and Angus MacIntosh both deny knowing that HN297 Rick Clark & HN300 ‘Jim Pickford’ engaged in sexual relationships with activists, with the latter falling in love and leaving his wife.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice We know from the gisted evidence disclosed in preparation for the secret hearings in T1P4 that an undercover reports Geoffrey Craft specially advising against sexual relationships stating, “it would be beyond stupid, and cause all sorts of problems”

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice This Inquiry must get to the bottom of the managers’ attitudes to sexual relationships and pin down exactly what is meant by “all sorts of problems”.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice We recently learnt that Rick Clark had a reputation for being “a bit of a lad”, which included “womanising”.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice However, again it's only in the gisted material from the secret hearings in T1P4 that we learnt that HN300 was “a sexual predator” and “was confined to the office because he was an alcoholic”.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice One witness in those secret hearings stated that it was Angus McIntosh who dealt with HN300 falling in love when undercover.

However this info is conspicuously absent from Angus McIntosh’s own witness statement.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice Similarly, Geoffrey Craft continues to claim no knowledge of the activities of HN13 ‘Barry Desmond Loader’, who was arrested twice in 1977 and 1978.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice However disclosed documents show that other managers interfered in the court process, and an update was given to the @metpoliceuk Commissioner.

It is inconceivable that Craft would not have known of this.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk This Inquiry must press the managers to explain these glaring contradictions in the evidence.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Were managers deliberately overstating their monitoring and supervision of UCOs, or did they know what was going on and wilfully turn a blind eye

Or was it the case that they positively sanctioned such conduct to maximise the product for their “customers”?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk The #spycops attended weddings and funerals of those being targeted, spent time in their private homes, and babysat young children when undercover.

What efforts were made to check and protect the welfare of those targeted and reported on?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Was there any consideration for the welfare of the families of the deceased children whose identities were being used?

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk In terms of significant management failures and the accuracy and honesty of the SDS Annual reports, certain UCOs and deployments stand out...

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk one example is 'Phil Cooper' aka HN155. He infiltrated the Waltham Forest Anti-Nuclear Campaign (‘WFANC’), the SWP, and the Right to Work Campaign (RTW).

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk He gained two notable positions of responsibility - as a treasurer in the WFANC and then in the RTW.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Reporting signed off by #spycops manager Dave Short notes that in the RTW, Ernie Roberts MP was nominally the treasurer, while HN155 signed the cheques and controlled the account – a significant position of responsibility and control

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk By June 1982, his managers realised that HN155 was a problematic officer, and there were serious issues with his performance - it is recorded that his “days were numbered” due to other “misdemeanours” and that he was soon to be withdrawn.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk However in July, he still hadn't been withdrawn. Another manager, 'Sean Lynch' (HN68) is described as “slightly worried by the case because Cooper’s position in the Right to Work Movement gives him regular access to Ernie Roberts MP and meetings at the House of Commons”

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk It seems that he understood the potential scandal that would erupt in Parliament, if it came to light that Special Branch were conducting covert surveillance in close proximity to, and quite possibly on, an MP and in Parliament itself.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk HN155 initially admitted to a risk assessor that he had engaged in two, three or possibly more sexual relationships when undercover, but he then later denied this

#spycops

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk He also told the risk assessors that he "lived a full alternative life", and was a heavy drinker and occasional drug-taker during his deployment.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Julia Poynter met him during this time. She witnessed him getting stoned regularly, and says that on one occasion he was so inebriated he fell off his chair and broke it.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Meanwhile the managers continue to claim that they kept a close watch on the welfare of the #spycops

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk The @metpoliceuk seemed incapable of appreciating that, in a democratic society, citizens could campaign against injustice and demand social change on matters of social and public importance, such as racism, without being subversive.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk They were fixed in their own deeply politicised, racist, and misogynistic narratives which saw public order as inextricably linked to organised groups on the left.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk This is classically exemplified by the 1976 comments of Rollo Watts about "a build-up of racial tension in Brixton"

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk According to him, Special Branch was studying this problem, and wanted to "discover to what extent left-wing extremists were influencing the coloured population in this area.”

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk The review section of the 1981 Annual Report clearly shows that 1981 was a deeply unsuccessful year for the SDS – they were focussed on peaceful marches and rallies on wage poverty and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Meanwhile, the Brixton Riots in April 1981 were amongst the most significant public order events of the period.

They were not caused by left wing campaign groups but were spontaneous and uncoordinated uprisings against racist policing.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk This was not understood or honestly reflected upon by the SDS in the 1981 Annual Report, despite the findings of the Scarman Inquiry.

The SDS seemed incapable of honestly appraising the roots and cause of public disorder in this era.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk In the same way that racism and political bias undermined the MPSB/SDS response to popular protests in Brixton, there were parallels in the way in which women were perceived and treated.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk It is clear that a pernicious culture of misogyny contributed to highly inappropriate policing decisions affecting women.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk The #spycops considered it was appropriate to target women campaigning around reproductive rights and fair pay, which were deemed to be "subversive".

