"don" comes from the Chechen дуй хьуна? (dui hwuna)
First: хьуна is the dative form of the second person singular, i.e., "to you." Literary Chechen has eight cases: nominative, genitive, dative, ergative, instrumental, substantive, comparative, and locative...
The nominative, dative, and ergative can all be subjects of a Chechen verb. Ergativity is a widespread feature of indigenous languages of the Caucasus.
Essentially, if a Chechen verb doesn't take a direct object (intransitive), the subject will be in the nom. If it does take an DO (transitive), the subject will be in the ergative case, and the direct object in the "nominative." More on ergativity here: medium.com/@jalechner/com…
Now let's look at дуй
Depending how you count, Chechen has six noun classes. Only two reflect gender in the Indo-European sense. We use ду to denote them
The combination of noun class and ergative verb structure makes Chechen particularly difficult for foreigners. Verbs often agree with noun class: in intransitive sentences with the nom., in transitive sentences with the direct object. Click on photo for example
The default noun class is ду. It is used when a noun is not specified, often as an implied "it."
The particle -й makes the sentence a question...
So дуй хьуна? Means "is it not to you?" Probably something close to "ain't it?" or innit?
In natural speech, dui hwuna becomes closer to dohwun or doʔun... which gets transliterated as "don"!
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One more thing I'd like to add on the #Wagner discourse in #Niger. The events in Niamey are, I think, a culmination of an increasingly polarized geopolitical environment combined with the arrival of new security partners for African governments (1/n)
What I don't think gets a lot of attention is how narrow the structure of the international system is for African political entrepreneurs: i.e., African governments, political opposition, armed groups etc. (2/n)
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Let me say before, I am not an expert on Niger, on Nigerien politics, or what is going on Niamey. I do know, however, a bit about how #Wagner views its operations in Africa and that's the perspective I'm coming from (2/n)
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Whether a national government partners with Russian PMCs is based almost entirely on local security priorities. Russian PMCs as a potential partner are simply the latest among of slate of potential intervenors (West, particularly France, UN). (2/n)
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Some close to the matter told me it's nonsense; the US made no such demand. If true it's a terrible deal and a non-starter. Replacing Russian PMCs with "training" and support for peacekeepers would be regime suicide for Touadera, armed groups would quickly be at Bangui (3/n)
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