Thread by @VolodyaTretyak

I found an exciting interview with the Ukrainian general Kryvonos. He answered many questions that have tormented me for many months: quickly occupied south, preparation for the war, UA casualties, and more.

Mark Solonin published the interview on his YouTube channel on 29.07. I will post it in a few threads. Please follow me so as not to miss the next translation :)

My translation:

Question:
"Generally speaking, it appears to ordinary people that the military leadership of the country, roughly speaking, overslept the beginning of the war. Is that wrong or what?"

Gen. Kryvonos:
"Let's get this straight: the country's military-political leadership (overslept the beginning - remark). The military clearly knew that there would be a Russian attack plus or minus, tying in specific timelines to within two to three days.

But, precisely 72 hours before the war started, there was a 100% certainty there would be a war. Plus-minus, understanding in which directions the offensive would be. So you are absolutely right. Did the word oversleep, or did they pretend to oversleep the offensive?

That's the question. I think someone else will have to tell you eventually. Why didn't they respond at all to warnings from not only Western partners? Western partners have been warning us since the fall of 2021.

In the spring of 2020, I told from where and how the Russians would attack. And in principle, it all coincided 100% told us how the offensive would come, specifically, named the targets that Russian troops would be interested in.

And our colleagues from Western countries were telling us more clearly. In January, some Americans of the extremely high level came, and right on the maps, they were telling us what would happen and how.

But the political leadership said it was all lies, nonsense, and provocations. Why? Well, because the pro-Russian agents are probably in the president's office.
There's no other way to justify this. To say that they didn't know. That's an outright lie.

Ukrainian and foreign intelligence agencies officially reported to the leadership about the Russian offensive."

Interviewer:
"One thing is a military analysis by a professional, and it is another thing to know that such plans are written in the headquarters in Moscow.

If I understood you correctly, it was a piece of specific information about the actions of the Russian command."

Gen. Kryvonos:
"Of course. And we have informants."

Interviewer:
"Well, I'm not asking for last names."

Gen. Kryvonos:
"Well, no, but no one has forgotten them. Nevertheless, at a high level, there were these reports.

And very often, there were such examples when officers of the Russian General Staff, generals of the Russian General Staff called their classmates, friends, and brothers who were serving here and warned that in 24 hours, Russia would attack.

"And there in 72 hours, we will attack", for example. There was just no reaction. The people, who got the information from us, immediately reported upstairs, saying don't panic, don't tell tales, everything will be ok."

Interviewer:
"Terrific. Practically concluding this block of questions, I once heard from many people, whom I am not authorized to name, that the Ukrainian air force was dispersed and moved to previously prepared, fielded airfields on the eve of strikes and so on.

As a result, what should have been, according to Russian plans, a command, first destroying strike against Ukrainian aviation, went through almost empty places. Why didn't we notice any of that if that's the case?

As I recall, there was also no deployment of Ukrainian ground troops on the night of 02.24. Or didn't I see something I was not supposed to see?"

Gen Kryvonos:
"Well, most likely the second option. You didn't see the actions of certain military personnel. You have to give credit that the air force command reacted clearly, regardless of any questions.

And to disperse, planes and helicopters moved even within their airfields. And in principle, very often, in the first 24 hours, Russian missiles were hollowed out. The same was true for most of the ground forces.

Although there were examples when the flights were relatively trivial, one of the examples was when the command of the special operations forces, despite their subordinates' demands and requests, the commander did not decide to move the base and the principle.

On the morning of the 24th, Russian missiles hit the special operations forces command building. There were casualties; although there were warnings about it, there was no reaction.

It is elementary unprofessionalism and an elementary thing that a person was unable or was afraid to take the decision.

Unfortunately, it happens because sometimes, the formation of command staff in certain branches of the armed forces, especially in the last two years, is done by selecting people who are silent and committed to something personal and who have their own opinion."

The following translation will examine why RU forces occupied southern Ukraine so quickly. Later I will post the translation to @wartranslated

Please like, retweet, and follow :)

end

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The thread of all questions is pinned in my profile. I update it every day.

The second part is live:

https://twitter.com/VolodyaTretyak/status/1553419931894648832?s=20&t=ekrH6Y0lJASR3eL1RqSaGg