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Managers thought nothing of belittling these women in sexist and derogatory ways, such as the comment that “500 women, many patently emotionally unstable and quite paranoically opposed to men,” attended The Women’s Liberation spring conference

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Throughout this time, there is strong evidence to suggest that managers repeatedly either condoned or turned a blind eye to increasingly frequent incidents of inappropriate sexual behaviour by their officers, as well as misogynistic banter.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk The fact that such banter was considered harmless and not worthy of managerial challenge is evidence itself of deep-seated institutional misogyny.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk In the view of Richard Waklker (HN368) “men who say things about women don’t always mean it,or follow through with what they say".

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Ironically, managers and indeed the MPSB hierarchy were more than willing to keep an extremely close eye on some UCO relationships with women but, it seems, only when it suited their interests.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk One example was the case of 'Paul Gray' (HN126), who was seemingly having a sexual relationship with another police officer, in police accommodation.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Manager Barry Moss took it upon himself to visit Paul's wife, and it appears he did so in order to intimidate her into keeping quiet about her husband's infidelity.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk It is telling that managers thought it appropriate and lawful to use police resources in such an illegitimate and corrupt manner to cover-up potential UCO misdeeds, rather than consider the substance of the allegations that were being made – i.e. serious police misconduct.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk There is a clear parallel between this and the way in which the police tend to react (and assign resources) vs anyone else they consider a threat to themselves - for example the Blair Peach campaign and the Stephen Lawrence campaign.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk There was a pervasive belief that nobody would ever find out about the #spycops - undercover officers were given the idea that they could operate outside of the law.

Managers even used this to justify the use of deceased children's identities

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Evidence that has been produced for this 'tranche' includes more information about the #blacklisting and vetting which the #spycops contributed to.
It is important that SDS managers are asked to explain their role in this abhorrent and devastating practice.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk We now know that #spycops were tasked with spying on the WRP, including one individual, Roy Battersby.

As he says in his statement, there is clear evidence that he, as a BAFTA winner, was one of those blacklisted. There is a very clear paper trail leading directly to the SDS.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Battersby states that this practice was an attack on the democratic process (elections), privacy and freedom of political and artistic expression, in particular the plurality of voices and standpoints on our national broadcaster, the BBC.
#Blacklisting
#spycops

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Heaven ended with some short points from the NSCPs.

- We need a clear timetable for the rest of this Inquiry.

- We would like to make submissions on Mitting's intention to publish an 'Interim Report'

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk - An investigation into the SDS cannot be done in a vacuum, and this Inquiry must examine to what extent the #spycops operations were influenced and directed by the Security Services and others.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk - Regular Inquiry management hearings need to be scheduled - covering important matters like the Interim Report, the scope etc - between now and the next set of evidential hearings.

These should be done in public - it's a Public Inquiry after all

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk In conclusion:

The wrongdoing engaged in by the SDS was not an exception to an otherwise lawful and justified policing operation.

Rather, the SDS, from its very inception, was unlawful, in contravention of basic policing principles and a threat to democracy.

#spycops

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk The SDS was not simply a rogue unit, operating in hiding and insulated from internal MPSB and Home Office scrutiny.

It was specifically designed to remain a secret from the public and from Parliament.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk It was only by remaining under a cloak of secrecy that the SDS could carry out the type of surveillance activities that were not, and are not, permitted in a democratic society.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Those who knew about the existence of the #spycops unit sanctioned its evolution, and took every opportunity, on behalf of the Governments of the day, to ensure it remained a secret.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk The judgment of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in Wilson puts beyond doubt that undercover policing operations of the SDS and later units violated fundamental human rights...

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk These included:

the right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment,

the right to private and family life,

and the rights to the freedoms of expression, assembly, and association.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk The NSCP group endorse and adopt the opening statement made on behalf of 'Category H' Core Participants for T1P3, which sets out the way in which SDS operations failed to comply with basic requirements of the common law, international human rights law and administrative law,

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Many of the managers giving evidence in T1P3 make reference to the fact that the SDS practices went on over fifty years ago and should be considered in their historical context.
However, that is simply not correct.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk The illegitimate surveillance, political policing and abhorrent and unlawful tradecraft and misogyny which was allowed to become embedded in this 'tranche' (1968 - 1982), set the course for the future of undercover policing operations.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk These abhorrent practices survived and even flourished following legal reforms, such as the introduction of the Regulation of Investigatory Power Act 2000.

This will be explored in later Tranches.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk A fundamental purpose of this Inquiry is to identify why there was such a catastrophic failure of policing at the heart of British democracy.

The public are demanding answers, which can only be obtained by a thorough & effective investigation in public, and with full disclosure.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk The #spycopsinquiry should not cut corners for reasons of political or financial expediency
This is the only way that the victims of unlawful state surveillance can achieve truth & justice and ensure that these fundamental breaches of human rights never happen again.

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk Finally for today, we were provided with a Summary (created by the @ucpinquiry ) of two civilian witness statements - those of 'Madeleine' and Julia Poynter.
You can find the full written Statements, and associated exhibits mentioned in them, via ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/upl…
#spycops

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk The Inquiry will recommence at 10am tomorrow morning, with 'live' evidence at the Thistle Hotel in Central London.
This will be streamed online, with a ten-minute delay in place.
More info: ucpi.org.uk/2022/05/11/ope…

#spycops

@UndercoverNet @ucpinquiry @MetPolice @metpoliceuk @threadreaderapp unroll