In the last 93 days, we have seen a constantly shifting operational environment, with both Ukrainian & Russian militaries experiencing tactical success and failures. This is very much the norm in warfare. Today, I explore the shifting tides of war in #Ukraine. 1/25 Ukrainian soldier in front line trenches in the Donbas
2/ This week, the Russian military has made steady progress in the conduct of its eastern offensive in the Donbas. While it has made little progress around Izyum, one of the key Russian axes of advance, progress elsewhere has been more apparent.
3/ Around, Popasna, the Russians have consolidated their hold of the town and have pushed west and north to the main highway that runs further east to Severodonetsk. Russian vehicle in Popasna
4/ Northwest of Popasna, the Russians have captured the town of Lyman, a centre that sits on important rail links to the east, south and west.
5/ These two tactical battles are probably part of a wider Russian operational design to envelop the territory that forms the last parts of Luhansk under Ukrainian control. Importantly, this includes the city of Severodonetsk. Map showing situation in Severodonetsk salient courtesy of @
6/ For months now, the city of Severodonetsk has represented the tip of Ukraine’s salient into Russian-held eastern Ukraine. Not only is it an important military objective for the Russians, it also has political value.
7/ Severodonetsk is the last major Ukrainian town in Luhansk. Capturing it will provide the Russians with a significant victory in their information war campaign.
8/ The Ukrainian position around Severodonetsk is precarious. The defenders there are a large force that includes multiple brigades of the Ukrainian Army. It could conceivably hold out for days, weeks or months. Map showing wider situation in the Russian eastern offensive
9/ But with Russian forces closing the northern and southern arms of an envelopment further to the west, and probably able to cut supply routes to the city in the short term, the tactical and political necessity to hold out in Severodonetsk is questionable.
10/ The Ukrainian forces that might be lost in this Russian envelopment are too valuable to lose in such an action. As such, the Ukrainian high command will need to make a tough decision soon about ceding Severodonetsk and surrounding territory.
11/ Not only would this preserve important Ukrainian Army brigades, but it might also shorten the ‘frontage’ or the length of the defensive front, that the Ukrainians need to defend in this part of the Donbas. It also lengthens Russian supply lines.
12/ The past week offers an important lesson on war. There are times in war when the enemy succeeds, despite the best efforts of those who oppose them. Most times, this is unpredictable, regardless of previous results. Thus are the shifting tides of war.
13/ What insights might we take from the events in eastern Ukraine in the past week? I think there are three.
14/ First, the Russians have learned and adapted from their earlier failures of strategy and tactics. Instead of a broad front and penny packeting forces, they have concentrated a significant force in a smaller part of Ukraine.
15/ The Russians have used their main advantage – massed firepower through gun & rocket artillery – to slowly roll south and east behind devastating barrages. This is not very different to how the allies eventually made their operational breakthroughs on the western front in WW1.
16/ And the Russians have moved slowly to ensure they don’t outrun their logistics while also keeping sufficient forces available for rear area security.
17/ Success can teach some things, but never as much as failure. The Russians have clearly begun to integrate some of the lessons from their northern campaign to capture Kyiv. Whether these extend from tactical lessons to the strategic realm, however, remains to be seen.
18/ Second, the Ukrainians cannot be expected to win every battle. Despite the magnificent strategic and tactical ability, they have demonstrated thus far, every Army in history eventually loses a few battles. And ceding ground to preserve a force is useful in the short term.
19/ There is little open-source info about the status or losses of the Ukrainians. But we should expect that despite the inspiration of defending their land, weariness will be starting to set in. And, they are fighting on multiple mini-fronts in the east.
20/ The Ukrainians are having to make some tough calls about priorities for logistics, artillery & air support. They can’t support every fight at every point of the battlefield equally. The key is ensuring that tactical losses don’t translate into Russian operational gains.
21/ Finally, as forecast some time ago, the campaign in the east of Ukraine is destructive and brutal, featuring the largest clash of arms in Europe since WW2. Both sides are far from exhausted, and both have the will, mass & supporting logistics to continue for some time. Destruction caused by artillery at a river crossing site
22/ Despite what Ukraine has achieved so far, the Russians have demonstrated no willingness at all to step back from this war. They probably believe they now have the initiative in their Popasna-Lyman-Severodonetsk offensive and will want to exploit this.
