#Ukraine_Moldova: Zelensky has reiterated that one of the country's objectives is to become a guarantor of European energy security. Ukraine is ready to export electricity to the EU, after synchronization with ENTSO-E completed in March this year. Due to the Russian war,⤵️
the EU approved the union of Ukraine and Moldova before the initial schedule. This makes it possible to temporarily provide the two EU candidate states with electricity in the event of an emergency situation, such as gas cuts for power production. At such risk is Moldova,⤵️
which last year signed a contract with Russia, which both the ruling party and Sandu hailed as the best solution that offers cheaper gas (than that available on EU market). Since the gas flow through NS1 is reduced to 20%, the Moldovan side expects negative scenarios for⤵️
the supply through other gas pipelines, mainly through Ukraine. With the addition of Ukraine (minus Moldova) to the EU network, both parties are gaining more resilience, including Moldova.
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#Moldova_Romania: The country is looking for ways to buy gas from Romania as soon as possible through Iasi-Ungheni-Chisinau. This was one of the letmotives of President Sandu's visit to Bucharest. She suggested that the government wants to ensure gas supply security by⤵️
replacing Russian gas. However, the financial issue has not been discussed. Or, Moldova cannot afford the cheaper gas it now buys from Gazprom based on the price formula negotiated by the ruling party, and Sandu herself welcomed this. The Romanian side said⤵️
it will not leave Moldova alone, without indicating whether it would be ready to subsidize the gas price for future gas delivery to Moldova. Lowering Moldova's price would violate Romania's state aid law. In fact, this problem can be overcome if a political decision is taken.⤵️
#EU_Gas_Sanctions: France shares Germany's concerns about a total gas cut-off by Russia in the coming months. This seemed like an inevitable scenario more than 4 months ago, when Russia started the war against Ukraine. One of the main conditions that determined Moscow (long 🧵)⤵️
to initiate the aggression was precisely the situation in the gas market. More precisely, we are talking about the interplay between the huge structural dependence of the vast majority of EU states on Russian gas and the skyrocketing prices of energy sources throughout 2021. ⤵️
However, the EU's focus was mainly on the development of sanctions, including on energy, and not on a serious risk assessment with immediate preparations for the worst gas cut scenario. The assumption that Russia will not cut off gas supplies before the EU embargo will kick-off⤵️
#Ukraine_EU: The country needs about $5 billion a month to spend on defense and social spending. The EU has promised to deliver a billion euros or 9 times less than previously promised. Germany rejects the idea of lending money to Ukraine as part of EU joint bonds issued ⤵️
to obtain financing on int. markets for the post-COVID-19 recovery. The frugal features of Germany come to life (again). As winter approaches, others are likely to join the German opposition (Austria and the Netherlands are the usual suspects). Without German approval, the EU ⤵️
cannot lend money to Ukraine, which risks defaulting on $900 million in debts in the fall. Russia is waging a war of attrition in Ukraine on the ground and "at distance" against the EU, which has acknowledged that sanctions are hurting the European (not just Russian) economy.⤵️
#Ukraine_Germany: Zelensky's decision to remove Melnyk as ambassador to Germany indicates Kyiv's interest in strengthening political dialogue with Berlin. This makes even more sense now that Johnson is stepping down, which will inevitably draw the UK's attention to internal ⤵️
problems. However, inconvenient as Melnyk was, his direct approach, atypical for diplomacy, caused changes in the German public narrative on taboo topics related to Russia. After learning many painful lessons about its dependencies on Russia, Germany has no choice but to⤵️
quickly adapt to new geopolitical realities. This, among others, includes helping Ukrainians at home and abroad (about 800,000 refugees are hosted by Germany alone) and consolidating Ukraine’s defense ahead the approaching cold autumn-winter.
#Ukraine_Moldova_Georgia: The highest public support for EU membership is found in Ukraine and Georgia (>80%). In the former, the population has put EU integration at the heart of the defense war against Russian aggression. All interested parties are united around the central⤵️
authorities of Kyiv. Georgia has witnessed the largest demonstration in the last decade, which brought together 160,000 people, without any monopoly over the citizens’ mobilization by political parties (of which the majority face public mistrust, both in the ruling party⤵️
and in the opposition). Compared to the previous two, Moldova is in a different position: public simpathy for EU membership is below 60% and its public demonstration is heavily suppressed by the low popularity of the pro-EU government (around 25 % or half of support for the EU)⤵️
#EU_Russia: Borrell's statements about Lithuania's application of the sanctions regime sound disjointed and unconvincing in terms of preventing Russian pressure on Vilnius. He insists that Lithuania is applying EU sanctions (which is correct). They restrict the transport⤵️
to/from Kaliningrad of a very specific category of goods in transit through Lithuania. Borrell admitted that Vilnius has guidelines provided by the Commission, after consultations. After saying that, he suggests double-checking if the correct guidelines were given to Lithuania.⤵️
In addition, the head of EU diplomacy announced that he will double check the compatibility between sanctions and the law (probably hinting at the 2002 transit agreement with Russia). First, it is imperative that the EU see if there is any discrepancy between sanctions⤵️