Director for Nonproliferation Policy @ArmsControlNow focused on nuclear & missile programs in Iran & North Korea & nuclear security. (she/her)
Sep 4, 2023 • 20 tweets • 4 min read
Unsurprisingly #Iran's decision to slow production of 60% enriched uranium & its failure to follow through on expanding IAEA monitoring is grabbing headlines.
The 60% news is a positive step with limited value. No progress on monitoring is a real concern.
But there is more: 1/
-The May IAEA report said the agency completed its annual PIV (physical inventory verification). The Sept. 4 report said the results “found no indication of diversion of declared nuclear material.” This is particularly important because of the 83% particles detected at Fordow. 2/
Jun 15, 2023 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
Interesting points in this report:
"Iran would agree under a new pact... not to enrich uranium beyond its current production level of 60 percent purity."
Iran would also "expand its cooperation with international nuclear inspectors"
nytimes.com/2023/06/14/us/…
Agreeing not to enrich above 60 is good but, Iran knows the consequences of ratcheting up enrichment. It wouldn't be as beneficial as a commitment not to accumulate additional material enriched to 60%, which is what the Wall Street Journal reported. wsj.com/articles/u-s-l…
Mar 4, 2023 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
A few overarching observations from today's statement & presser from DG Grossi's trip to #Iran:
1. Any additional monitoring is a positive step that deescalates tensions & reduces the risk of miscalculation. 1/
The concrete announcement of a 50% increase in inspections at Fordow is significant, particularly given the short breakout & plans to increase capacity with IR-6s. More monitoring should provide greater assurance that breakout/experiments will be swiftly detected. 2/
Aug 23, 2022 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Let's talk about what this actually means for Iran's nuclear program:
-Iran will ship out/blend down more than 238 kg of 20% enriched uranium
-Iran will ship out/blend down more than 43 kg of 60% enriched uranium
-Iran will stop enrichment at Fordow & remove all uranium from the site
2/
Jun 14, 2022 • 19 tweets • 4 min read
The US may disagree with IAEA DG Grossi that efforts to restore the #IranDeal will be dealt a "fatal blow" in 3-4 weeks as a result of Iran's decision to unplug 27 cameras, but the agency's assessment is still significant in the domestic debate & could effect the INARA process 1/
If the IAEA cannot reliably reconstruct a history of Iran's nuclear activities during this period of reduced transparency, it will fuel speculation that Iran diverted nuclear materials for a covert weapons or hedging program. 2/
May 8, 2022 • 16 tweets • 6 min read
4 years ago today, former President Trump made the irresponsible decision to withdraw the US from the #IranDeal - an agreement that had proved to be effective & verifiable in blocking Iran's pathways to the bomb.
Lets examine how damaging that decision has turned out to be 1/
Trump withdrew despite members of his own cabinet acknowledging that Iran was complying with its obligations. He also isolated the US by leaving the deal over the objections of key US allies that view the nuclear deal as critical for their security. dw.com/en/frances-emm…
2/
Apr 26, 2022 • 18 tweets • 4 min read
Back from leave and disappointed to see that the future of the #IranDeal remains in limbo and so focused on the politics of modifying IRGC sanctions.
I'm surprised to see so little discussion about the nuclear cost Biden will pay if he fails to act. 1/
Lest we forget, the JCPOA is a nuclear deal. Designed to address a decades long nuclear crisis and block Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons. The imperative of restoring the deal's guardrails is getting lost in the debate about the political cost of delisting the IRGC. 2/
Sep 8, 2021 • 20 tweets • 5 min read
US Sec of State Blinken warned today that the US is getting "closer to the point at which a strict return to compliance with the #JCPOA does not reproduce the benefits that that agreement achieved"
That's not surprising given the bleak picture pained by the IAEA's new report 1/
The current IAEA monitoring situation is particularly serious. In addition to Iran's refusal to official clarify if the February 2021 special monitoring arrangement is still in place, Tehran has not responded to requests by the IAEA to access remote surveillance equipment. 2/
May 14, 2019 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
Today, both the NYT & Newsweek repeated claims that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons - it is irresponsible & dangerous reporting to let these claims stand unchecked. #IranDeal 1/
Both Pompeo & Bolton have muddied the water with loose rhetoric describing Iran’s nuclear program that implies Tehran has an active nuclear weapons program - despite US intelligence assessments and IAEA statements saying otherwise. 2/
May 21, 2018 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
US Secretary of State Pomepo is talking about the #IranDeal right now - c-span.org/networks/?chan…
Pompeo reiterates an often used criticism of the #IranDeal, namely that the agreement expires. This mischaracterization ignores key provisions that remain in place in perpetuity, such as more intrusive monitoring & a prohibition on weaponization activities
May 8, 2018 • 13 tweets • 5 min read
Ahead of Trump’s announcement on the #IranDeal - at which point he is expected to reimpose sanctions in violation of the agreement - it is worth recapping what nuclear agreement has accomplished & its nonproliferation value 1/
As a result of the 2013 interim deal, Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 20 percent was neutralized. The JCPOA prohibited enrichment to levels above 3.67 percent for 15 years 2/
