As we know, @LiquityProtocol allows users to borrow $LUSD (with $ETH collateral) for a one time borrow fee (no accruing interest!)…
But how exactly is this borrow fee % derived?
How does it react to $LUSD peg fluctuations?
Let’s dive in 🧵👇
Currently, if I were to mint/redeem $LUSD, I would be charged a .5% borrow/redemption fee.
(Smallest fee possible, and will likely be .5% the majority of the time, especially during times of mkt volatility/depeg to the upside)
However, the fee CAN alter if LUSD slips below $1…
Here’s how it works:
If LUSD <1, users will swap for LUSD in LPs -> arb by redeeming LUSD for 1$ worth of ETH collateral from the trove/s with the lowest C-ratio/s whilst paying their LUSD debt off -> LUSD price⬆️ + trove C-ratios⬆️ + borrow/redemption fee⬆️
a. Troves with low C-ratios run the risk of being redeemed against (not ideal to lose $ETH collateral), thus incentivizing borrowers to top up their troves by swapping back into LUSD -> repaying debt (naturally $LUSD price ⬆️)
b. Base redemption fee of .5% disincentivizes redemptions above 99.5c, + fee scales the bigger the redemption
Redeeming is temp more expensive after redemptions to prevent low-collat borrowers from being redeemed against, yet not expensive enough in the event of a mass depeg
d. Opening troves will subsequently be more expensive (higher borrow fee), disincentivizing new $LUSD entering circulation during times of distress
So how exactly ARE borrow/redemption fees calculated? (After redemptions occur)
As we know, our redemption fee equation of (baseRate + 0.5%) * ETHdrawn is directly proportionate to the amnt of LUSD redeemed vs total supply
(which in turn proportionally increases the borrow fee)
However, max borrow fee can scale up to 5%, while redemption fees can go as high as a min 50% for redeeming 100% of the supply, decaying exponentially (half life of 12hrs) back to the .5% floor based on time since last fee event.
Here’s our formula:
b(t) := b(t-1) + 𝛼 * m/n
b(t) = baserate at time t (aka what will the baserate be?)
b(t-1) = baserate at time before t
𝛼 = constant parameter, set to .5 to optimally control $LUSD price floor
m = amount of LUSD being redeemed
n = $LUSD current supply
Time for an example!
Let’s say a user wants to swap for 10k depegged $LUSD ($.95) through an LP -> redeem (to burn the redeemed LUSD out of circ -> LUSD price ⬆️, in exchange for ETH collateral), given the current total LUSD supply is 1m LUSD + previous rate was .5% (floor)…
How much will it cost him to do so? (Redemption fee)
How much will the borrow fee alter?
Our equation becomes:
New rate = previous rate + 𝛼 × (amount of LUSD being redeemed / current LUSD supply)
New rate = .5% + .5 × (10k/1m)
.005 + .5 × .01
.005 + .005
New rate = .01 -> 1%
1% -> new redemption fee
Once the 10k $LUSD is redeemed for 9.9k worth of $ETH (10k * 1% redemption fee), borrow/redemption fee rates will rise to 1%.
$LUSD goes from 1m to a 990k total supply, effectively raising LUSD price to $.9595.
(.95*1m = 950k/990k (10k redeemed) -> .9595)
How abt a current example?
Currently, $LUSD has a total supply of 181m. (Obvs with a .5% borrow fee given $LUSD’s movement above peg these past few months due to mkt conditions)
If I wanted to redeem 1m $LUSD, how much will I be charged?
b(t)= .005 + .5 × (1m/181m)
.005 + .5 × .00552
.005 + .00276
.00776 -> .776% redemption fee! (thus borrow fee)
(And who gets these #RealYield borrow/redemption fees?
You guessed it — $LQTY stakers!)
(Note: this obviously wouldn’t happen now given LUSD is currently trading at $1.01)
If you’re interested in learning more about Liquity (extensive deep dive on the ins and outs of Liquity + how to navigate the UI), check out the linked threads below!
As you can see below, the VP per $vlAURA (veBAL price × veBAL/vlAURA ratio) is/has been HEAVILY more valuable relative to AURA mkt price.
(avg of $5.61 worth of VP vs $2.14 mkt price)
Since protocols ONLY want the underlying $vlAURA voting power to incentivize their pools with $BAL emissions, this large deviation has resulted in juicy bribes to $vlAURA holders, or a smaller “discount” for protocols relative to $AURA price.
“But Barry, even without Velodromes $OP incentive-bribes, trading fees alone will be able to incentivize these pools”
Here’s why this isn’t true🧵👇
Picture this…
Currently, OP/USDC and WETH/USDC pairs are paying 60% and 44% APR in trading fees to respective veVELO voters + no more OP bribe incentives (current OP volumes/fees unsustainable but whatever).
Other smaller pools are barely yielding trading fees (this is currently, as you can see below) + no more OP bribes -> waaay less voters for said pairs (Bribe 2 = actual protocol bribes)
Bc of this, most votes go to the OP/USDC and OP/WETH pools to earn the trading fees ->…
Seeing a lot of ppl wanting to swap their stables to $LUSD (given current regulation concerns), but don’t want to swap at it’s current mkt price premium (1.05$)…
Here’s a simple guide to minting your own $LUSD (for 1$!) 🧵👇
SAFELY lending/borrowing ANY asset with extreme composability…
Saving borrowers THOUSANDS of dollars in liquidation fees…
Say hello to @eulerfinance — THE next generation of capital efficient money markets 🧵👇
You’re probably wondering, how can “lending/borrowing with ANY asset” and “safe” be used in the same sentence?
After all, didn’t we learn from our mistakes with other certain permissionless money markets?
We’ve all seen the volatile collateral with high LTV ratios+low liquidity->(potential attacks)-> liquidations occur->collateral sold on mkt (high slippage)->further price dump ->liquidations not profitable ->platform bad debt accrual…