Some notes about #ISWAP, #JASDJ#BokoHaram. Mamman Nur & Habib Yusuf broke away from Abubakar Shekau in 2016 with a strong reform agenda. I think it can be summed up as a rationalisation / bureaucratisation of jihad. Just one example of this: penal reform. A thread...
Shekau was famous for the spectacular violence he visited upon people he deemed criminals (adulterers, thieves, drugs dealers and users). Executions, chopping hands and feet, brutal flogging… He and his men made shows of this, for the education of the masses.
There, we are squarely in the realm of the spectacle of extreme violence: brutal, but intermittent. The ruthless affirmation of sovereignty and quest for purity.
Though of course every once in a while they'd be embarrassed when a buddy of Shekau had been doing some plundering of his own. It was never clear why some were punished and others were not.
This created a lot of tensions within the organisation, feeding the 2016 divide.
Nur and Yusuf came with a very different take, proposing a change that is eerily close to Michel Foucault’s distinction between punishment and discipline… Nur and Yusuf came with a thorough reform of the prison system.
They created new prisons, they renovated others, replaced the cramped mud-houses by large metal cages with zinc roofing (I think I saw pics of one in media accounts of the Nigerian Army’s 2022 offensive).
They banned corporal punishment. They developed a standardised feeding system. I suspect they were the ones who introduced prison registries to keep track of detainees and terms.
Jail terms replaced a lot of the brutal punishments Shekau favoured. The no public executions dropped, though some still took place, with or without Nur's and Yusuf's knowledge & authorisation. Some people have also told me of discrete assassinations of major internal critics.
But for usual crime, Nur and Yusuf insisted that people be given a second and third chance. And jail terms became part of that more subtle, more forgiving, economy of punishment which they promoted.
Of course, the situation in ISWAP’s reformed jails did not become great – former detainees are clear this tough. But the intention was clear enough. The intent was to govern more precisely, more sparingly.
They realised that Shekau's quick kills, often hastily decided, created a lot of rancor. There was a famous episode in Bama when young fighters had been executed for marrying without authorisation their sweethearts who had captured by the group.
That episode created a huge controversy within the group, and the chief qadi of JASDJ eventually apologised for it. It was one of those defining moments when some militants began thinking Shekau was bad.
And so ISWAP has learnt from that, probably with the help of the IS, which may well have done its own soul-searching on this since the downfall of the Caliphate.
Amazingly, I even heard recently that the IS was calling into question the 2018 execution of Mamman Nur - Nur was accused of being in touch with the government and having received money, no less. But his death was still seen as having created too many problems.
The politics of mercy...
Sorry for the typos and stuff. Bear with me.
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I want to add to the praise showered upon @ankaboy for his @BBC documentary on banditry in the NW of #Nigeria. And maybe I can do it by highlighting the takeaways.... a thread.
It is a topic whose coverage is in inverse relation to its importance, because it is a dangerous place to report about... & also because the conversation is filled with all sorts of communal biases and political sensitivities.
Anka does a remarkable job to give a fair, balanced account. To those who are obsessed by the supposed grand battle between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, he documents how Muslim-on-Muslim violence is massive.
First of all, if I am correct, the conflict was opposing certain Fulani bandits and a Muslim farming community from another ethnic group... Highlighting this for those who seem to only notice Muslim on Christian violence...
Second, the insistence (apparently correct) that the Fulani in question are locals, autochthons, reveals that indeed autochthony and the rights attached to it are at stake here.
Hearing about #JASDJ#BokoHaram used to designate not only Islamic courts to implement sharia law, but also a level down, mediators who would try to resolve local conflicts before they were taken to the courts...
As @AdamBaczko and others have shown, part of the edge that territorialised jihadi organisations can have is their capacity to provide cheap and relatively efficient and credible governance.
Yes, #JASDJ and other jihadi structures have not shied from implementing and demonstrating gruesome and gory huddud punishments... But under that, there has been a lot more going on, an attempt to address discrete daily conflicts.
Hearing of a spectular hike in #Iswap's taxation of fish on parts of Lake Chad. Used to be 3,000 nairas for a carton with a market value of 90,000. Now 30,000.
And the market war goes on. Recent military ops against a fish market near the Lake. Goods destroyed. Some civilians killed. But of course, the business has resumed. Civilians cant do without.
The taxation of cattle stays the same - 1/30 of the herd every year. Since that rate is an Islamic prescription, perhaps it's difficult to change for a moment that claims to adhere to Islamic principles...
Thanks to @YGuichaoua, I am reading a thoughtful old-ish piece by @hxhassan on the deglobalisation of jihad… Some thoughts and comments, with special reference to sub-Saharan Africa… newlinesmag.com/argument/what-…
Hassan argues Global War on Terror has been good at one thing: making it clear that global jihad was a losing game. And so the Taliban & Jabhat al Nosra have veered away from global jihad. They have refocused on local goals & fights. They have abstained from targeting the West.
Hassan does not put it like this, but it’s the old Stalin/Trotsky thing all over again. Revolution in one country wins. Always. Global revolutionary zeal is just non-politic, prophetic nonsense. Bureaucrats, local guys, managers know that, and in the end, they prevail.
Sur la question de la Casamance et de l'écriture de l'histoire officielle au Sénégal, un exemple intéressant, par un historien dont les sympathies sont évidentes... senego.com/burok-ziguinch…
Nota bene: le papier reproche à Ousmane Sonko de promouvoir une histoire sénégalaise plutôt que casamançaise... De fait, Sonko est dans un rapport compliqué et prudent à la question casamançaise.
Il est de père diola, mais c'est évidemment un Sénégalais (un "Sénégalais de synthèse", comme dirait Macky Sall), né au Nord de parents fonctionnaires d'Etat (dont une mère "nordiste").