One of the many issues I have with the #Yale paper on #sanctions effects is their take on Russian FX reserves, which the authors claim are "bleeding out fast". The chart is in dollars, the reserves are not. The dollar appreciated by 10%. You do the math! 🤷
Will use this thread for more minor issues in the #Yale paper. Not crucial, but corroborates overall impression:
- 725bcm is Russia's total, not Gazprom.
- gas dependency chart is based on secondary source (ING), not the latest Gazprom data.
- the 83% "Europe" includes Turkey.
For some reason, the #Yale paper claims that Power of Siberia was financed by China, while in fact it was fully financed by Gazprom. 🤔
Also, the dividend decision was basically a tax maneuver by the Russian government: Gazprom will pay a special tax that coincidedes with the planned record dividend. I couldn't find the "massive capital expenditures" in the linked CNBC (...?) article.
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Vorsicht mit diesen Theorien, die erzeugen ein falsches Gefühl der Sicherheit. Gazprom hat nach eigenen Angaben die Gasproduktion bereits massiv gedrosselt, um dieselbe Menge, die es bislang in die EU exportierte. Finanzielle Schäden sind für Putin offenbar kein Hinderungsgrund.
Man könnte auch fragen, warum Putin sich um die Wiederaufnahme der Produktion Gedanken machen sollte, wenn wir gleichzeitig (wie im Tweet zurecht gefordert) die Energiezusammenarbeit endgültig beenden. Rational wäre das nicht.
Nobody really knows if #NordStream1 goes back online, but the bigger picture is clear: #Russia is tightening the screws with a slow-motion gas cutoff. And Russia will have to continue to tighten: The European energy crisis is one of the few successes of #Putin in this war. 1/
The underlying motivation for #Putin for cutting off gas is only becoming stronger: 1.) The West's role in the Ukraine war is increasing. It may not have been crucial in the first phase, but it is important now, and over time, Ukraine will be fighting mostly with Western arms. 2/
Motivation 2.): #Russia will fall into a deep economic crisis towards the end of the year, the situation will be much worse than now, and Putin needs a crisis in the West for his propaganda to work with if he doesn't want to look weak. 3/
Right now, #Russia is close to its sweet spot in #gas trade with the EU: Volumes are small, putting pressure on the EU. But prices are so high, that revenues will still be more than enough, higher than in many previous years. And: #Gazprombank remains untouched by sanctions! 1/4
The immediate response to a full gas cut-off should be sanctions against the rest of Russia's banking system, particularly Gazprombank, freezing recently accumulated dollars/euros. This threat is one reason for Russia to keep SOME gas flowing: it's the bank's life insurance. 2/4
Unpopular right now, but: EU will eventually have to cut off the remaining gas imports from Russia itself if it doesn't want to allow Gazprom to remain at the current sweet spot forever. 3/4
Latest data on #Russia's federal budget in May: Oil and gas revenues decline, but still more than 2021 (nominal). Other revenue (VAT etc.) below 2021, despite 17.1% inflation. 1/
Contracting imports clearly visible in VAT statistic (dark blue = this year).
Unfortunately, Minfin will not publish detailed montly data on budget expenditure anymore. It is supposed to make it harder to impose #sanctions (but the only real rationale I see is hiding problems or spending on the war). 3/ rbc.ru/economics/14/0…