Thread by @VolodyaTretyak

PART 4 of the interview with gen. Kryvonos made by Mark Solonin and translated by me.
Topic: withdrawal of RU forces from Kyiv.

original video:


The full text is also available at @wartranslated: wartranslated.com/big-interview-…

Here is also a thread of different parts of the interview. I have added some information about Kryvonos' background and views, as there are many questions about those.

https://twitter.com/VolodyaTretyak/status/1553422810424524804?s=20&t=LMn0c8tRFqScdq68AzCK6A

/1

Translation:
(I): Okay, we're done with the beginning of the war, and we go straight to the conclusion of the first phase, which is the end of March. /2

The enemy withdrew and liberated significant, vast areas of territory north of Kyiv, the Chernihiv region, and the north-northeast of the country. So there are all sorts of opinions on this. /3

Excuse me, I believe it was still an organized retreat, not a retreat under the blows of the pursuing Ukrainian troops. Do I understand the situation correctly? And why were they allowed to leave quietly if that is the case? /4

Although another component is just as important: Why did they go?
(K): Well, let's start with the word "why". /5

RU forces bogged down in the battles in the Kyiv direction; thanks to the AFU and their persistence, Russians had already lost the offensive initiative and were partially exhausted. Our army just fought for every meter of land on the outskirts of Kyiv. /6

Russians realized that they did not have enough forces and means to blockade Kyiv. Their logistics system was never really created. /7

The Russians decided that it was better to shift their efforts and move those troops that were still there, that were not demoralized yet, to other directions, including Kharkiv and Donetsk. /8

So it was decided that, given Mr. Putin's appetites, it was impossible to be satisfied with one coverage. /9

That is, Russia's mouth turned out to be too small for big Ukraine, so they decided to bite off Ukraine in pieces, not to swallow it whole, as it was initially, according to the plans of the Russian General Staff, according to Putin's decision. /10

So they organized a retreat from the Kyiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv regions. Where the Ukrainian armed forces could, they hit the advancing Russian troops. /11

But the problem is that the Ukrainian armed forces had severe shell hunger from the end of March - early April 2014 (probably K. means 2022 – remark).

(I): Already at the end of March? /12

(K): I'll put it this way, even as early as the middle of March, it was this hunger; it was pretty severe. /13

Although many spoke, including me, warned that by the experience of the Armenian-Azerbaijani war, when Azerbaijan, with all its enormous financial resources, faced shell hunger on the 35th day of the war. /14

In Ukraine, it started much earlier because of not building and not creating a powerful ammunition factory in Ukraine. On my understanding, there had to be several of them. We found ourselves in such a strange time of need. We knew the intelligence was working great. /15

We just received a considerable amount from our informants from the territory of Ukraine, a vast amount we transferred to the senior intelligence agencies, who reported it in time and laid it out. And accordingly, the commander in chief gen. Zalyzhnyi made clear decisions. /16

But when you have 100 targets and only 20 shells to destroy targets, you can't do it. So you can't jump over your capabilities no matter how great a general you are. The desire is there, but the abilities don't allow it. So that is one of the problems why it didn't happen. /17

Because there were no means of reliably large numbers of means, of defeat, and of providing those means of loss, there would have been projectiles; there would have been artillery systems, and it would have been different. /18

These forces would hardly have reached the Russian-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Belarusian border by now.
That's the first thing. /19

The second: In 2012 and 2013, at the expense of diversion, properly organized by the Russian secret services, the armed forces, at the behest of the country's leadership, shot hundreds of thousands of artillery shells every day. Simply into the void. /20

Under the guise of utilization. What did it lead to?

(I): Hundreds of thousands?

(K): Yes, per day, at all the ranges.

(I): The barrels can't take that kind of fire.

(K): Right. On all the ranges. I remember those morning reports well, "How many shells we shoot". /21

So, if you put it together, it was like firing, like machine gun belts. It led to just extreme wear and tore on our resources, our artillery pieces. And a tremendous amount of rockets and rocket systems were shot, too. /22

So we started to feel already in 2014 because the accuracy of the artillery systems was very much in question. But so far, there has been no investigation in this direction, even though it was clear two years later. Why? /23

Because those who decided to conduct such actions were participants in the process and are still in certain positions of power, raising this issue is highly uncomfortable for many politicians and military still on Ukraine's territory. /24

But this is precisely what I call a super, properly organized sabotage. I assess it as a military man. I understand how well Russian agents worked it out. Unfortunately, they did. /25

Therefore: We knew we could have, we had information, but we had nothing to shoot and nowhere to shoot (regarding the retreat from Kyiv – remark). /26

The following thread will be about the battle for Donbas: Why did the enemy advance? How high were the UA casualties?
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end /27

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