Thread by @C_M_Dougherty

Where does the war in Ukraine go from here? What are the prospects for a Ukrainian counter-offensive? A long-ish Tuesday thread. 1/23

I spoke with @ReidStan of @RFERL about these topics here: rferl.org/a/pentagon-chr… 2/23

And with @DanMichaelsWSJ of the @WSJ here:
wsj.com/articles/war-u… 3/23

Before assessing where the war's going, we need to know where it is today after ~5 months. As always, drawing on the outstanding work of @KofmanMichael, @MassDara, @TheStudyofWar, @JominiW, @SamBendett, @WarintheFuture, @Jack_Watling, et al., & frontline reporters. 4/23

Combat ops have slowed over the last ~month since Russia seized Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. This pause is likely due to 2 factors. 1) HIMARS disrupting Russian logistics & C2; and 2) Russia culminating due to casualties & munitions expenditures. 5/23

Focus has been on HIMARS, but point 2 is key to understand prospects for UKR offensive: offensives require lots of people, vehicles, and stuff at the front and in reserve. Neither side has enough now to break through lines and exploit. More attrition, less maneuver. 6/23

This dynamic won't change soon. Both sides have suffered heavy losses, esp. to their best forces, though exact numbers are hard to come by. economist.com/europe/2022/07… 7/23

Ukraine has growing stocks of advanced western weapons and, per reports from the field and intelligence leaders like the head of Britain's MI6, a significant advantage in morale.
washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/… 8/23

Russia, however, has deeper reserves of manpower and materiel, and per @MassDara, has retained/recruited better than expected under the circumstances.

https://twitter.com/MassDara/status/1549481870089396225

9/23

The strategic/political levels tell a similar story of two combatants under strain. Ukraine's gov't has held together under Pres. Zelensky, but cracks are showing with the recent firing of 2 top officials, including the head of internal security. reuters.com/world/europe/u… 10/23

Ukraine also faces pressure from the dependence of some of its key allies on Russian energy, and esp. natural gas. Winter is coming, and people in those states will need gas to heat their homes. Will Ukraine's allies stand strong when Russia cuts them off? 11/23

Russia's economy is groaning under the weight of sanctions and embargoes. It has even been forced to turn to *noted arms manufacturer* Iran to replenish its stock of military drones.

https://twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1546820367624404992

12/23

Politically, Russia seems relatively stable, but autocracies can often seem relatively stable right up until the point that they become drastically unstable. Putin and the ruling clique likely feel pressure, but how much and what kind is hard to say. 13/23

Operationally and strategically, the war appears to be a stalemate. Current trends seem to be pulling in opposite directions, creating a complex picture of where the war is headed and which side time favors. 14/23

Desire to break this stalemate has shifted UKR focus south to retake Kherson and pushed them to ask for more western weapons including longer-range ATACMS missiles for their HIMARS and GMLRS launchers. 15/23

Can UKR retake Kherson? Likely yes, but the real question is how. If the assault looks like Russia's attack on Severodonetsk, it's probably a dead end. It will cost UKR dearly in scarce manpower and materiel, & would likely be the last major UKR operation of 2022. 16/23

Urban operations of the size needed to take Kherson have an unquenchable thirst for forces. Instead, UKR could use fires & maneuver to isolate Kherson (on the far left of Russia's line), then rely on irregulars, fires, and lack of resupply to wither Russia's defense. 17/23

The downside to this approach is that isolating the city also isolates the civilians living there. The Russians will know this and have little compunction about using them as hostages, human shields, or worse. There are no easy answers here. 18/23

If an offensive is likely to be bloody and costly, why launch it? Why not wait for more Western aid and training? The answer likely lies in the strategic tension between political pressures and military logic. 19/23

Tension between political & military leaders is an old trope. "The politicians don't understand military reality!" "The generals don't understand politics!" These tropes are old because there are truths within them. 20/23

UKR pol. leaders likely want a victory before winter to sustain internal and external support. Even if that victory comes at high cost and runs counter to western military advice to wait until spring of 2023, when UKR forces will be better trained & equipped. 21/23

In this case, both political & military leaders can be "right" b/c they're working from very different assumptions about what drives success in war. In this case, the political imperative to sustain UKR's western lifeline wins the argument, as it should. 22/23

What can the US/NATO and western allies do to ensure UKR success now and over the longer course of the war? More weapons? Different weapons (like ATACMS)? That will be the topic of tomorrow's thread. 23/