If I rated Senate races by *margin* instead of probability over @SplitTicket_, I'd probably have #FLSen at likely R because I don't think Rubio wins by much more than low double digits at most, and it could get to mid-single digits.
@SplitTicket_ Florida is not really considered a battleground state this year by anyone serious. DeSantis is exceedingly likely to win, and Rubio is probably even more likely to win than DeSantis is. Demings is a great candidate, but this is not the right year or matchup for her. Safe R.
@SplitTicket_ Also, the notion of rating Senate seats by margin never really made sense to me personally, because you try to quantify the likelihood it flips. Tossup/Lean/Likely/Safe are really just probability buckets on the odds of a seat going in a certain direction.
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As someone who lives in the Bay Area, something extremely disconcerting about JD Vance is that he's running a campaign using the type of rhetoric that people in San Francisco think appeals to people in Ohio.
It's weird. If you ask a lot of elites in SF what they think about Ohio or Indiana, you'll probably get a whole ton of stereotypes about the place being the northern equivalent of Alabama. They absolutely *despise* them, look down on it, and view them as backwards wastelands.
Now ask those people what you'd need to appeal to voters in Ohio. They'll probably come up with random stuff about needing to sound very racist and having to use regressive rhetoric on women's rights, abortion, and LGBTQ policies.
This is almost certainly because Ryan has spent more than Vance has, as the article notes, but one thing of note for Ryan is being close to 50 in a state like Ohio, where white undecideds usually break disproportionately Republican.
It is also important to note that it is a Ryan internal, and that we haven’t really gotten a public R internal to counter it; with that said, the NRSC and GOP groups wouldn’t be buying ads and leaking if they didn’t also find it currently close in their polling.
Why is it a surprise to so many people On Here that a position that is clearly split along partisan lines and polls underwater nationally by over 15 points might possibly actually have some real, negative effect against the party supporting the unpopular position?
the baseline isn't a D+4 environment, the baseline with a 39% approval rating for Biden is an R+7. If Democrats manage to limit their losses to even an R+2 year, that'd be huge for them and fairly disappointing for Republicans -- makes the Senate a tossup and the House narrowly R
(once again, this isn't the #bluewave nonsense I see on here from others, but margins matter a lot and this is an issue that seems to be moving it ~3 points towards Democrats on margin, depending on who you ask)
Extremely early, but there are some very good signs for the "No"/pro-choice vote in the Kansas abortion referendum's early vote. In polling, Kansas usually very narrowly leans in favor of abortion restrictions, so if this fails, it's a pretty big hit against the GOP position.
One thing to see is how counties vote compared to the benchmarks @BruneElections has assembled. In basically every county, "No" is blowing the doors off in the EV. E-day is far more GOP, but these margins make it a tougher climb for "Yes" right now.
But *with that said*, the KS Secretary of State is reporting that turnout may be at 50%, which would be mind-blowing. If that's the case, we've only seen a small fraction of the votes so far. So while there are good early signs, it's critical to wait, because things could shift.
Both parties have some big red flags for them in the electorate. But maybe the biggest one for Republicans is that they're losing young voters by historic margins, and it's not clear that they'll magically become GOP-leaning with time.
@SplitTicket_ Is it normal for young voters to be this Democratic? The short answer: no. The long answer: absolutely not.
This is, quite simply, the strongest sustained period of age polarization we have seen in the electorate in the last fifty years. It is not at all normal.
@SplitTicket_ The average shift is for a cohort to become ~7 points more Republican over twenty four years, as irregular voters become more regular. That's not nearly enough to wipe out a D+20 youth margin. At some point, Rs either have to win young voters or massively flip millennials/gen-z
Huge GOP margins with the white working-class, a big Hispanic swing right, and drama over the winner.
We’re talking about the 2000 election, not 2020. From me and @HWLavelleMaps for @SplitTicket_, here’s a detailed look back, with demographic estimates.
@HWLavelleMaps@SplitTicket_ Data on this election is very, very hard to find compared to 2020. After searching through a lot of old books and archived websites, we were able to scrape together demographic estimates from VNS/Roper exit polls. They are not perfect, but they do provide a nice rough picture.
@HWLavelleMaps@SplitTicket_ 2000 was likely the first election in the modern era which white non-college voters, a traditionally Democratic demographic, voted to the right of the usually Republican white college-educated voters. This trend would only accelerate over the next 20 years.