Thread by @thepagey

It’s time to talk about moral injury and the Army.

Because if it’s not fixed, I think it might fundamentally alter:

- who stays and who goes,
- how the Army is led
- who the Army attracts.

What I’m saying is - it might shift the character of the Army & service.

A thread.

Let’s start with a definition

Moral injury is distressing psychological, behavioral, social, impact in the aftermath of exposure to events.

It’s different to PTSD - which is based on trauma, processing and recalling memory, and/or the disturbance of the present by the past.

Moral injury occurs when people experience a discrepancy between the moral code they hold, in relation to how they operate within their workplace, which negatively impacts their psychological wellbeing and mental health

We can see how it plays out in a values based organisation.

Moral injury is based in moral judgment, and having it requires a working conscience.

PTSD and Moral Injury can share some symptoms, like anger, addiction, or depression, but moral injury has no diagnosis or treatment method. Which is why we *really* need to pay attention to it

So what about MI and the Army?

Campaigns and Post Campaign rebuttals.

There’s a discomfort with allowing and accepting critique of the Army’s performance in recent campaigns. Everything from NI, Iraq, Afghanistan.

We need to accept this is our “post-Vietnam” era. But we don’t.

Instead there’s this uncomfortable denial and dismissal of scholarship that surfaces some ugly truths.

There’s the “othering” of politicians, civil servants, agencies like DE&S, other services (RN) and the ogre that decides to harm the Army that presumably lives in Head Office.

Deep down, we know the Army must have take a share of getting things wrong.

But we never talk about that. We seldom admit that the way we ran campaigns, operations and tactics may have been deeply flawed.

Hollow slogans create this MI discomfort “never defeated tactically” etc.

2. Values and Standards.

The Army has suffered a spate of incidents recently from fraud, rape, murder, sexual & domestic assault, racism, bullying etc.

Similar slogans.
“Bad apples” “isolated incidents” etc.

This is at odds with loved experience and built in morals of joiners

There’s also been some misguided defences deployed.

“Protect reputation at all costs”

What if that cost, of your defence and defensive behaviour, and narrative is the very reputation you seek to protect?

I think that’s started.

3. Say Do Gap.

Things won’t get better through activism, advocacy and people’s video messages.

They change through action.

Visible, visceral, action.
That people see, hear and crucially “feel”.

The Army needs to get better at that. Less “managing out” & sound bytes.

Action.

4. Knowing what needs to be done.

Numerous reports highlight incidents, causes and recommend actions.

Chilcot, Wigston, Women in AF, Race and Equality.
Good and bad, it’s all there.

Casting for evidence or recommendations is less effective than adoption and implementation.

5. The challenge of change.

Too often activity is confused for success.
Process confused for accomplishment.

The Army isn’t that great at change, it accelerates under crisis, not proactively, as part of culture and growth.

This requires skill, practice and practitioners.

6. The offer vs reality.

The brochure might not match the lived experience. The yeah but crowd will go hard on this tweet.

Keep perspective, experience is one of many. But the trends are there, of a disparity, between what the Army sells, and what it does.

Be mindful of that.

All of these things are pieces of a puzzle that make up moral injury

The gap between our inner code and what we see or experience.

It’s debilitating. Nobody and no-thing, is perfect.

We need to move debate to include this important aspect of mental health and well-being.