Thread by @KelseyDav

The US may disagree with IAEA DG Grossi that efforts to restore the #IranDeal will be dealt a "fatal blow" in 3-4 weeks as a result of Iran's decision to unplug 27 cameras, but the agency's assessment is still significant in the domestic debate & could effect the INARA process 1/

If the IAEA cannot reliably reconstruct a history of Iran's nuclear activities during this period of reduced transparency, it will fuel speculation that Iran diverted nuclear materials for a covert weapons or hedging program. 2/

Even if there is no evidence of diversion, Iran's history of lying and obfuscation about its nuclear program will drive concerns about illegal activity. 3/

There are also implications for diplomacy. If an agreement is reached to restore the JCPOA or a new deal is negotiated after the agency loses continuity of knowledge, the IAEA's ability to verify said agreement will come into play. 4/

Under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), the Secretary of State must submit a verification assessment to Congress within 5 days of reaching an agreement with Iran. That report includes an assessment of the IAEA's ability to verify a deal. 5/

Specifically it must assess if the IAEA can "effectively implement the verification regime required by or related to the agreement" 6/

congress.gov/bill/114th-con…

If regards to the JCPOA, the Biden Administration has indicated any agreement to restore the JCPOA will be subject to INARA review. Will the Biden Administration be able to make the assessment that the IAEA can implement the verification regime? 7/

Absent negotiating new measures to address the continuity of knowledge issue, I'm not sure.

Grossi has already cast doubt on the IAEA's ability to implement the JCPOA's verification measures after this 3-4 week window. 8/

In his June 9 press conference, Grossi said that after 4 weeks "we wouldn't be able to give them the accuracy that they require" because the agency would not know what the baseline is. Hence the "fatal blow" to the JCPOA. 9/

iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2022/jun/…

So if the iAEA says it can't implement the JCPOA's verification measures, it will be challenging for the Biden administration to positively assess in the INARA required reporting that the agency can effectively implement the deal. 10/

Biden may still be able to maintain the support he needs in Congress to block a resolution of disapproval under INARA, which would prevent him from waiving sanctions. But space between the US & the IAEA on verification could damage its sustainability. 11/

A future President could use it as justification not to issue the certification required by INARA every 90 days, which includes the assessment that iran is "transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the agreement." 12/

Failure to certify would trigger a window during which Congress could use an expedited process to reimpose sanctions. 13/

Of course a future President could just follow Trump's irresponsible & dangerous approach of withdrawing from the JCPOA without cause. But if they were looking for a way to reduce the perception of US blame, IAEA concerns about verification could be a justification. 14/

If efforts to restore the JCPOA are scrapped, the challenge of reconstructing a history of Iran's nuclear activities during this period will still likely have to be addressed in any future deal to prevent the issue of verification from complicating the US review process. 15/

That is doable - but it is much more difficult than restoring the JCPOA, or restoring/negotiating new monitoring in the 3-4 weeks, which would extend the window for talks to restore the nuclear deal or conduct new negotiations. 16/

Restoring the JCPOA is the quickest route to rolling back Iran's advancing nuclear activities that pose a growing proliferation risk & restoring the most intrusive monitoring regime ever negotiated. 17/

An agreement to do just that exists in draft form. Hopefully this 3-4 week window will light a fire under the Biden administration to act with greater urgency to close a deal on restoring the JCPOA. 18/

It would be a failure of US leadership and complicate future diplomatic efforts to negotiate an agreement with Iran if Biden allows this window to close. 19/19