In this article published 6 years ago, @OliverDTurner and I argue that the American discourses of 'virtue' and 'power', shared by most Americans, are productive of the subjectivity of neoconservatism, which, despite its widely abhorred manifestation in the Bush Doctrine, is thus 
more normatively appealing and more enduring than commonly understood. In fact, it could be argued that there has been a quiet neocon-ization of the West over the past two decades, with many Western countries appropriating American 'virtue' and identifying with US power.
The fact that no one talks about neoconservatism anymore today is not because it's gone, but because it's gone capillary. The deep faith in US-led virtue and power is such that the neoconservative motto of 'moral clarity' and 'military strength' has replaced good old-fashioned
diplomacy as the go-to approach to international relations. The rhetoric of the 'Free & Open Indo-Pacific', the formation of the #Quad and #AUKUS, and the expansion of #NATO are all to some extent the products of this neocon-ization of Western identity and foreign policy.
Without an understanding of the productive power of neoconservatism as a discourse in the US and the West in general, we'd be unable to fully grasp the dynamics and intensity of ongoing US/Western policy towards China (and Taiwan). journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13…
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