This feels like more theatrics from the AU, which from the start when Hemedti convinced Faki to demand a seat at the mediation table, has been subtly and not so subtly using its seat to rebalance talks to give added support to military-Islamist forces. This has imperiled the
credibility of the entire process. The fact that only the military and its supporters are truly lamenting the AU's withdrawal demonstrates this point.
No doubt there should be AU representation at the table, but what role exactly? Perhaps as part of a
"technical" track that seems to be emerging, but ultimately another influential political role would likely be looked at suspiciously by pro-democracy forces. Many continue to allege a quid pro quo between Hemedti and Faki, who need each other to advance their personal objectives
in both #Sudan and #Chad, respectively. The question outstanding is whether given that suspicion the AU can play any productive role in the resumption of talks? A more independent and respected figure, who isnt also Faki's chief of staff, would at least be a good start.
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Rumors from Doha that a final agreement between Chadian military government and politico-military groups about to be finalized along the lines of this version from last week. If true, this document seems to lay out some very significant steps forward for civilian rule. Notably:
➡️ A universal ceasefire/pledges by all sides to refrain from future combat/retaliation
➡️Creation of hybrid (government, armed actors, civil society) committee to oversee a comprehensive DDR program following the national dialogue
➡️ Passage of amnesty for all former combatants
And sets the agenda for the national dialogue:
➡️Reform of the army
➡️Forming a new transitional government with civilian PM
➡️Drafting new constitution and fundamental government/legislative reforms
➡️Creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Today's sanctions announcement by the US on #Sudan's Central Reserve Police is, on its face, a welcome, albeit long overdue announcement. It targets clearly one, but by no means all, of those security entities responsible for the violent crackdowns and home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…
killings of protesters since the Oct coup. While it is better late than never, its also too smart by half. First, it uses an existing authority under Global Magnitsky to target human rights abusers that could have been deployed months ago. It didnt need to take this long.
Second, by not being targeted against individuals, which could have been done under GloMag, the US has targeted an entire organization which will make any effort to deal with them or reform them at a future date that much harder. Third, by not targeting people at least closer to
.@USAID chief travels to #Sudan and #Ethiopia this week where she will celebrate the achievements in Sudan, their turn away from genocide and authoritarianism, and admonish Ethiopia for turning toward it. reuters.com/world/africa/u…
It is oddly reminiscent of a trip she took (with the current @USAmbUN) to the Central African Republic in 2013 as that country was being torn apart by genocidal violence. nytimes.com/2013/12/20/wor…
Even though she is in a new role now, where humanitarian access is her foremost priority in Ethiopia, where per @declanwalsh the government's "unofficial blockade" has kept more than 400k in famine conditions, I hope she raises the real risk of genocide. nytimes.com/2021/07/29/wor…
Cooler heads in Egypt and Sudan continue to prevail. But I would not be surprised if sometime soon a cyber attack on the GERD took it offline before power generation could begin. The world underestimated how regionally divisive the 2nd filling has been. aje.io/kqh3wt
To be clear, Im not advocating any effort to attack/disable the GERD, but the quiet from Sudan and Egypt since the 2nd filling doesnt mean they are letting it go quietly. Im deeply concerned that Ethiopia's unilateral action will beget more unilateral action by the other side.
Despite modest public statements from the UNSC, tensions are only mounting in the region and there is no serious attempt to address Sudanese or Egyptian concerns. I know from contacts there that they are scenario planning multiple responses. One contemplated is cyber.
It seems from the latest @UNOCHA report that the biggest challenge is not quantity of aid, but limited access due to fighting. But because Abiy declared victory 2 months ago in his law and order operation, he is clearly not admitting that he is still struggling militarily. And..
Continues to need Eritrean and Amhara forces to stay in the fight. Admitting that would be a humiliation. Admitting that fighting is as intense as it is in many areas is as well. But its clear that withdrawing outside forces wont be possible in the near term. As such..
Its becoming increasing clear to me that at a senior political level, Sudan's removal from the SST list is becoming bundled with the President's larger Middle East peace plan and securing normalized relations between as many Arab states and Israel as possible.
While it is true that #Sudan is moving forward on the explicit requirements (settling terror claims) and there is no explicit quid pro quo that Sudan normalize with Israel to be removed, the way Pompeo's visit to the region is being framed is as part of broader regional peace.
Moreover, the news that Sudan will be invited to a US-led, Gulf hosted Middle East peace conference suggests that it isnt enough that Sudan cast aside a dictator and got removed from the SST list, but that it also joined a US-organized Arab coalition of states friendly to Israel.