Thread by @caparsons

New Post: The Policy and Political Implications of 'Securing Canada's Telecommunications Systems' christopher-parsons.com/the-policy-and… #cdnpoli #cdnnatsec

Three findings from analyzing the recent “Securing Canada’s Telecommunications Systems” policy statement:

1. the government is unclear when referring to “supply chain breaches” making it challenging to assess the specific risks being addressed

2. The government may be banning Huawei and ZTE principally on the basis of American export restrictions placed on Chinese vendors and, thus, be following the same model as the United Kingdom which was forced to ban Huawei following American actions; and

3. Establishing the security and protection of telecommunications systems as an “overriding objective” of Canadian telecommunications policy could have long-term implications for Canadians’ privacy interests.

Policy Implications:
1. We’re certain to see reforms to CSE’s Security Review Program. Open question: what will Huawei’s reaction be, and to what extent will it modify its involvement in the assessments of its 4G equipment that is currently assessed?

2. We could see an update to the Canadian Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee’s “Security Best Practices for Canadian Telecommunications Service Providers (TSPs).”

3. Open questions of what it means to make security “an overriding objective” for 🇨🇦 Telecoms Policy

4. Assuming security assumes a heightened role, then more direction to the CRTC will be needed. May also need to revisit role(s) of the Privacy Commissioner, Heritage Department, etc that have equities at play

5. I hope the government lives up to its transparency in national security commitment, with the effect of producing/releasing an equivalent to the UK’s ‘Telecoms Supply Chain Review Report’

Political Implications of Banning Huawei and ZTE:
1. Might be able to declare we made a ‘sovereign’ decision by waiting for the Michaels come home and USA to stop bullying Canada on Huawei. But if decision was forced by US sanctions on Huawei how sovereign a decision was it?

2. A vendor-neutral assessment might let Canadian foreign service officers argue this isn’t an anti-China decision but based on security

3. How the ban was announced was a slap to China’s face. Linked to natsec reviews of academic research, Canada should expect consequences.

4. I think the banning decision is mostly geostrategic and forward looking, as opposed to based on contemporary threats posed by Huawei/ZTE equipment

5. Will reforms to the Telecom Act be linked with broader government strategies on foreign policy, industrial policy, and cybersecurity? While I hope so, I’m not going to hold my breath

The government *must not* link Telecom Act reform, needed to enable security assessments, to broader a extension of powers to law enforcement, security, or intelligence agencies. Doing so would poison the debate and bill.

Ultimately, I think the reforms to the Telecoms Act are arguably very needed. But need to supplement with Canada working to convene international allies and partners to collectively undertaking security review of vendors’ equipment and sharing results.

Collective information assurance will help to better secure individuals all around the world. If Canada is going to be a ‘convening nation’ then it should get to work convening collective information assurance meetings to enhance cybersecurity around the world.

Again, you can find the full post at: christopher-parsons.com/the-policy-and…