23/ Whether this translates into a wider Russian military advantage needs more assessment. If Ukraine has mobilised 700K troops (versus less than 200K Russians in Ukraine) & can sustain (or build) Western support, Ukrainian advantages will come into play in the medium term.
24/ The current Russian gains, and Ukrainian challenges, in the east are normal elements of warfare. It is an example of the dynamism and shifting tides of war. We should be cautious in predicting an outcome. End.
25/ Thanks to @IAPonomarenko @Maxar @UAweapons @RALee85 @danspium @War_mapper washingtonpost.com & nytimes.com whose images I used in this thread.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Mick Ryan, AM

Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @WarintheFuture

May 30
In the 95 days since Russia invaded #Ukraine, I have explored adaptation and how military institutions learn during war. Today I examine what the last couple of weeks in the Donbas tells us about how the Russians are learning in the ongoing #adaptation battle. 1/25 Image
2/ Sir Michael Howard wrote in “The Uses and Abuses of Military History” that military institutions normally get the next war wrong, mostly for reasons beyond their control. As such, an important virtue for military organizations must be adaptability to unexpected events.
3/ In March I explored the concept of adaptation in war, as well as how Russian transformation efforts since 2008 appear to have paid minimal dividends for them at the tactical & strategic levels. abc.net.au/news/2022-03-1…
Read 25 tweets
May 23
While the Russian Army’s offensive in the east continues, it is likely in the short term that they will reach the limit of their offensive capability. As such, today I explore what transitioning to a defensive strategy might mean for the Russians in Ukraine. 1/25
2/ The Russian Army has been attempting to re-boot its efforts in Ukraine. It fired senior commanders accused of failure, reorganised combat units, begun digging in defensive positions north of Kharkiv & conducted additional strategic missile strikes across Ukraine.
3/ The focus of Russian forces at present is eastern Ukraine, and in particular, securing the Donbas region. Compared to the grand aspirations of Putin in the war’s early days, this is a relatively modest target.
Read 25 tweets
May 21
War is an incredibly destructive human endeavour. And despite their courage and resilience, the war in #Ukraine has been a violent tragedy for the people of Ukraine. But the war is also a learning opportunity for military institutions around the world. 1/25
2/ In his book, “War: What Is It Good For?” Ian Morris argues that war throughout history has benefitted humans because it led to bigger, more complex societies, ruled by governments which then suppressed as much internal violence as possible.
3/ Clausewitz saw its ‘benefits’ in more simple terms – as an “act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.”
Read 25 tweets
May 17
Today, an examination of the Ukrainian strategy of 'corrosion', that - so far - has seen it successfully fend off a larger and (theoretically, at least) more powerful invader. 1/25 Image via @UAWeapons
2/ Throughout their Ukraine campaign, Russia’s military has been forced to continually re-assess its strategic objectives. The Russian Plan A - seize Kyiv, Kharkiv and other key points, capture government leaders and force a political accommodation – failed. Image from @war_mapper
3/ Plan B for the Russians - a multi-axis attacks in the south, east, northeast, north & in the skies above on a slower timetable – also failed. They then shifted to the Donbas and the creation of a ‘land bridge’ from Russia to Crimea.
Read 25 tweets
May 15
The battle of Kharkiv has been won by #Ukraine, with Russian forces withdrawing to the north & east. Today, analysis on what is next for Ukraine’s military as it exploits a faltering Russian eastern offensive. 1/25 Image
2/ The war in the east, and the war in #Ukraine more generally, is approaching an important turning point. vox.com/policy-and-pol…
3/ The Ukrainian success in the battle for Kharkiv is significant. It sees the recapture of Ukrainian territory and will ensure the city is out of Russian field artillery range. These are important humanitarian & political achievements for #Ukraine. forbes.com/sites/michaelp…
Read 26 tweets
May 13
I was going to do a thread today on the implications of Ukraine’s offensive around Kharkiv. Instead, I have pushed that to tomorrow in order to discuss the Russian river crossing operation over the Severskyi Donets this week in #Ukraine. 1/
2/ This Russian river crossing has gained attention because it resulted in the loss of (probably) a battalion tactical group and some critical engineer equipment. The reality is, it is worse than that. thedrive.com/the-war-zone/d…
3/ Before examining why, let’s explore these types of operations. Assault river crossings are one of the most difficult combined arms operations possible. Not only do all the elements of the ground team need to come together in a tightly orchestrated series of events.
Read 23 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(