As I read China's #Taiwan policy white paper's full text, confusion sets in -- it's unclear on relationship between 'unification' and 'national rejuvenation' (NR)
Is unification a #precondition to achieving NR? Or will China #demand/compel unification at all costs only after NR?
Two key statements on this sound a bit circular. English version:
1. "Complete Reunification Is Critical to National Rejuvenation"
2. "The Taiwan question arose as a result of weakness and chaos in our nation, and it will be resolved as national rejuvenation becomes a reality."
In 2021-January, 57% of Taiwanese had faith that US would intervene militarily in a war.
By late March 2022 (i.e. after Ukraine), only #30% had faith. That's a 27% decrease, or almost half. /2
Now latest CAPOR poll published this Monday via United Daily News shows -- 48.5% of Taiwanese now have faith in US willingness to intervene militarily.
China issues a new Taiwan policy white paper today.
Mix of patience and confidence.
1. High bar for using force: "Use of force would be the last resort -- taken under #compelling circumstances".
2. Accommodation: "We are ready to create vast space for peaceful reunification".
3. Confidence: "Never before have we been so close to, confident in, and capable of -- achieving the goal of national rejuvenation. The same is true when it comes to our goal of complete national reunification."
2. 'Catfish effect':
Even multilateral vehicles like @ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting - which had largely refrained from critical commentaries on China-Taiwan relations - was spurred into issuing a statement of concern on 8/3, and further 'internationalizes' Taiwan issue. /3
A short thread on China's #rhetoric on @SpeakerPelosi's rumored plan to visit Taiwan. So far Beijing's wording has been far below the threshold of the kinds of words & phrases that China historically used for signaling impending war/brinkmanship. /1
@SpeakerPelosi Let's start with MFA spokesperson's recent words: "China will act strongly to resolutely respond to it and take countermeasures. We mean what we say" (中方必將採取有力措施予以堅決應對和反制。我們說到做到) /2
Many observers take 'forceful response' to mean war. That may be overselling it.
Note his key operative words '有力' can mean 'forceful' or 'effective'. If they meant war, they would have said '武力 or 非和平' (military/non-peaceful measures). /3
State of Taiwan's Nov 2022 #midterms: the ruling DPP is facing an uphill battle.
There are 22 cities up for grabs. Of which the DPP is only consistently leading in 4. It's either neck-and-neck or losing in the rest....
Repeat: 4/22. The DPP currently governs 7.🧵
This picture will of course change as the campaign goes on, and we need more & better polls, especially on less populous cities that get overlooked by pollsters. /2
But let's not fall for the simple narrative that because: 1) the DPP controls the presidency & legislature, 2) it's done well with recent referenda, and 3) KMT's party identification is in the nadir... /3
#Ukraine crisis demonstrates that intense Western military aid and economic sanctions, can make a difference, even in conflicts involving a military great power.
This will impact future discussions about US posture of ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ on #Taiwan. /1
Recent discussion focuses on diminishing US military superiority vis-à-vis China in the Indo-Pacific, and how US must therefore move towards ‘Strategic Clarity’ in order to boost deterrence. /2
Assuming Ukraine holds, if even indirect Western intervention proves sufficient to help hold off a great power invasion, then it will make Beijing think twice about military adventurism. /3