Kelsey Davenport Profile picture
Jun 14 19 tweets 4 min read
The US may disagree with IAEA DG Grossi that efforts to restore the #IranDeal will be dealt a "fatal blow" in 3-4 weeks as a result of Iran's decision to unplug 27 cameras, but the agency's assessment is still significant in the domestic debate & could effect the INARA process 1/
If the IAEA cannot reliably reconstruct a history of Iran's nuclear activities during this period of reduced transparency, it will fuel speculation that Iran diverted nuclear materials for a covert weapons or hedging program. 2/
Even if there is no evidence of diversion, Iran's history of lying and obfuscation about its nuclear program will drive concerns about illegal activity. 3/
There are also implications for diplomacy. If an agreement is reached to restore the JCPOA or a new deal is negotiated after the agency loses continuity of knowledge, the IAEA's ability to verify said agreement will come into play. 4/
Under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), the Secretary of State must submit a verification assessment to Congress within 5 days of reaching an agreement with Iran. That report includes an assessment of the IAEA's ability to verify a deal. 5/
Specifically it must assess if the IAEA can "effectively implement the verification regime required by or related to the agreement" 6/

congress.gov/bill/114th-con…
If regards to the JCPOA, the Biden Administration has indicated any agreement to restore the JCPOA will be subject to INARA review. Will the Biden Administration be able to make the assessment that the IAEA can implement the verification regime? 7/
Absent negotiating new measures to address the continuity of knowledge issue, I'm not sure.

Grossi has already cast doubt on the IAEA's ability to implement the JCPOA's verification measures after this 3-4 week window. 8/
In his June 9 press conference, Grossi said that after 4 weeks "we wouldn't be able to give them the accuracy that they require" because the agency would not know what the baseline is. Hence the "fatal blow" to the JCPOA. 9/

iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2022/jun/…
So if the iAEA says it can't implement the JCPOA's verification measures, it will be challenging for the Biden administration to positively assess in the INARA required reporting that the agency can effectively implement the deal. 10/
Biden may still be able to maintain the support he needs in Congress to block a resolution of disapproval under INARA, which would prevent him from waiving sanctions. But space between the US & the IAEA on verification could damage its sustainability. 11/
A future President could use it as justification not to issue the certification required by INARA every 90 days, which includes the assessment that iran is "transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the agreement." 12/
Failure to certify would trigger a window during which Congress could use an expedited process to reimpose sanctions. 13/
Of course a future President could just follow Trump's irresponsible & dangerous approach of withdrawing from the JCPOA without cause. But if they were looking for a way to reduce the perception of US blame, IAEA concerns about verification could be a justification. 14/
If efforts to restore the JCPOA are scrapped, the challenge of reconstructing a history of Iran's nuclear activities during this period will still likely have to be addressed in any future deal to prevent the issue of verification from complicating the US review process. 15/
That is doable - but it is much more difficult than restoring the JCPOA, or restoring/negotiating new monitoring in the 3-4 weeks, which would extend the window for talks to restore the nuclear deal or conduct new negotiations. 16/
Restoring the JCPOA is the quickest route to rolling back Iran's advancing nuclear activities that pose a growing proliferation risk & restoring the most intrusive monitoring regime ever negotiated. 17/
An agreement to do just that exists in draft form. Hopefully this 3-4 week window will light a fire under the Biden administration to act with greater urgency to close a deal on restoring the JCPOA. 18/
It would be a failure of US leadership and complicate future diplomatic efforts to negotiate an agreement with Iran if Biden allows this window to close. 19/19

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More from @KelseyDav

May 8
4 years ago today, former President Trump made the irresponsible decision to withdraw the US from the #IranDeal - an agreement that had proved to be effective & verifiable in blocking Iran's pathways to the bomb.
Lets examine how damaging that decision has turned out to be 1/
Trump withdrew despite members of his own cabinet acknowledging that Iran was complying with its obligations. He also isolated the US by leaving the deal over the objections of key US allies that view the nuclear deal as critical for their security.
dw.com/en/frances-emm…

2/
Certain Trump administration officials even opposed the decision to withdraw. In Oct. 2017 then Defense Secretary Mattis said it was in the US national security interest to remain in the nuclear deal.

theguardian.com/us-news/2017/o…

3/
Read 16 tweets
Apr 26
Back from leave and disappointed to see that the future of the #IranDeal remains in limbo and so focused on the politics of modifying IRGC sanctions.

I'm surprised to see so little discussion about the nuclear cost Biden will pay if he fails to act. 1/
Lest we forget, the JCPOA is a nuclear deal. Designed to address a decades long nuclear crisis and block Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons. The imperative of restoring the deal's guardrails is getting lost in the debate about the political cost of delisting the IRGC. 2/
While Biden would certainly pay a price for delisting the IRGC, effective nonproliferation policy that benefits U.S. security, not domestic politics should guide decision making on JCPOA. 3/
Read 18 tweets
Sep 8, 2021
US Sec of State Blinken warned today that the US is getting "closer to the point at which a strict return to compliance with the #JCPOA does not reproduce the benefits that that agreement achieved"

That's not surprising given the bleak picture pained by the IAEA's new report 1/
The current IAEA monitoring situation is particularly serious. In addition to Iran's refusal to official clarify if the February 2021 special monitoring arrangement is still in place, Tehran has not responded to requests by the IAEA to access remote surveillance equipment. 2/
Under the Feb 2021 special arrangement, this equipment is recording information that will be given the IAEA if the JCPOA is restored. The data will ideally allow the IAEA to maintain knowledge about Iran's nuclear activities during the period when Iran limited inspector access.3/
Read 20 tweets
May 14, 2019
Today, both the NYT & Newsweek repeated claims that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons - it is irresponsible & dangerous reporting to let these claims stand unchecked. #IranDeal 1/
Both Pompeo & Bolton have muddied the water with loose rhetoric describing Iran’s nuclear program that implies Tehran has an active nuclear weapons program - despite US intelligence assessments and IAEA statements saying otherwise. 2/
Pompeo said April 22 that one of the U.S. demands of Iran is to “end your pursuit of nuclear weapons.”
state.gov/secretary/rema…

Bolton said in February that Iran “continues to seek nuclear weapons.”
3/
Read 8 tweets
May 21, 2018
US Secretary of State Pomepo is talking about the #IranDeal right now - c-span.org/networks/?chan…
Pompeo reiterates an often used criticism of the #IranDeal, namely that the agreement expires. This mischaracterization ignores key provisions that remain in place in perpetuity, such as more intrusive monitoring & a prohibition on weaponization activities
Pompeo says the Trump administration will ensure that Iran has no path to a nuclear weapon, by applying “unprecedented financial pressure” & the “strongest sanctions in history.”
Read 10 tweets
May 8, 2018
Ahead of Trump’s announcement on the #IranDeal - at which point he is expected to reimpose sanctions in violation of the agreement - it is worth recapping what nuclear agreement has accomplished & its nonproliferation value 1/
As a result of the 2013 interim deal, Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 20 percent was neutralized. The JCPOA prohibited enrichment to levels above 3.67 percent for 15 years 2/
Iran also removed nearly 20,000 centrifuges, including its more advanced IR-2 machines, and is capped at enriching uranium only with 5,060 IR-1s at Natanz. Iran can only stockpile the equivalent of 300 kilograms of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent 3/
Read 13 tweets

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