Both were visible supporters of the pro-democracy movement.
8/ Also infected? Individuals with little public profile, but who played an important support role in protests, or fundraising.
A picture emerges: a #Pegasus operator seeking detailed information about the protest movement... in some cases guided by non public information.
9/ Who is behind the hacking? We @citizenlab aren't making a conclusive attribution.
But it's worth nothing that we've seen #Pegasus operators with a #Thailand nexus since 2014.
And there's a lot of circumstantial evidence...
10/ When you read the @iLawFX & @DigitalReachSEA report, it's clear: the entity responsible for the hacking has a detailed & obsessive focus on voices calling for democracy and reform of the monarchy in #Thailand.
12/ This investigation only happened because victims came forward & participated.
#Pegasus can make people feel powerless about digital security, yet they acted to reclaim some agency & are now helping to shed light on the secret mechanics of repression.
It's deeply inspiring.
13/ Special thanks to the team at @AmnestyTech, which independently analyzed a sample of indicators in this case & confirmed Pegasus infections using their distinct tools and methods.
14/ This investigation was a team production, ranging from the incredible work done by our collaborators @iLawFX and @DigitalReachSEA, civil society groups that prefer to remain unnamed, and the @citizenlab team including👇
A "damaging" leak of tools from a five eyes exploit developer?
Concerning. We need to know what's under this rug.
Big picture: "trusted, vetted" private sector players offensive cyber are not immune to losing control of tooling... with national security consequences 1/
2/ If true, a tooling leak at boutique firm Trenchant wouldn't be the first time that exploits from commercial offensive vendors wind up... in the wrong place.
Many questions.
In the meantime. Remember when Russian APT29..was caught with exploits first used by NSO & Intellexa?
3/ There will always be a push for states to turn towards the private sector to meet offensive needs.
It's appealing. For some, it's very lucrative.
But in practice it brings unavoidable counterintelligence & national security downside risk that shouldn't be downplayed.
NOW: US court permanently bans Pegasus spyware maker from hacking WhatsApp.
NSO Group can't help their customers hack @WhatsApp, etc ether. Must delete exploits...
Bad news for NSO. Huge competitive disadvantage for the notorious company.
Big additional win for WhatsApp 1 /
2/ Although the massive punitive damages jury award against NSO Group ($167m) got reduced by the court, as is expected in cases where it is so large (to 9x compensatory damages)...
This is likely cold comfort to NSO since I think the injunction is going to have a huge impact on the value of NSO's spyware product.
Comes as NSO Group has been making noises about getting acquired by a US investor & some unnamed backers...
3/ NSO also emerges from the @WhatsApp v NSO case with just an absolute TON of their business splashed all over the court records..
NEW: fresh trouble for mercenary spyware companies like NSO Group.
@Apple launching substantial bounties on the zero-click exploits that feed the supply chain behind products like Pegasus & Paragon's Graphite.
With bonuses, exploit developers can hit $5 million payouts. 1/
2/ Apple is introducing Target Flags which speeds the process of getting exploits found & submitters rewarded.
This faster tempo is also a strike against the mercenary spyware ecosystem.
And the expanded categories also hit more widely against commercial surveillance vendors.
3/ If I contemplating investing in spyware companies I'd want to carefully evaluate whether their exploit pipeline can match what @apple just threw down.